In 1625 Christian IV, king of Denmark and Norway (ruled 1588-1648), entered the war in Lower Saxony as leader of the Protestants. This intervention in the Thirty Years? War during the years 1625 to 1629, the so-called "Danish War", created new tension in the centuries-old rivalry for supremacy in Scandinavia between Denmark-Norway and Sweden-Finland. Christian IV lost the conflict, and the Peace of Lübeck in 1629 was the beginning of a series of defeats which sealed Denmark?s decline into a minor power. Gustavus II Adolphus of Sweden inherited Christian IV?s role as leader of the Protestants. The military victories of Gustavus Adolphus on the continent established Swedish domination throughout the Baltic Sea, which held sway until the Great Northern War brought it to an end in 1720 and Peter the Great?s Russia began to upset the balance of power. Seen from the present, these developments might appear in some sense inevitable, but in 1625 the final outcome was far from clear. At the time Denmark-Norway was considered the undisputed supreme power in Scandinavia. This raises three questions that are to be addressed in the following pages: What role did Denmark-Norway play before and during the Thirty Years? War? What prompted Christian IV to take part in the conflict in the first place? What policy did he pursue when defeat became inevitable?

In the age of Christian IV Denmark-Norway?s territories stretched from Altona to the North Cape and from Iceland to the island of Ösel (now Saaremaa) off the coast of Estonia. Its possessions in southern Sweden, the fertile areas of Scania, Halland and Blekinge, assured the Danish king control over access to the Baltic Sea (Ill. 1). [1] Merchant ships passing through the Øresund, or Sound, were required to pay a toll in Helsingør, and similar duties were levied for the passageway to Murmansk, north of Norway. The only way to enforce this was by maintaining a powerful and expensive fleet of ships.

Compared with southern Europe, the vast kingdom was only sparsely populated (in 1650 the kingdom had around 1.5 million inhabitants compared with around 0.9 million in Sweden in 1630). Moreover, the trade structure was largely uniform and the country lacked natural resources, with the exception of wood. Most people earned their living from agriculture, producing grain and beef for Europe?s heavily populated northwestern areas, the income from which allowed the country to import raw materials for the military (iron, copper, hemp and tar) as well as salt and such commodities as cloth, wine, beer and luxury goods, including silk and spices. The cities were small and handwork largely undeveloped. Foreign trade was controlled by Dutch merchant ships. Denmark-Norway?s resources can perhaps best be compared with those of German states like Brandenburg or Saxony.

In terms of its political structure, Denmark-Norway was an elected monarchy. The king was required to sign a deed which was formulated by the nobility. The latter?s position was further strengthened by the fact that both the declaration of war and the levying of taxes required the approval of the Rigsråd, or Council of State. On the other hand, the Council?s influence was weakened by the fact that the king was also Duke of Holstein, a territory he had received as a fiefdom from the Holy Roman Emperor. The Reformation had increased the king?s power in two ways. On the one hand, as monarch he was head of the Lutheran Church, which quickly proved itself a loyal subject; on the other, half of the territory of Denmark fell to the crown when the Catholic Church was secularised. This put the king in a position to grant generous fiefs to the nobles, who owned the other half of the land. The boom in agricultural exports, which the Thirty Years? War helped to prolong until 1640, benefited the nobility. This prosperity was interrupted again and again by temporary crises; big farms that had the necessary capital to brook the periods of crisis had a better chance of surviving. The social imbalance thus became so prevalent that by 1625 one-third of the nobles owned 75 percent of the land and at the same time had secured a monopoly on royal fiefs. This closed and interrelated society of the high nobility, which also controlled the Council of State, built the many manor houses that still grace the Danish countryside. Only these families could afford to send their sons on expensive tours through Europe, which for their part were a prerequisite for the rewarding offices of state. The astronomer Tycho Brahe came from these circles.

The Danish constitution at the time the kingdom entered the Thirty Years? War can be described as a Monarchia mixta: power was shared between the crown and the nobility. The two parties agreed on the necessity of supporting a strong fleet to secure the lucrative tolls on the Sound. This claim was founded on the doctrine of Dominium Maris Baltici(supremacy in the Baltic Sea), in which the Baltic, with its shipping channel from Blekinge south of the island of Öland and north of the islands of Gotland and Ösel, was defined as Danish territorial waters. Whereas the king wanted a standing army consisting of mercenary forces, the Rigsråd was willing to give him only a small national militia.

A major factor in this conflict was the relationship to Sweden. In the late middle ages Denmark, Norway and Sweden had formed a political alliance, the Kalmar Union, against German invasion into the Baltic region. Thanks to its greater population density, its location in the southwest and its profitable agriculture, Denmark had dominated the union, but as Sweden?s economic importance grew, due in part to its ore production, the country strove toward independence, which eventually led to a disbandment of the alliance. In 1523 the nobleman Gustavus Vasa was elected king of Sweden. Hostilities came to a standstill during the Reformation, but in 1563 mutual mistrust led to an outbreak of war which lasted until 1570. In the course of the war it became evident that Denmark was able to gain the upper hand, but at the same time that the huge and relatively barren territory of Sweden could neither be subjected, nor could its expansion toward the East be prevented. The peace treaty opened the way to negotiations for a settlement between the kings and their respective nobles to avoid future conflicts. In this question it was clear that the wealthy and relatively powerful Danish nobility showed far more self-confidence in its dealings with its king than the Swedish nobles had.

In the last decade of the 16th century Sweden was weakened by internal confrontations among Gustavus Vasa?s sons. The second-eldest son, John III Vasa, had married a Polish princess. Her son Sigismund was declared Sigismund III, king of Poland, in 1587 and inherited the throne of Sweden from his father, John III, in 1592. In the age of the Counter-Reformation Sigismund, who was an ardent Catholic, aroused fear and distrust in Lutheran Sweden. This paved the way for the advance of Gustavus Vasa?s third son, Charles. In 1599 there was an uprising, and after severe clashes in which numerous nobles who had joined the opposition were beheaded, Charles IX was crowned king of Sweden in 1604. The internal conflicts threatened to isolate Sweden in Protestant northern Europe. Denmark, by contrast, was able to strengthen its position through a skilful marriage policy. Royal marriages were a measure of the international esteem in which the house was held. Christian IV married Anne Catherine of Brandenburg, and through the marriages of his sisters he became the brother-in-law of King James I of England, of Duke Heinrich Julius of Brunswick, of Duke Johann Adolf of Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp and of Christian II, the elector of Saxony. A marriage between Christian IV?s brother Hans and Xenia, the only daughter of Czar Boris Godunov, was agreed upon, but the brother died in Moscow before the wedding could take place.

This was the political background before Christian IV attained his majority and was crowned king in 1596. The talented prince had enjoyed a thorough and extensive education. He was 11 years old when his father died, which catapulted him to the centre of attention. This gave him self-confidence and at the same time he gained insight into the cultural environment and mentality of the nobility by having to deal with the regency of four nobles of the Council of State. So it never entered Christian IV?s mind to establish an absolute monarchy, although he did retain foreign policy and ? on a trial basis ? financial control as a royal prerogative throughout the long period of his rule. Characteristic for Christian IV were his rapid and clear understanding, his restless energy and a pragmatic turn of mind aimed at results. Other characteristics such as his impatience, his desire to do everything himself and his intervention in all matters great and small weakened his overall perspective and his judgement. He was a man of simple faith and devotion to duty. His favourite preoccupations were architecture and music.

The first years of Christian IV?s rule were marked by an intense build-up of his armed forces. The Copenhagen shipyard and the arsenal developed into the most important ones in Europe, while at the same time the size of the fleet increased threefold and became the strongest naval force in the Baltic Sea region. This build-up was occasioned by growing tensions between Denmark and Sweden, where Charles IX attempted to solve domestic problems by implementing an aggressive foreign policy, in part toward Poland in Livonia and on the other hand toward Denmark in northern Norway. There the Swedish king laid claim to dominion over the coastal region from Tysfjord to Varanger and above Finnmark. This area had traditionally been considered part of Norway, the claim having been set down in the second basic tenet of Danish foreign policy, the doctrine of Dominium Maris Septentrionalis, which concerned Denmark?s sovereignty of the seas between Iceland and Norway and had been recognised by France in 1583. The significance of this area for trade and commerce had increased ever since Sweden?s capture of Narva had taken away Russia?s last port on the Baltic Sea. Russia was forced to increase maritime traffic from Murmansk, which threatened to reduce Danish customs duties levied in the Sound. In order to assert Danish control Christian IV personally led a naval expedition to northern Norway. In the following years he tried to press the reluctant Council of State to declare war on Sweden. It was not until they had undertaken numerous attempts at mediation and Sweden had instituted a blockade of the Livonian ports, thus threatening the supply of wood, hemp and other goods to the Danish fleet, that the Rigsråd began to give in. In 1611 Christian IV forced them to make a decision by declaring that he would wage war against Sweden not in his capacity as King of Denmark, but as Duke of Holstein. The Kalmar War of 1611-1613 was in many ways a repetition of the previous war of 1563-1570. It showed once again that Sweden could not be conquered even though the Danes still had the upper hand on the seas. Christian IV succeeded in capturing two Swedish border fortresses, Kalmar and Elfsborg, thus assuring an advantageous peace treaty for Denmark. Sweden gave up its claims to northern Norway and Ösel, ended its blockade of the Livonian ports and was forced to pay reparations of more than a million thalers in four instalments between 1616 and 1619. As security Denmark kept Elfsborg (near Gothenburg), Sweden?s only western port and access to the west. In case Sweden failed to deliver the money on time, the port was to fall to Denmark.

The outcome of the war bolstered Christian IV?s position. With a balanced national budget, the income from customs duties on the Sound and the Swedish reparations, Christian IV around the year 1620 was one of the wealthiest rulers in Europe (Ill. 2). The money was invested in loans to foreign rulers and Danish noblemen and in commercial projects. The twelve years from 1613 to 1624 represent a period of reform effected above all in three areas, the military, commerce and architecture. As to the military, the build-up of the fleet was carried on, but now supplemented by constructing new fortresses and founding cities, thus combining strategic with commercial interests. Examples included Kristianstad in Scania, Varberg in Halland, Christiania (the present Oslo) in Norway, and Glückstadt near Hamburg. The greatest fortress of all was the new fortification of Copenhagen, the area of which was increased threefold, including the construction of the installations at Christianshavn, a new quarter of the city with canals modelled after Dutch towns. Furthermore, a standing army of 4,000 peasant soldiers was created.

Secondly, in order to achieve economic independence, the crown founded manufactories and trading companies. Copenhagen was to become the trading centre for the Baltic region. The first trading company was the "Icelandic Company", which competed with Hamburg?s Iceland traders, followed by the "Petsoric Company", set up to compete with the Dutch and British whaling trade. In 1619 a fleet was launched to find the Northwest Passage, and the same expansive aim was behind the formation of the "East Asia Company", which proved to be unprofitable, but which led to the founding of Tranquebar, a Danish colony on the Coromandel Coast in southern India. The most ambitious enterprise, however, was the construction of the silk factory in Copenhagen. Dutch weavers manufactured textiles there which Christian IV gave as presents to the Czar and others. [2] However, only a few of these investments proved viable in the long run, partly because the basis was too shaky, but also because Christian IV withdrew his financial support when he entered the Thirty Years? War.

The third main initiative of this period of prosperity was the construction of magnificent royal buildings that served to glorify the king. The most important example is Frederiksborg Castle, the residence of Christian IV in northern Zealand. Like the Escorial before it and later Versailles, the castle was built at a suitable distance from the capital city. Divided into three parts (Ill. 3), the installation forms a framework for the glorification of the monarch. Its manneristic architecture is clearly related to the French and Dutch Renaissance. At the entrance to the forecourt visitors saw the Neptune fountain by Adriaen de Vries, which symbolised the ascendancy of the Danish-Norwegian king in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, while the entranceway to the inner castle courtyard was flanked by statues representing David and Alexander the Great. Twenty-six Gobelins hung resplendent on the walls of the Hall of Knights, illustrating the victories over Sweden. This iconographic programme in praise of the ruler culminated in the palace church whose partly preserved silver furnishings form a counterpart to those in the "Reiche Kapelle" (rich chapel) in Munich. When Christian IV looked down from his seating place in the church, which was decorated with paintings by leading Dutch artists, pietra dura works from Florence and silver from Augsburg, he could see the Angel of Victory raising aloft the imperial crown of Rudolf II to his throne. The palace church at Frederiksborg can been seen as a deliberate attempt to create a kind of Lutheran imperial chapel. [4]

As the conflicts between Protestants and Catholics increased in Germany, Christian IV decided to make his political presence felt in the northwestern region. This interest was not new. As far back as 1603 Christian IV as Duke of Holstein had compelled the city of Hamburg to proffer a formal oath of allegiance. Among other things, a magnificent parade was staged where the monarch was celebrated as the Sun King. [5] In 1605 Christian IV supported his father-in-law, the elector of Brandenburg, in his struggle to retain Prussia as a fiefdom from Poland by sending Danish warships to Königsberg. In 1605-1606 and again in 1615 he supported his other in-laws, the dukes of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, in their attempt to subjugate the free city of Brunswick (Braunschweig). In return the house of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel backed the king?s policy toward the secularised Protestant bishoprics, over which he sought to gain. In 1603 Christian IV?s younger brother had been named prince bishop (administrator) in Schwerin, and in 1611 he managed to have his son Frederik elected coadjutor. After 1615 Christian IV pushed through the election of Frederik in no less than four dioceses: the archbishopric Bremen as well as the bishoprics in Verden, Osnabrück and Halberstadt. Frederik?s younger brother Ulrik was to succeed him in Schwerin. His sons would have been taken care of and it would have been possible to prevent an internal hereditary division in Denmark-Norway. Moreover, this policy toward the sees gave him the possibility of collecting customs duties on the Elbe and Weser and well as extending the Danish sphere of influence as a counterbalance to Sweden?s expansion into Livonia. The most important partner in the Danish policy toward the bishoprics was Philipp Sigismund, the brother of the Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, who as prince bishop of Osnabrück and Verden succeeded in pushing through Frederik?s election as prince bishop of Bremen and Verden in the years 1621 to 1626. In addition, Holstein?s, and thus Christian IV?s, sovereignty over Steinburg was recognised in 1621 by the city of Hamburg through a settlement. In the years immediately preceding his entry into the Thirty Years? War, Christian IV?s policy in northern Germany was therefore not without success.

A certain share of this success was due to the high politics in Europe. The prospect of arbitrary increases in Danish tolls on the Sound or a Swedish blockade of the Baltic states had the effect on Dutch trade of a choice between cholera and the plague. The Dutch wanted free access to the Baltic Sea and therefore supported the weaker party in the struggle for supremacy in the Baltic. After the war of 1611-1613 they entered into an alliance with the Hanse cities, thus indirectly accelerating Sweden?s expansion into Livonia, which led to the seizing of Riga in 1621. The truce between Spain and the Netherlands was supposed to come to an end that same year. By setting up a blockade in Danish shipping channels Denmark could have thrown his weight toward the interests of Spain and the German emperor and brought Dutch trading to a standstill. This put Christian IV in a key position. As a result he was able to form an alliance with the Netherlands and gain a tacit recognition of his policy in the northern German bishoprics by both the major powers and the emperor. The growth of Christian IV?s power in northern Germany led however to a serious breach of confidence between the king and the Council of State, revealing fundamentally different views of the political role Denmark had to play. Whereas the king pursued an aggressive policy toward Sweden and sought to widen the Danish sphere of influence in northern Germany, the Rigsråd was more interested in a good relationship with Sweden, whose expansion could be held in check by cooperating with the Netherlands. The Rigsråd apparently counted on support from the Swedish nobility for this policy, an assumption which was not confirmed during the various Danish-Swedish mediation attempts between 1621 and 1624, however. On the other hand, the expenses incurred through Christian IV?s foreign involvements began to exceed his earnings, forcing the king to withdraw his support from commercial projects before they were able to show results. It was particularly alarming to the Rigsråd that to enforce Hamburg?s toleration of his bishopric policy Christian IV had used troops which the Council had only approved on an interim basis against the background of the outbreak of war in 1618. On the one hand, the Council saw its political influence threatened if Christian IV could realise his plans. On the other, this policy threatened to involve Denmark directly in the Thirty Years? War if the new sphere of influence in northern Germany should come under pressure.

In fact, this situation soon came about, because the defeat of the Protestants threatened to shift the balance of power in favour of the German emperor. At the same time France began to recover from the period of inner weakness which had followed the assassination of Henry IV. Since 1624 Cardinal de Richelieu supported the Protestants in order to revive the old conflict between the Habsburgs and the House of Valois. It was perhaps for this reason that James I of England, who had supported his son-in-law, the Palatinate elector, in Bohemia and at the same time had sought a Spanish bride for his son, later Charles I, gave up his wavering policy and married his son to Henrietta Maria of France. A short time later the English king, supported by the Dutch and partly by the French, sent ambassadors to the two Nordic capitals; a French diplomat arrived in Copenhagen as well. The content of the negotiations is not known in detail, but it is clear that Gustavus Adolphus made very high demands, while Christian IV was more willing to make concessions, no doubt to a large degree because he was afraid to leave the initiative to his arch-enemy. On the other hand, one cannot ignore the personal aspect: the king was now 48 years old, and he was being offered a last opportunity of winning fame on the field of battle. At the beginning of 1625 Christian IV succeded in getting himself elected colonel-in-chief, or military leader, of the Lower Saxony "circle" (the German provinces were divided into circles, or administrative districts, at the time). So it was not as the Danish sovereign but as the Duke of Holstein that he entered the war ? with no guarantee of subsidies and against the will of the Rigsråd.

Although Dutch and English subsidies failed to be provided and it turned out that Christian IV received only limited support from the Lower Saxony circle, the king succeeded in mustering a sizeable army of around 20,000 men. The army marched to the Weser and took up position near Hameln, while an allied army under Count Mansfeld, financed by the British, stood ready in northern Westphalia. The king had probably hoped for a quick victory over Tilly and the army of the Catholic League, which was quartered in the see of Paderborn. Instead he became involved in a war of attrition. Wallenstein had organised an imperial force in the summer of 1625 which drew its strength not least of all from plundering the enemy countryside. To prevent Wallenstein from joining forces with Tilly, Mansfeld advanced against Wallenstein?s army, but was defeated in April 1625 southeast of Magdeburg. Wallenstein was unable to turn this triumph to his advantage, however, being forced instead to march against the Transylvanian prince Bethlen Gabor, who had just invaded Hungary. Christian IV attacked Tilly in August 1626, but was beaten at Lutter am Barenberge. Although this rout meant a great loss of prestige, the king was able to assemble a new army in the winter of 1626/27, and still had Mansfeld?s troops at his disposal, which were fighting in Silesia, aided by the peasant revolts in Austria and Hungary. However, in the summer of 1627 Bethlen Gabor made peace with the emperor, which freed Wallenstein to fight to victory in Silesia. This sealed Christian IV?s ultimate defeat, as nothing could now prevent Tilly and Wallenstein from uniting their regiments. Although Christian IV and the Council of State joined forces to organise military resistance on the Elbe, Wallenstein occupied Jutland in the late summer of 1627 and conquered Mecklenburg and parts of Pomerania.

Since the Danish fleet still ruled the seas, Wallenstein was not able to occupy the Danish islands, however. As a consequence, plans were made to create a Habsburg Baltic fleet, which would also have presented a danger to Dutch trade had not the attempts to realise it led to conflicts between the emperor and the Catholic League. When plans for the fleet fell through, the combined forces of Denmark and Sweden liberated the strategic city of Stralsund in 1628, and Denmark initiated a meeting between Christian IV and Gustavus Adolphus in January 1629, which was interpreted by some as the beginning of a new military alliance. The Treaty of Lübeck followed shortly thereafter, returning all conquered territories to Denmark. In return Christian IV agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of the German Empire. The leniency of the treaty toward Denmark ? which put the king?s sons under no obligation and thus allowed him to resume his earlier policy toward the bishoprics ? likely resulted from the emperor?s tactical considerations: in case France banked on undefeated Sweden, deferential treatment could turn Denmark from a broken enemy into a future ally.

The defeat meant the end of the ascendancy of the kingdom of Denmark and Norway as a great power in northern Europe. The plundering of Jutland showed how difficult it was to defend this strip of land against attacks from the south. It became necessary to fortify the Holstein border and station troops there, to maintain the fortifications on the Swedish border and to consolidate Danish supremacy in the Baltic, measures which demanded huge financial investments that could only be raised by curbing the nobility?s exemption from taxation. A great deal was therefore at stake in developments on the continent. In 1630 Wallenstein?s 100,000-strong army was disbanded, facilitating to a certain degree the rapid Swedish victories in Germany and increasing the possibility of a war on two fronts between Denmark and Sweden.

The Rigsråd also had to recognise this new threat, but the council?s distrust of Christian IV?s autonomous foreign policy and doubts about his judgement, combined with the self-importance of the nobles represented in the Council, prevented any reforms from being carried out. The nobility approved the levying of new taxes and even contributed funds, but retained control over the money. This led to dual administration, which not only prevented quick, coordinated decision-making, but also obstructed the effective use of the considerable funds. So Christian IV had no choice but to drastically raise the tolls on the Sound ? increasing them threefold between 1639 and 1642 ?, thus forcing the Netherlands into the arms of Sweden.

Christian IV dared to undertake these measures above all because Gustavus Adolphus? great victories proved to cut two ways: by conquering parts of southern Germany he infringed upon France?s sphere of influence. At the same time Brandenburg and Saxony were working toward a Protestant "third block" to avoid one-sided domination by Sweden. The emperor finally allowed Wallenstein to recruit another army, which stopped the Swedish advance at the Battle of Lützen in 1632. Gustavus Adolphus was killed in the battle, hastening the general retreat of the Swedes in the following years. Instead of forming a Protestant union under Swedish leadership, the policy pursued by the Swedish chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, sought to secure territories for Sweden, which could then be exchanged for Pomerania and Bremen in case of peace. Denmark?s southern border was thus threatened, and if the policy had been successful, Denmark?s earlier encirclement of Sweden would have been replaced by a new policy of isolation which could have let Sweden enter into a war on two fronts against Denmark. However, Sweden?s weakness in these years allowed Christian IV to achieve a number of successes through carefully orchestrated politics to sway the balance of power. In 1633 the emperor granted Denmark the right to levy tolls along the Elbe for four years. In 1634 Christian IV made further progress in his bishopric policy by having his second-eldest son Frederik elected archbishop of Bremen, who was recognised in this position by both the emperor and Sweden in 1636 after long drawn-out negotiations. The king?s political manoeuvres were supported by a variety of propagandistic activities. For example, he rebuilt the castle at Kronborg, which had been burnt down in 1629 and which was seen as a symbol for the Sound duties. The new furnishings included a series of paintings by leading Dutch artists on the history of the Danish kings, which were also reproduced as copperplate engravings, thus spreading the fame of the crown. [6] The greatest event with which Christian IV sought to demonstrate to the world that Denmark had recovered from the defeat was, however, the marriage of the crown-prince to Magdalene Sibylle of Saxony in the year 1634. [7] The guests included envoys of the emperor as well as from France, Spain and Sweden. Not only the traditional tournaments, but also chess matches and ballet performances, to the music of Heinrich Schütz and others, were on the programme. In numerous allegories Christian IV was depicted as a bringer of peace. This was not only a poetic metaphor for the fact that the king, in his late fifties, was at an age then believed to embody the characteristics of peace and harmony, but it was also propaganda expressing Christian IV?s ambition to act as mediator at a future peace conference. After a gradual rapprochement with Vienna, the king was finally recognised in this role, which came to fruition in 1642 during the preliminary peace negotiations in Münster and Osnabrück (Ill. 5). At the same time, the king showed his strength by first forcing Hamburg to recognise the Elbe tolls and then forging an alliance with Russia, which was to be sealed by the marriage of his son to the Czar?s daughter, as mentioned above. [8]

As peacemaker Christian IV hoped to rob Sweden of the fruits of victory through a tacit agreement with Vienna. In anticipation of this, Oxenstierna had secretly contemplated launching a preventative war against Denmark as early as 1641. When in 1643 the Swedish troops under field marshal Torstenson marched on Bremen and Jutland without an official declaration of war, the desired conflict erupted. Sweden had increased the size of its fleet since the war of 1611-1613 and could moreover now rely on the support of the Netherlands, which was greatly embittered over the toll increases on the Sound. In order to deter an invasion of the Danish islands, the Danes needed to prevent the consolidation of the Swedish and Dutch fleets. In this precarious situation the 67-year-old monarch demonstrated both vision and strength. In the springtime Christian IV first laid siege to Gothenburg and then took command of the fleet in the North Sea, inflicting defeat on the Dutch fleet in the middle of May near the List Channel between Rømø and Sylt. He then sought to engage the Swedish invasion fleet in the Baltic Sea at Kolberg Heath, the shipping channel between the inlet at Kiel and the island of Fehmarn. During the naval battle his right eye was blinded, but he succeeded in surrounding the Swedish fleet in the Kiel Inlet. An imperial army was on the way north to attack the Swedes by land. But the Swedish fleet was able to escape, and in October Sweden joined forces with the Dutch to utterly destroy the Danish fleet near Fehmarn. The war thus ended in defeat for Denmark, and Danish Dominium Maris Baltici was lost forever. At the peace treaty of 1645 Denmark was forced to give up Ösel and Gotland and to mortgage Halland to Sweden; a decision on Bremen was put off to the future. Originally, Oxenstierna had called for all Danish lands in southern Sweden, but the major powers rejected his demands on the grounds of preserving a certain equilibrium in Scandinavia. However, Denmark was excluded from the negotiations at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, where Bremen and Pomerania were granted to Sweden.

Christian IV?s last years were bitter. In addition to military defeat he faced national bankruptcy, strife in the family and the death of the crown-prince, which allowed the nobility to exact a high price for supporting the election of his son Frederik, the former archbishop of Bremen, as his successor. Christian IV was the conflict?s great loser, but he maintained his integrity. His sense of duty, readiness to make sacrifices and courage during the Torstenson war transformed the myth of man and monarch into a hero-king, an invaluable legacy for his descendants and an integral part of Danish identity (Ill. 6).

FOOTNOTES