I. Robert Fruin's 'conservative revolution'

In 1865 Robert Fruin (1823-1899), a leading Dutch historian, published his article 'De drie tijdvakken der Nederlandsche geschiedenis' ('The three periods of Dutch history'). In it he discerned a certain linear progression in the political evolution of various nations from the Middle Ages to his own time. In France, for example, a continuous path had led 'to the consolidation of the monarch's rule', and in England to a balance of power between the royal authority and parliament. According to Fruin, no such development had occurred in the Low Countries; instead, three periods, each with a radically different character, had followed one upon the other.

The first of these spanned the late Middle Ages to the middle of the sixteenth century. Each of the 17 Netherlandish provinces had gradually come to have the same head of state, first from Burgundy, later from the House of Habsburg. Like their counterparts elsewhere, these rulers sought to strengthen the hold on their diverse territories through the creation of a central government. Beginning in around 1555, however, Philip II (who was also king of Aragon and Castile) sought take this centralisation one step further, leading to increasing dissatisfaction among his subjects. For Fruin, this marked the beginning of the second period. The populace came to see its government as something 'foreign, [and] anti-national', [2] and from this sentiment arose the open revolt that ultimately culminated in the foundation of the Dutch Republic. Made up of the seven provinces north of the great rivers, it had no central authority whatsoever; each of the provinces regained its sovereignty, and supreme authority came to rest not in the hands of a princely ruler - he had been repudiated in 1581 - but in the provincial States. The state now developed '[...] in a completely opposite direction [...]'. [3] The Republic, which, according to Fruin, was based on the medieval system of privileges and other antiquated customs, was recognised internationally with the Treaty of Münster and remained intact until 1795. A period of transition then led to the third phase: the Kingdom of the Netherlands - a country 'organised the way the Burgundian and Austrian dynasties had intended' - a unitary state without privileges and with equal rights for all its citizens. This was a 'happy state of affairs' according to the liberal Fruin, who thus gave expression to a typically nineteenth-century vision of Charles V and his aims. [4]

The Dutch Revolt, which had put an end to Burgundian-Habsburg rule, was thus nationalistic and - above all - conservative in nature. The States had done nothing but revive long obsolete rules and practices. For Fruin, the monarchy was progress. This view was adopted by a large number of Dutch historians, and came to dovetail with international research into the 'new monarchies' that had grown up in various countries beginning in the late Middle Ages. [5] But: does this system really deserve the monopoly on modernity? And - in this context in particular - were the States as a form of governing institution really so archaic? A careful examination of the Dutch situation, both in theory and practice, can supply an answer to these questions.

II. Rulers and representative bodies

At one time it was thought that the principle aim of all representative colleges in Europe was to prevent the expansion of royal authority, resulting in a kind of perpetual power struggle between rulers and corporations. This idea has changed dramatically in recent years. Representative bodies, which existed as early as the twelfth or thirteenth century, concentrated their efforts on promoting the interests and rights of their cities or regions, and sovereigns, aiming to build a viable state, sought to work with rather than against them in order to reinforce their own position. In fact, they had no choice: they lacked the means to replace local or regional governances with their own functionaries - and had they tried it probably would only have resulted in unrest. In the Netherlands, moreover, the vast differences between provinces made a uniform approach impossible. The 'states' created were thus 'composite', and could at most have become unified over time; national representative colleges - such as the States General - were founded in order to aid in this process. In some countries they succeeded; in others, however, the construct ruler/regional college appears to have remained the most workable form. This did not mean, of course, that the representative bodies suddenly halted their own quest for power. They continued to gain in strength, and this led inevitably to confrontations with the ruler. The growth of royal authority was thus parallelled by that of the representative bodies. [6]

The Netherlands, too, had all the characteristics of a 'composite state'. Already in the twelfth century, the urbanised territories of Flanders and Brabant established meetings of nobles and townsmen that could almost qualify as provincial assemblies (Statenvergaderingen). Holland and Zeeland lagged somewhat behind. Their States eventually came to have approximately the same structure, however, bringing together representatives of the clergy, the nobility and the towns, although in Holland the clerics did not participate. Things were quite different in Gelderland. This province was divided into four 'quarters' and each had its own assembly of nobles and townsmen; these bodies had contact with one another, but never met together. The province was thus a miniature federal state in itself. [7]

Normally, the assemblies were convened by the sovereign or his stadholder, usually for pecuniary reasons - financial straits making it necessary for him to seek funds from his subjects ('een bede doen'). The 'proposition', as it was called, was generally followed by a broad palette of counter-demands, all designed to strengthen the college's own position. Between meetings, the States carried out various other tasks. They were engaged in regional defence, foreign policy - particularly when their own, often material, interests were at stake - judicial issues, trade, and provincial politics. Frequently, it was they themselves who requested this involvement. They also met when there were important announcements to be made.

The actual power accorded to these bodies was, however, quite limited. In all other areas besides the fiscal it was the sovereign who made the rules: after all, these fields - particularly foreign affairs - were his prerogative, and he generally only relinquished them out of weakness or utility. Beginning in 1550, for example, the responsibility for collecting the monies granted the sovereign was delegated to the States of Holland. This was a concession, born out of pure necessity, to even more far-reaching demands. As in other European countries, representatives sought to extend their political influence, and financial leverage was an excellent means of achieving this: control over spending and collection of funds offered the deputies a chance to have a say in policy as well. [8]

This was also the ambition of the States General, which comprised delegates from most of the provinces. Due to the sovereign's habitual impecuniosity this body met quite frequently in the period before 1558 and, although they could not yet be described as a cohesive group, the representatives made their cooperation dependent on the fulfilment of certain requirements. Thus, the States General of 1557-58 granted Philip II the sum of 800.000 guilders per annum for nine years (the so-called Novennial Aid), but only on condition that its collection and disbursement be managed by the assembly itself; in this way they could be certain that the monies were spent for the intended purpose. This was reason enough for Philip II to forbid any further regular meetings of the college. [9] It was not until 1569 that a routine gathering again took place - and once again the deputies wanted to discuss politics.



III. On the road to sovereignty

The Revolt became increasingly violent in the course of the 1560s, concentrating in 1572 - rather unexpectedly - on the county of Holland. By 1576 the armed conflict had moved to the richer provinces of Flanders and Brabant, and this had a direct influence on the provincial States' struggle for power.

In July 1572, a number of Holland noblemen and delegates from 12 of the province's cities met in Dordrecht, together with a representative of the Prince of Orange. They convened of their own accord and in defiance of the ban. The college assumed all governmental and administrative functions and even went so far as to name William of Orange stadholder - in opposition to Philip II's stadholder, Count Bossu. The insubordination was now complete. [11]

The same pattern was repeated four years later in the States General, after more and more territories had become involved in the strife. The assembly met without an official summons, and its members immediately commenced with political actions. They negotiated with the rebellious provinces of Holland and Zeeland and concluded a peace treaty, the Pacification of Ghent. [12] In this revolutionary manner, the States of Holland and the States General gained the authority the king had refused to grant them.

No agreement could be reached with Philip II on the treaty, and so the number of mutinous territories continued to increase. By around 1585 the Revolt came to focus entirely on the area north of the great rivers, and this was now where the States General convened, meeting daily in The Hague beginning in 1593. By this time, too, the States of the rebellious provinces - seven as of 1595 - had all developed into governing bodies. They had fortified their position still further in 1581 by repudiating Philip II (Act of Abjuration). [13] Initially, some effort was made to find a replacement, but was unsuccessful; in 1588 the decision was finally made to proceed without a royal head of state. The Republic of the Seven United Provinces was born.

Each of the provincial States now became the equivalent of a count or duke for its territory, every province thus being governed by what was in essence a polymorphous ruler. The new sovereigns took on all the duties of the former monarch in addition to their regular representative functions. It was they who determined how much money was required for administering the province and directing the war - just as the Habsburgs had before them; but it was they, too, who decided which resources were to be tapped in the search for the necessary funds, making the States in fact more absolutistic than any of Europe's absolute monarchs.

Matters effecting the country as a whole were handled by the States General, comprised of delegates from all the provinces: e.g. defence and its financing, and the formation of alliances - which would eventually develop into a coherent foreign policy. This body was thus a sort of supra-national college; its authority derived solely from the seven provinces, however, and it had no power in itself. Subsidies for the war, for example, had to be petitioned from the individual provincial States. Since it was responsible for defence, it was the civilian-dominated States General that mapped out the war's strategy, leaving its execution to the military. This marks the beginning of a separation of political and military authority, both of which had previously been in one hand, namely the king's.

Functionaries, too, although retaining their former titles, were now sometimes given other assignments. The stadholder was subordinate to the new sovereign, the provincial States; it designated him his power - for example to appoint city magistrates. This subservient position, however, was contrary to social reality: the stadholders were nobles, descendants of the House of Orange-Nassau, and as such enjoyed a status far above the members of the States. They were, in fact, often taken for kings - all the more so as the stadholderate was combined with the supreme command of the troops, the captain-generalship. The next ranking provincial official was the Advocate or Pensionary, who was head of the territorial administration. [14] These regulatory mechanisms were all born out of praxis, and were never actually fixed in a constitution. At most, changes were noted in the incidental resolutions of the provincial assemblies or the States General, or in the instructions or letters of commission of individual administrators, and this remained so until the end of the Dutch Republic in 1795. [15]

There was, however, a need for theoretical treatises explaining and justifying events both at home and abroad: the abjuration of a king in favour of a republic was obviously not an everyday occurrence. Governing bodies and individuals made use of pamphlets to accomplish the task, demonstrating clearly how new facts called for an immediate adaptation in theory. In an increasingly refined manner, it was argued that a country's subjects had the right to rebel against a tyrannical ruler. The States played a crucial role in the formulation of these assertions. It is interesting to note that this theoretical meditating took place outside the universities, where, isolated from the more mundane facts of the world and mainly interested in philosophy an sich, scholars remained concerned with the monarchy and not the Republic - at least until the Treaty of Münster. [16]



IV. Composition and voting in the provincial States

How did these new institutions - under their old name - actually work? Today, historians look not to regulations and instructions for the answer to this question but to the records of the college's everyday activity, particularly to their resolutions. Due to the multiplicity of provincial traditions, the States varied widely in composition. In urbanised Holland, for example, the ridderschap had only one vote, as opposed to the 18 of as many towns. Every city sent two to four representatives; the nobles came in groups of three. In Utrecht, the Church chapters were still represented along with the nobles and the towns; [17] in Overijssel delegates from the country and the city had the same number of votes. In Gelderland each of the 'quarters' kept its own assembly; they met at the same time and place but never together.

While most of the States convened only once, at most twice, a year, the States of Holland met four to seven times and for several weeks. Between meetings affairs were disposed of by an administrative apparatus. The college can thus be seen as the successor to the Habsburg stadholders - one reason why it had been given more responsibilities than before. [18]

Each of the provincial States sent representatives to the States General. As elsewhere in Europe, they were given an imperative mandate [19] and specific instructions regarding their conduct on a number of issues; on others they were required to refer back to their 'principals'. The number of delegates grew steadily, from 35 to 55 per year around 1600 to 70 to 95 around 1620. [20] In practice, however, it was a key group of around 15 who were largely responsible for determining policy. [21]

The meetings of all these assemblies were conducted in much the same way. The chairman presented various items and documents for discussion. Speaking in a hierarchically fixed order, one deputy per estate then gave his opinion. The word was then returned to the chairman, who summarised what had been said and formulated a conclusion that was to form the basis for the body's final decision. If opinions were not too far apart, or if the resolution required only a majority vote, business could be wrapped up quite easily. If not, other means had to be employed. An item could be delayed for further study - often a way of postponing it indefinitely - or in order to 'persuade' the deviant member(s) to cooperate. The most serious differences were frequently resolved through organised consultation outside the gathering itself. [22] Most problematic were the instances where unanimity was required - in the case of war or peace, for example - and one group was both adamantly opposed and refused to bow to pressure. There was only solution in such a situation: the recalcitrant party had to be 'outvoted', by forcing the largest possible majority to comply. However, this was always only a last resort: not only was it a question of possibly infringing on the resistant delegation's sovereign rights, but it could also have had a long-term negative effect on relations within the assembly as a whole. [23]

All this meant that the seven sovereign States functioned in an often slow and opaque manner - about which foreigners in particular frequently complained. [24] In a monarchy, where only a handful of people were involved in decision-making, things were much simpler, and necessary decisions could be made quite quickly. Moreover - in contrast to a collective decision-making system, where someone was always bound to talk out of turn (whether unconsciously or on purpose) - secrecy, too, could be maintained. [25]



V. Government committees and factions

The amount of work increased continually in both the States General and the States of Holland. Theoretically, this could have been dealt with by expanding the administration, but in fact bureaucratisation was only in infancy at this time. [26] The problem was solved instead by appropriating tasks within the college itself. First the States of Holland and then the States General delegated a variety of activities, both preparatory and executive, to ad hoc committees or besognes, made up of members of the assembly. This system was also employed in the other provinces. [27]

These committees grew in number in both colleges in the years before 1650, as did the total of their members, making them better able to undertake the workload. Some, the so-called secrete besognes (secret government committees), were given tasks which, due to their delicate or urgent nature, needed to be carried out with the utmost discretion. Moreover, with the institution of a regular bureaucracy, the States of Holland had in fact provided itself with a permanent commission, and a number of others were created from the mid-seventeenth century onward. [28]

At the same time, a variety of commissions representing all the provinces were established within the States General - besognes of seven or eight members, [29] which later formed the basis for the assembly's standing committees. The secret committees were usually made up of same number. Research has shown that before 1650 the majority of participants were drawn from the nucleus of powerful deputies within the States General mentioned above. [30]

Although these committees were designed to increase government efficiency, their efforts often came to nothing because within the States - and in the commissions themselves - there was little agreement among the representatives. The same was true in the towns and villages, and in the States General. There was factional in-fighting at all levels. The opposing parties were unorganised, frequently short-lived, and operated mostly without a firm ideology. Their constituents mainly sought to control certain, particularly attractive government posts, and to promote what they saw as the welfare of their own town or province.

In the cities, these factions generally centred around a leading regent, and were composed of his family, members of his class, and friends whose interests coincided with his own. Once securely installed, all enjoyed a certain respect and by no means meagre emoluments (although rarely a real salary). Despite this, they were never able to exploit their positions to the full: abuse was immediately noted by their opponents and swiftly punished, a form of natural social control. [31]

It is only recently that historians have come to recognise the factions within the provincial States, a meeting-place for those whose concerns were both municipal-administrative and local-factional. Short-term cooperation between delegates based on mutual interest was not unusual. We therefore sometimes find two or even three factions within the States, where, in addition, some deputies also had their own influential positions.

The pattern of collaboration in the States was the same as in the towns, with representatives grouping around a certain midpoint - sometimes a particular person, but more often a prominent local faction. The Pensionary was one such binding element, [32] as were the delegations of influential cities like Amsterdam and Leiden. It is interesting to note that the stadholder, too, played an important role: although not a member of the States, his right of appointment and high social standing meant that many urban regents were in fact beholden to him. His 'clients' often formed the core of a faction within the assembly. The Oranges thus cooperated with some regents against others, and were not - as has often been suggested - the hereditary enemies of the entire class. [33]

Although their horizons were generally limited by local, or at most provincial, concerns, there was inter-regional contact among regents throughout the century, leading to factions whose members were drawn from all over the Republic. Such factions manifested themselves in the States General, and sometimes even included the Prince of Orange, or his relative the Frisian stadholder. Praxis thus no longer corresponded to the institutional structures and a highly complex situation evolved. 'National' factions could be found in at least some of the provincial delegations, dividing them internally and making it almost impossible to develop a uniform standpoint. From the beginning then both the States General and the provincial States were a place practising the art of consensus. To historians, these inter-provincial, 'national' groups have always seemed comparable to nineteenth and twentieth century political parties - particularly if it is assumed they were bound by a common ideology. After all, weren't the Oranges - who certainly engaged in the factional fighting - supported by a 'Prinsgezinde Partij'? And didn't their opponents, the regents, make up a 'Staatsgezinde Partij'? Modern analysis has demonstrated that this concept no longer holds, and that it was only in the eighteenth century that things began to change.



VI. The States' sovereignty and the Treaty of Münster

Various aspects of this unusual governmental structure played a role in the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Münster. The peacemaking process and its pre-history thus offer an excellent means of studying its internal workings. [34]

The Dutch Republic had undergone a number of changes in fortune since its foundation. Although it had managed to secure its central territories in the period up to 1609, important areas along the borders had often been lost again. Exhaustion and financial problems led both parties to sign a 12-year truce in 1609. At the time, real peace seemed impracticable, a major obstacle being the continuing Habsburg refusal to accept the abjuration of 1581: they viewed themselves as the rightful sovereigns of the 'rebellious' provinces, and wished to remain so. Furthermore, they persisted in their opposition to the practice of Calvinism in 'their' territories, while the 'rebels' resisted according Catholics any public authority. Finally, Madrid refused tolerate the Dutch presence in the East Indies, regarding it, too, as their own domain. In the end, Philip II was only prepared to officially recognise the Republic for the period of the truce. [35]

From an international point of view, the cease-fire created a rather awkward situation. Various nations, particularly France and England, had supported the Revolt, not only financially but as 'official' allies - notwithstanding that at this period the exact meaning of the term was somewhat unclear. Although their actions had naturally been dictated by their own interests, their acknowledgment allowed the Republic to enter onto the international political stage, and this was to remain the case for some time to come.

During the years of the Truce the Seven Provinces turned to the task of putting their affairs in order. During the war many fundamental issues had been neglected, and hidden tensions regarding political and religious questions, and differences of opinion on the relationship of church and state began to surface. By the end of this period Holland's dominance had been somewhat weakened, the church had chosen for strict doctrinism and had been forced to tolerate some governmental interference. None of these things, however, were of a very permanent nature. [36] The Truce revealed still more: the suspension of hostilities temporarily put an end to the restrictions on trade and shipping, and both branches now began to thrive. On the other hand, the textile industry suffered terribly from competition with the Flemish cloth towns, which could now export their wares unhindered. [37]

Despite the advantages of the cease-fire, the war began again in 1621. Things did not go well for the Republic until around 1625, when the States General - in close cooperation with Frederik Hendrik, prince of Orange - began to follow a more aggressive course towards Spain. This involved the creation of buffer zones securing the country's natural borders - the Ijssel, the Rijn and Mass, and the Westerschelde - and was extremely successful thanks to the conquest of Twente, the Achterhoek, and parts of Limburg, Brabant and Flanders.

Around 1629 these victories began to awaken the desire for peace. The same results, it was argued, could be achieved at the negotiating table as on the battlefield. This cry grew ever louder, particularly in Holland, which felt itself excessively burdened by the costs of the war and the enormous damage to its sea trade. Before long, however, its States were split into two factions. The merchant cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam played a central role in this division. If peace was not within reach, they declared in addition, then more attention should be paid to the war at sea. Their assertions were opposed by the 'war faction' around the textile cities of Leiden and Haarlem. They sought to continue the war until their competitors in the southern Netherlands had been eliminated and Catholicism checked.

Both factions had their supporters in the States General, making any kind of decision on the course of action extremely difficult. And so the war continued, one of the reasons being the failure of negotiations with the south. The peace faction, however, gained in strength after 1637, when the conquest of Breda and its environs more or less secured the Republic's southern borders. [38]

What role did Frederik Hendrik play in this power struggle? Was he not, as a general, automatically and naturally a partisan of war? A careful reading of his statements reveals that in fact he was caught between the two opposing factions. The prince had two irons in the fire: one the one hand, he could agree to a cease-fire, but only if the conditions were highly advantageous; on the other, he could continue the fighting in order to achieve still more favourable conditions. For him, war was a means of securing both territory and a good negotiating position. [39] Because, however, he chose to carry on the struggle - at least temporarily - he was easily mistaken for a champion of the war party. This view changed only in 1645 when the last bastion was conquered at Hulst in Zeeland-Flanders and the negotiations designed to end the Thirty Years War had already begun in Münster. Although the Spanish-Dutch conflict were not really a part of this war, the parties were invited to take part in the conference anyway, the emperor aiming to put an end to all Europe's contests simultaneously.

Thanks to their military triumphs, the Dutch were in an excellent bargaining position. Moreover, it appeared that Spain, having lost much of its former strength, would now be more accommodating than in 1609. The Netherlanders could therefore make far-reaching demands: recognition of the Republic's sovereignty, the title of Hoog-Mogende Heren (high and mighty lords) for members of the States General, and the highest rank - that of ambassador - for its eminent diplomats. Furthermore, they requested incorporation into the hierarchy of states in a position immediately below the emperor and the kings, but above the electoral princes, dukes and counts. The Republic of Venice was already included in this category; the States wanted to come directly after it. Spain's new willingness had already been demonstrated in 1640, when the delegates to the peace conferences were granted the desired diplomatic status. [40]

On the domestic front, however, a number of problems remained unresolved. What instructions should be given to the ambassadors to Münster? How many were to be sent and who were they to be? Should some agreement be reached about the future of the Union before either a new truce or peace were concluded? And what means should be used to judge the eventual results of the negotiations? [41]

These matters were discussed in the first instance in the States General, and only later in the provincial States and on a local level. Naturally, many aspects had to remain secret, and so were referred to the secrete besognes. Within the States General, solely the members of the government committee set up before the peace talks were permitted to bring important documents to the attention of their provincial States, to discuss them there, and to carry the results back The Hague. The same process took place in the provincial States. Members were sworn to an oath of secrecy: they were allowed to discuss subjects pertaining to peace in their native city, but not in public and only with one or several burgomasters. [42]

Inevitably, deputies returned to the States General with a variety of opinions; factional fighting and persuasion once again became the order of the day. To save money, Holland, for example, had wanted to send only four ambassadors to Münster - among them of course one of their own. Naturally, this was unacceptable to the other provinces, who also wanted to be represented. Holland was eventually forced to back down and a delegation of eight was finally dispatched. Zeeland sought to have the issue of future cooperation carefully framed on paper before it agreed to talk about Münster; Holland and the other provinces, however, refused, not wanting to be caught later in dangerous formulations. The Zeelanders acquiesced in 1645 only to take up a new position: the majority of delegates in its provincial assembly were in favour of continuing the war, as were Utrecht and, in Holland, the city of Leiden. The Zeeland delegate to the States General, Johan de Knuyt, however, was an Orangist and in favour of peace - making the relationship with his province a rather uneasy one.

The Dutch plenipotentiaries arrived in Westphalia in January 1646. At first, deliberations focused around a possible cease-fire, but it soon became apparent that Spain actually wanted to negotiate peace. Once the provinces had agreed, business proceeded smoothly - much of it being merely a repetition of the consultations of 1609. On 30 January 1648 the completed treaty was ready to be ratified by the two countries. Intense debate followed in Madrid and The Hague, Zeeland finally being out-voted. On 15 May the delegates met again in Münster to exchange the ratified documents and swear an oath on the agreement. On 5 June peace was proclaimed in virtually all the provinces, accompanied by celebrations. Only Zeeland, which had reluctantly signed on 30 May - i.e. after the pledges had been taken - refrained from official festivities, as did Leiden.

Despite this small setback, the results were certainly worthy of acclaim. The Spanish king now recognised the Republic as a union of free and sovereign territories, meaning that other countries, too, could now formalise their relationship with the Dutch. Their new status was confirmed when the Seven Provinces were granted their desired place in the international hierarchy of nations. Sovereignty and integrity of the individual provinces was the first principle of the treaty, making it, de jure, the founding moment of the Dutch state, and the resolution of all other issues followed in its wake: Spain no longer opposed the public practice of Calvinism; it lifted restrictions on Dutch trade in the East and West Indies, although it still claimed to have a monopoly; and it agreed to the imposition of heavy duties on Schelde shipping, particularly to Antwerp.



VII. Conclusion

The granting of authority to the provincial colleges; the delegation of competencies to the supra-national States General; conflict between factions of regents, even across territorial borders; the institution of committees to handle some of the assemblies' tasks; the conclusion of compromises, forced or not - all appear in the decision-making process leading up to the Treaty of Münster. They were an integral part of the States' development in the takeover of the government in the late sixteenth century.

Undoubtedly, all these governmental structures had their roots in the earlier Burgundian and Habsburg systems, which in turn had their origins in a still more distant past. The corporate desire - already long-standing - for more executive authority grew persistently in the Low Countries beginning in 1572, even coming to embrace areas that had previously been the exclusive prerogative of the king. In other European countries, it was the kings who sought greater control but were unable to achieve it thanks to the representative colleges.

The notions of absolute monarchy and sovereign representative colleges began to develop more or less simultaneously in the Middle Ages. Because in most states the monarchy had eventually gained the upper hand, and was still the most prevalent form of government in the nineteenth century, Robert Fruin regarded it as progressive. However, as a form the States, too, contained the seeds of progress. Precisely their continually evolving responsibilities demonstrate that in the Low Countries the colleges were a success, and in this sense they were far ahead of other European nations. If we focus on this aspect, the Dutch Revolt no longer appears conservative but must in fact be judged as a kind of progressive revolution. It was the Treaty of Münster that gave the state formed under these special conditions its formal legitimation.