For the Venetian patrician travelling though the Holy Roman Empire in summer 1643, it ought to have been absolutely clear that peace must come to Germany. As he looked out from his coach at the passing landscape, he saw scorched earth, uninhabited villages, and - as he wrote to the Serenissima - cities that had lost four-fifths of their population. Augsburg, before the war an extremely populous city, now appeared to him 'to be reduced to the size of a decrepid little den, so to say'. He judged it as a sign of the plight that prevailed there that he was never presented with the couple of wine-jugs that were the customany gift of welcome. A hundred years, he thought, would not be long enough for every province to be returned to the condition it had previously enjoyed. [1]

Alvise Contarini is the patrician who wrote the dispacci containing these observations. Contarini was on his way to the conference in Münster which, it was hoped, would be able to end the great war. The then 46 year-old, who should act as a mediator in Münster, was an experienced diplomat, and perhaps the best man Venice could summon for this difficult mission. He had represented the interests of the Republic as ambassador to the States-General, England, France and the Vatican, as well as Constantinople. [2] In his reports, he proves himself a keen observer. Occasionally, the sources allow a frank [3], even reckless character to emerge, while his personality doesn't otherwise take on any sharply-focused contures. Anselm von Hulles's portrait of Contarini shows a gentleman dressed in black, Spanish-style; obviously portly and of the gravitas becoming to a statesman. His facial expression reflects intellectual superiority, almost arrogance.

Contarini operated on behalf of a power who, by the time he was travelling through a destroyed Germany, had finally exceeded the zenith of its power. But even this fact was a requirement for its serving as a mediator. In order to understand why specifically Venice came to take on this function at the Westphalian Peace Congress, it is necessary to sketch briefly Venice's position in the tense climate that characterised European politics at the time of the Thirty Years' War.

In the first third of the 17th century, Venice had almost completely taken on the outward appearance that it - in petrified form - presents today. The most spectacular accent that the city had yet to gain was the building of the Santa Maria della Salute Church at the bottom of the Grand Canal, which was erected by the Senate as a votive church after the plague of 1630.

After the epidemic, the number of inhabitants grew through immigration, to about 140,000 - 160,000 by the middle of the 17th century. [5] The economic decline that was taking place was only covered over by this population growth. Venice's world had become smaller. The shifting of world economic power from the Mediterranean region to the Atlantic was noticeable through the increasingly limited radius of galley sailings, which most clearly showed the economic descent of the old Mediterranean world economy. The 'Beaver Republic (Biberrepublik)' (Jacob Burckhardt) had become a regional power. Its main interests lay in the Adriatic, in the north-western Aegean, and in Upper Italy. Venice succeeded in preserving some room to manoeuvre in these zones well into the 17th century, through a clever policy of neutrality that was based on its relative military strength.

In the years immediately before the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, the Republic had extricated itself successfully from the 'Habsburg vice' (Frederic C. Lane), to the see. The attempt by the Spanish Vice-King of Naples, the Duke of Ossuna, to break Venice's dominance in the 'Gulf', as the Adriatic was typically referred to, was defeated by the deployment of an armada of impressive dimensions. [6] The use of a fleet consisting of 86 galleys, smaller boats and sailing ships, for which English and Dutch ships and men were hired, successfully forced Ossuna to retreat. At the same time, a plot hatched by Spain against the Venetian government was exposed and bloodily put down. [7] Venice played an active role during the Veltlin Crisis. Due to the initial Spanish successes, the Senate enlisted mercenaries. First, Ernst von Mansfeld was given a contract as condottiere, followed by Heinrich Matthias von Thurn. The diplomacy of the Serenissima was actively involved in the formation of the Leagues of Lyon and Avignon, respectively, which bound France, Savoy, and Venice, and should have called a halt to Spain's ambitions. However, in the years that followed, Venice found itself forced ever more to the periphery of events. The Venetians kept out of the fight for Genoa of their own accord. However, the Peace of Monzon (5 March 1626), an arrangement made by the great powers, took place fully out of reach of the Venetians.

The Mantuan War of Succession should have first demonstrated the limits of Venice's political possibilities. An attempt by the Republic to oust the occupying Habsburg mercenaries from the capital of the small state ended in disaster. Imperial troops beat the Venetian army; Mantua fell and was plundered.

As far as the situation on the Italian mainland was concerned, the most dangerous Habsburg threat ever - at least from the perspective of the Serenissima - came about in 1630. [8] The Senate had intermittently supported the Swedish invasion in North Germany through subsidies. [9] However, it avoided taking too clear a position - and did not come down in favour of the only power, namely Richelieu's France, who promised to offer back-up against Spain and its allies. Its position in Upper Italy was stabilised by the Peace of Cherasco (1631), which sorted out the Mantuan question, largely in favour of the French. Venice did not participate in shaping the conditions of the treaty. [10] In view of the uncontrollable conflict situation between the Great Powers, the Venetian state remained ever more decisively in favour of neutrality and of careful maneuvering.

Despite success in the battle for Mantua, Richelieu achieved neither the incorporation of a general guarantee clause into the peace treaty nor the establishment of a long-planned collective security system, under French direction, through a League of Italian states. [11] Such an alliance would have increased the danger for the Italians of a direct confrontation with the Habsburgs, at least in the short term. At any rate, Venice's caution likely contributed to the fact that the war in Upper Italy did not spread. In Madrid, the Republic's position in 1635 was judged as 'resolute, and well affectioned against the Erzhaus'. [12] When, in the following year, the Serenissima allowed Richelieu to achieve his goal-oriented initiative - the extension of the Cologne Congress to Sweden and the States-General - it was a consequence of Venice's policy of balance [13] and was an early sign of the role that Venetian diplomacy would play at the Westphalian Peace Congress. It was logical that the Republic took part, as part of an alliance of Italian states that could put a check on Rome's ambitions, in each bizarre war (1641-1644) [14] led by Pope Urban VIII against Odoardo Farnese for the feudal tenures of Castro and Ronciglione. [15] The Peace of Venice-Ferrara (31 March 1644) was then mediated by Mazarin, and it was awarded France's guarantee: a clear sign of the fact that, in Italy, the balance had tilted in favour of the West European Great Power. This was a also a signal for the loss of significance and prestige of the Curia, with consequences for the diplomatic activities of the Papal Nuncio in the Reich, Fabio Chigi. [16] The precarious Italian situation was doubtless a main reason for Venice's neutral stance. The Turkish threat was more important still for their determination to preserve the status quo in their policy-making and for their overall efforts to provide balance in Italy and Central Europe.

Since the late Middle Ages, Osman expansion had remained one of the most important constants in determining the foreign policy considerations of the Serenissima. During the Italian developments just described, the Turkish pressure had weakened in the eastern Mediterranean, since the Hohe Pforte was involved in a confrontation with the Persian Empire. [17] Meanwhile, the Venetian fleet was kept busy by a small but damaging battle against Christian and Islamic pirates, whom the Great Powers instrumentalised as substitute 'guerrillas'. In a source from 1615, a careful, vigilant peace policy had already emerged as the only possibility to counteract the threatening Osman expansion. [18]

A cold war dominated here, in one of the fissures between the great empires of the early modern period. This war was kept in check through some contractual arrangements and considerable effort. [19] In any event, Venice had to be prepared in case of actual war. Allies were constantly being sought, possible conflict constellations analysed, and strategies developed, all of which could be used against Turkey, such as the unleashing of a privateer war in the Black Sea by the Cossacks', who were dependent on Poland. [20] In addition, Venice hoped that Ladislus IV could convince the Hohe Pforte to intervene on behalf of their protege, by attacking the Turkish Tartars.

It was assumed that peace in Germany presented a decisive precondition for concerted activities. [21] But the course of the Cologne Congress, at which Venice had also involved itself as mediator - although it had not stepped forward at other pre-discussions [22]- gave little occasion to hope for a quick resolution of the negotiations. Based on rather remarkable reasoning, [23] Richelieu's successor, Mazarin, was judged to be a war-monger. Only the greatest coercion would bring this minister to opt for peace, in the opinion of Venice's ambassador to France. [24] Venice, already at the centre of Émeric Crucé's [25] utopian world peace plan, was thereby predestined to be the mediator in the peace talks for a number of different reasons. The mediation of a European peace lay in Venice's interest, due to the danger presented by Turkey and on account of the complex internal situation in Italy. The initiative to mediate obviously stemmed from the Serenissima itself. [27] The gain in prestige promised by participation in the negotiations should not be underestimated. [28] Richelieu and later Mazarin favoured Venice's intervention because they hoped for (and as was shown, were wrong in expecting) [29] anti-Spanish tendencies on the part of Venice. [30] The Italian middle-sized power was, at most, indirectly affected by the opposing interests that were established in Münster. [31] Finally, what spoke in favour of the Republic's being considered a suitable negotiating partner for all confessional parties was that it had for a long time provided diplomacy that was well-known and deemed uncorruptable, [32] and, above all, that it was Catholic, [33] but traditionally distanced from Rome. This was in contrast to the Curia, which refused to have direct negotiations with the Protestants. As the Swedish advancement into Danish territory at the end of 1643 made Danish mediation in Osnabrück obsolete, there was even consideration of extending Venice's mediation to the second Congress location. Contarini ruled out this request with singular skill, estimating - probably accurately - the expected opposition and risks that such an engagement would have entailed. [34]

On 16 July 1643, the Venetian Senate advised Contarini of its orders, and two weeks later the ambassador was underway. From Augsburg it was on to Frankfurt, where a mass was being held. He found the city almost untouched by war, full of hustle and bustle. Goods were plentiful, and this time the Council showed the diplomat the proper honours, with a gift of wine. However, he judged the Delegation Diet, which had met within the walls of Frankfurt since January, disrespectfully and - as far as the situation in late summer 1643 was concerned - appropriately: local tradition afforded lots of drinking, no less discussion, but little was brought to fruition. [35]

Contarini used his trip to make the widest possible assessment of the political situation. The Reich city of Cologne, his next station, was a place for the exchange of news: numerous diplomats and military personnel could be found there, waiting for further developments. A Bavarian general the flattered the Venetian, telling him - although he was exaggerating considerably - that it was up to the Serenissima to secure the balance destroyed by the weakness of Spain and domination of France.

On 16 November, Contarini got to Münster. He met with the Papal Nuncio Fabio Chigi at the Congress at the beginning of April. [36] The Castro War - 'a terrible state of affairs (dises Welsche Unwesen)' - as it was called in an Imperial instruction, [37] was resolved through a peace agreement, so that nothing more stood in the way of co-operation between the two mediators. [38] When Urban VIII died (29 July 1644), Contarini intervened successfully on Chigi's behalf, so that Chigi was able to remain in office. He did so to counteract French irritation with the pro-Habsburg tendencies of Urban's successor, Innocence X. [39] The Venetian had to confront a medley of ceremonial disputes, many of which had a lasting influence on the external image of the Peace Congress. The French representative D'Avaux demonstrated subtly to Contarini that he considered the Venetian Republic's position lower than that of the monarchies represented at the Congress. [40] Further still, D'Avaux did so as a signal to the Netherlands. [41] Such slights were a thorny problem for Venice's representative. If he was not granted his appropriate place at the Duke of Longueville's reception and, as result, he threatened to depart, it, too, reflected the complex constitution of the Venetian state. Internally organised along aristocratic lines, Venice gave its pseudo-monarchs outward honours and attributes that would not have been ill-fitted for a King or even the Pope. The Doge - nothing more than a sort of 'pub sign', according to the biting comment of a chronicler - should have at least reflected Venice's brilliance in the concert of European potentates. [42]

Supported by a secretary and three coadjutors, Contarini set out on his mission under multiple difficulties. Making painstaking effort not to harm his deemed neutrality, he nevertheless came under the suspicion of the Imperialists, for keeping 'himself far too aligned with the French side (sich gar zuvil parteyisch an seiten der Frantzosen)'. [43] In July 1644 the Imperial diplomat Count Auersperg believed it advisable to have the Venetian dismissed. [44] The Spanish were also mistrustful. [45] Only over time did Contarini win the trust of Habsburg diplomacy, as was shown in the negotiation of the Pomeranian question. [46] The Senate did not become any less strict in its neutrality. As a result, Venice ruled out Mazarin's request, in January 1647, for the Republic to bind itself in an Italian system of alliances. [47]

Ordinarily, it was Contarini's task to inform the parties of the different negotiating offers. [48] The deliberations often took place in the presence of the mediator, often in Contarini's quarters on Domplatz. He took part in as many as 800 individual discussions. The diplomat functioned in these talks as more than a 'postman', although he himself once characterised his and Chigi's role as that of 'simple reporter'. [49] He was a communicator with broad knowledge of the entire diplomatic field, whose interpretation was regarded as sensible. He conducted confidential 'background talks', cleverly able to assess the psychology of his opponent. [50] He received delegations in his quarters and offered them recommendations as to their negotiation tactics. [51] In short, the record confirms Bougeant's judgement that Contarini was no stranger to finesse and the art of dissimilation. Once, he actually made a suggestion to the Imperial diplomats 'to win the particular interests' of Adler Salvius, the Swedish envoy; in other words, to bribe him. [52] In individual conversations with the parties, he never avoided making critical evaluations of demands or diplomatic strategies. [53] His judgements would then be passed on to the respective political centres. On occasion, the Venetian ventured forth with his own projects, which were not much of a success. [54]

Normal written procedures made the negotiations in Münster difficult, in that they required precision and clarity in order to represent the various positions. [55] In many cases, the contribution of the mediator remained limited to improving the atmosphere and to keeping out external influences, whenever possible. [56] In his letters to the Serenissima and in private writings, we find Contarini an eagle-eyed commentator of the events taking place at the Congress. In his confidential letters he doesn't mince words. He judges vanity and self-interest harshly, but does not deny praise for reasonable pragmatists, like Count Trauttmansdorff, [57] whose work was vital for realisation of peace. He views Mazarin critically. He blames the disastrous situation in the early summer 1647 on the egotism of Maximillian of Bavaria, whom he deems a cynic in pursuit of his own interests, while operating on the pretext that Christianity mattered to him. [58] To the Doge, he expresses deep dismay - his heart breaking on account of all the small passions, wasted over nothing, but that resulted in so much Christian blood being unnecessarily spilled. [59] He can not explain it other than as a punishment from God. He generally attributes all the confusing events at the Peace Congress and on the battle fields as a cosmos, reflecting both god's wrath and blessing. Only in so doing could he, who saw the Christian occident so dramatically threatened, have sublimated his own impotence.

Embedded in his network of correspondents and in contact with the unique information system of the Serenissima, Contarini also gained a broad picture of the development on the periphery of the Venetian maritime empire. [60] Alarming indications of an imminent escalation of conflict with the Turks had grown more frequent since January 1645. In summer, an incident in the eastern Mediterranean became the reason for the Hohe Pforte to set a fleet into motion to capture Crete. [61] On 22 August 1645, Chania fell, and a war that would last almost a quarter of a century had begun. [62] The defence of the Christian world would depend on the negotiations in Münster and Osnabrück, Contarini wrote in a private letter, while the Venetian leadership persisted in fearful paralysis. [63] Here, tensions had emerged over time between the Senate and their envoy, who favoured a more active role for Venice. [64] The threatened sharpening of the situation in the Aegis formed the background for Contarini's diplomatic activity; he seized the opportunity to appeal for direct support for the Turkish war. [65] The lines of power structured by the Mediterranean world - including the conflict between Spain and Portugal, with the latter supported by France; the Catalan crisis; and the Italian tableau - formed a system of co-ordinates that confirmed his political thinking - that war against Turkey was his actual theme. As the provisional treaty with France was drawn up, the Venetian ambassador believed in all honesty that he could recruit a hundred thousand retired mercenaries for Venice. Characteristically, the Senate considered it reasonable to send the Secretary Gerolamo Cavazza to Bavaria after the conclusion of the Ulm cease-fire in March 1647, where he was to hire the soldiers that Prince Maximillian thought of dismissing. [66]

It is not possible to determine exactly the overall significance of Venetian mediation in the achievement of peace; in the literature, it is rather moderately assessed. [67] Contarini's voice nevertheless remained impossible to ignore in the flurry of diplomatic discussions, and it increased in importance the more his role became that of the independent defender of the state. He emerged as the drop of oil in the peace machinery, and his negotiating maxim was to do everything that supported the pax universalis - and to work against everything that stood in its way. [68] He advocated that the negotiations should open the Reich Diet, [69] and he blocked the attempts by Spain to engage him in a hopeless ploy to preserve Breisach for the House of Habsburg. Peace must be achieved at any price, was his argument. [70] Contarini's positive role in conjunction with the provisional agreement with France was obvious. In addition, the sources show his never-tiring engagement during the Congress crisis in early summer 1647. At that time, he wrote to his nephew that he did not have a moment of peace and quiet; rather, the arthritic diplomat dragged himself, with the aid of a walking stick, from one discussion to the next. [71] He was also occupied with numerous small concerns - such as complaints about the demands for contributions in the area around Münster. [72] Contarini and the Nuncio kept themselves largely out of the talks between Spain and the States-General. [73] On occasion, they were used to bring the Spanish-French dialogue back on track, but the Dutch took on the role as mediator, or interpositori - to the annoyance of Contarini and Chigi. [74] Particularly sensitive Venetian interests were involved here, as Amsterdam was the chief emporium of Dutch weapons transport for the Turkish war. [75]

For the mediators, the final phase of the negotiations was dramatic. What went on behind the scenes was less clear to them than ever. In February 1648, Contarini appeared to have lost all confidence that something would come out of the 'German peace (teuchen Frieden)', and he asked the Senate for permission to leave. [76] His reports reflected a nervousness and, even more, a feeling of powerlessness over a process that had taken on its own uncontrollable dynamic. Only in the early summer would the tone of the reports become more optimistic.

A contemporary emblem likened the wonder of the peace agreement to finding a needle in a haystack. Contarini was certainly proud that both Venetian mediation and he, in particular, were explicitly named in the peace treaty. Indeed, he mentions this right at the beginning of his final communiqué. On the other hand, he was not successful in wresting from Servien a French commitment, by means of an agreement in a secret article, to assist 'against the Turks'. Contarini came to the conclusion for the Doge and Senate that two advantages emerged out of the peace agreement for the Republic: first, that the Emperor's potency had suffered a setback, and second, that Venice's mediation was considered praiseworthy by all involved. [77]

Never, in any phase of the Congress, did Contarini have illusions about the room for negotiation available to him as mediator. 'This ship from Münster', he commented once, 'will not set off on its trip, unless it does so with the winds that blow from the harbour'. [78] The shocking experience of the Revolt of Masaniello against Spanish rule in Naples (1647) and the news about the unrest in France amply taught the Italian that storms from other places also threatened and that the plans of politicians ought not to count on the endless patience of the public. [79] Wicquefort, the most significant diplomatic theoretician of the 17th century, made the judgement that the Münster mediators harvested more suffering than successes, and even less honour. [80] And he continued: 'Their intentions were good, but they came up against such toughness, and even the best reasoning in the world was not able to soften it [...] If truth be told, it isn't the mediators who finalised the treaties, but the positive approach of the parties to the conflict'. Certainly, the secular significance of the Westphalian Peace lay in the fact that it was a compromise peace that came about via an outward form of mediation. The efforts of the mediators earned placative, even programmatic significance for the style of the negotiations - even if they only had the power of their words against the interests of steel.

FOOTNOTES