The Thirty Years' War was not just the culmination and the end of the seemingly never-ending Dutch war of independence, but also a "maelstrom" in the heart of Europe. It usually obscures the silent, hard, malicious, "peaceful" struggle over trade which made the countries of north-west Europe into rivals for dominance of the great trade arteries between northern and southern Europe. Because economic dominance normally went hand in hand with military control, it was easy for competition for markets to turn into open naval warfare. The French market, however, was at the centre of the European economy.

The Peace of Westphalia was a very limited peace treaty, relating above all to continental Europe and covering the Holy Roman Empire and the southern Baltic. The conflict between the French crown and the House of Habsburg continued as a Franco-Spanish war and did not end until the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659). At the same time fighting restarted in the Baltic, with massive intervention by the Dutch Republic, intent on gaining free access to the Belt. In the Danish-Swedish War (1643-1645) it supported Sweden, but in the later conflicts between the two states (1657-1660) took the Danish side. However the decisive clashes were the three Anglo-Dutch wars (1652-1654, 1665-1667, 1672-1674). These were no longer wars of independence, but primarily trade wars, which affected the European markets in their entirety.



The French economy and the Thirty years' War

During the wars with England, France was the crucial link in the Dutch convoy system. The two great battles of the first Anglo-Dutch conflict in 1652/53 took place in the English Channel. On the outward voyage Admiral Tromp escorted an "outbound" convoy heading for La Rochelle, on the return journey a convoy of 150 sailing ships - no small number - which had gathered at La Rochelle. [1] This indirectly poses the question of the effects of the Thirty Years' War, and consequentially the Peace of Westphalia, on the French economy. Normally descriptions of this terrific European catastrophy restrict themselves to the mainland and the most conspicuous and spectacular aspects. But at least two Frances existed in parallel: The north and north-east was the vehicle and the victim of the military efforts, the target of devastation and destruction. The west, involved in maritime trade and export, was relatively protected. As far as the Mediterranean coast is concerned, it lived its own life, centred on export of fabric, especially cloth, to the east. In 1664 Colbert still held this to be France's most important export in terms of value.

If one takes this analysis further it turns out that the Dutch War (1672-1678) reversed the fronts. Under the leadership of Vauban and Condés France, forced to compete with the English and Dutch naval forces, and strengthened by new acquisitions, became drawn into a "Reunions" policy. This policy of "pré carré" [i.e. the kingdom of France in its geographical borders, translator's note], was actually in the first place intended to create a continuous line of defence or attack. And the economic context of all these events is important. France bought almost all its weapons, especially heavy weapons, abroad. The French army's technical equipment had for some time rightly been regarded as exceptionally outdated. The German encyclopaedias of the second half of the 17th century held a low view of the quality of the French armies, although the evaluation is less critical after 1680. [2] For this reason attempts were made to modernize French metallurgy. This development was to some extent determined by the requirements of the war from 1635 to 1659. It brought advantages to the poor and forested areas, the property of the high nobility. Not until the desperate efforts of Colbert did France become independent in arms production, and even gradually an exporter. At the same time the war bought forward a staff of military engineers - the Italian influence is considerable here. [3] These new technologies inevitably influenced the economy. The construction of fortresses and arsenals caused large amounts of capital to flow to marginal regions, from which the most devastated, and also of course poorest border regions profited most (with the exception of Alsace and Franche-Comté).



The French economic balance sheet for the Thirty Years' War

As we have seen, the development of the French economy can only be understood in the European context. Which is why the French developments are very diverse, even contradictory. The period from 1648-1660 appears terribly complex, because it was based on a very delicate balance. The east and above all the north-east remained battlefields, at the mercy of looting and "desertions". Alsace and Lorraine were among the regions worst affected by the wars - this remained so until 1659. Repopulation and reconstruction were late in starting, sometime between 1670 and 1680. The demographic and economic collapse suffered by the three bishoprics of Toul, Metz and Verdun was only marginally less serious. [4] Champagne, the Laon region, Vexin and Picardy were less affected, but still suffered serious losses. The peasants' complaints to the ?Secrétariat d'Etat à la guerre? [Secretary of State for War] form a ?red stripe? of several hundred kilometres along the Somme, then the Moselle and the Meuse, and finally the Saône. [5] In the hinterland the Paris basin centre, which had been seriously affected during the religious wars, once again suffered the horror of the Fronde.

Behind this zone of destruction and declining population it was still possible to maintain a line of communication which was as important then as it is unknown today: the Lyon - Troyes - Netherlands line. It appears to us that the uncertain situation in the Alsace/Lorraine/Champagne favoured its maintenance, and even caused a certain upturn for the city of Lyon. The city on the Rhône remained an important financial centre. It offered a double way out, on the one hand via Savoy to Italy, and on the other to Geneva and the Alpine crossing region formed by Switzerland. The obstacle of the above-mentioned "red belt" could thus be bypassed to the south.

Together with the Mediterranean coast, the west with its varied components forms a very clear contrast, despite the Franco-Spanish war. This becomes clear in the example of Saint-Malo. In so far as the history of this town can be followed, there is a clear development curve: a strong rise during the second half of the 16th century, slowed a little by a phase of limited independence in connection with the conflict between Henry IV and the league; then - until about 1650 - a constant stable horizontal progression of the curve corresponding to a phase of consolidation and orientation, and finally from 1650 to 1688 a strong upturn, stopped by the wars at the end of the reign of Louis XIV. But Saint-Malo's commerce is the pillar of trade with Seville. [6] So one should not think that war even just reduced trade with Spain. The same applies to Poitou's connections with the Iberian peninsula: Poitou exported grain on a large scale (as did Morbihan) and mules to an even greater extent. We are dealing with a number of more or less independent markets, which overlap at their margins. Instead of a "world market" (F. Braudel and Wallerstein) one should rather speak of trade zones with varying geometry depending on product.

Altogether the war did not in the slightest interrupt exports of the major agricultural products from the rural regions of western France, however great the misfortune suffered by the individual areas. But France was largely a "passive" exporter. Its ship owners (to the extent they existed at all) were from the lower or middle bourgeoisie and had only limited financial means. The ports with lively traffic were not necessarily those at the river mouths like Nantes and Bordeaux (Le Havre was still a very small town). Rouen was the port for the capital, but had suffered greatly in the religious wars. The ports which had the greatest shipping traffic, and their own naval units with powerful ships, were Dieppe, Honfleur, Grandville, Saint-Malo, and La Rochelle with Royan affiliated to it. [7] A glance at the map is enough to see how far these ports were from the centre, and that their hinterland was insufficient. They were also relatively shallow and therefore more or less unable to meet the requirements of major trade. Worse still, the only goods which were important in terms of weight were salt, wine and grain. And these products all had significant disadvantages

Grain harvests were subject to strong fluctuations. So - as in the case of price rises and famine - export was extremely uneven and the prices, and with them the profit, fluctuated. As far as salt is concerned the growth rates were modest, and limited by the high taxation. The same applies to wine. After accounting for annual fluctuations its average production remained constant throughout the ancien régime. So the great export market of France - especially western France - offered only goods with limited scope for development. The price of the one was too low, of the other too unstable, to allow for a calculable profit.

In 1582 England had more than 55 ships with over 100 t and 18 with over 200 t, in 1629 it was 178 and 145 respectively. In the meantime the global capacity had risen from 67,000 t to 115,000 t. [8] France lagged far behind. Most of the French merchant fleet was still in a large number of small ports, and was spread out widely along the rivers and the Breton coast. The "shipowners" of these ports were small merchants, their fleets small in number and capacity. The effects of the Peace of Westphalia on this economic structure must have been considerable. For it freed the Dutch merchant fleet from all war-related obligations. The upturn led to intensified Dutch trading activity on the Baltic, in the Mediterranean, and on the west coast of France. Since 1640 the merchants of Nantes had been trying to persuade the king's advisers to take measures to counteract Dutch hegemony. In Nantes (and probably also in the other French port towns, with the exception of Saint-Malo) the Dutch trading agents belonged to the upper class. They were permanently resident, controlled all goods traffic in the Loire port, and bought up the grain directly from the producers before it was even ripe. They completely circumvented the local trading network by selling their Dutch products directly to the consumer, and purchasing their production directly. This was made easier for them by the constant low Dutch cargo prices. So they set their prices as they pleased. These merchants were also reputed to be particularly arrogant, and a letter of complaint quotes one of their mottos "the Greeks - i.e. the French - don't know a lot about trade" (original quote Dutch). [9] They were a minority whose economic weight far exceeded their numbers. [10] And that in a very Catholic town - one must imagine their role in La Rochelle before 1627. For major trading capital had chosen La Rochelle as its seat rather than Nantes or Bordeaux, and even ahead of Marseille. Richelieu profited from the weakening of Dutch trade and military through the war, which restarted in 1621, meaning that England had to assist the Protestants of La Rochelle completely alone. But the power of La Rochelle was demonstrated in 1622 by the town's ability to repel a royal squadron in an indecisive naval battle (Battle of Ile de Ré). It must be said that the royal squadron consisted of galleys (from the Mediterranean) and armed merchant ships. A similar battle took place in 1625 off Lorient, where La Rochelle even captured six royal ships. Not until September 1625 did the Protestants suffer their first defeat. This time the "French" fleet was made up of English and Dutch ships "borrowed" from those two powers. As a consequence the political situation was very complex and capricious. The battle ended with the withdrawal of the English and Dutch ships. However, despite Richlieu's capture of La Rochelle, maritime trade (and as an indirect consequence river trade in the whole French Atlantic and English Channel area to the east of a line from the Burgundy plateaus to the Cevennes) remained largely under Dutch, and to a lesser extent English control. It was divided into two areas: 1. The river ports (i.e. at river mouths), where this influence was strongest, and 2. the port towns of the Saint-Malo or La Rochelle type, which one can term imprecisely but illuminatingly as "maritime republics". They possessed indisputable autonomy and occasionally pursued an independent foreign policy. This partial autonomy did not end until the capture of La Rochelle. This situation was contingent on the weakness of the French central power and the scope for political manoeuvring in maritime trade between Spain, Holland and England. We believe it is possible that French foreign trade underwent another upturn from 1650 on. This is indicated by the increase in various port taxes. And Colbert's investigation of 1664 put the size of the fleet at 150,000-180,000 t [12], making it probable that - given that the useful life of a merchant ship at that time was about 15-18 years - a large part of this fleet must have been built between 1640 and 1664 (whether as new ships or renovation of existing ships). In 1688 the figure passed 200,000 t, while the capacity of English ships was 340,000 t.

Some general conclusions can be drawn from the above observations. France's hostile attitude to Holland was not a specifically French phenomena. Fear and envy of the dominant country were widespread from the Baltic to Spain (the struggle between the English and Dutch economies between 1648 and 1652 was particularly bitter). It may have been the Atlantic ports which gave Colbert his hostile attitude. It is known that some of Colbert's confidants came from Nantes (Savary). As far as Colbert' calculations are concerned, they are extremely plausible in the context of the epoch. The quantitative inferiority of the French merchant fleet compared to the English fleet did not appear insurmountable, as the difference was not that great. On the other hand the difference to the Dutch merchant fleet could not be closed in the foreseeable future. Colbert openly admitted the inherited weakness of French trade. The costs of Dutch shipbuilding were much lower than the French (and even the English). Therefore duties on Dutch products were openly intended to create a balance between the French ship owners and their Dutch competitors. It is also indicative that Colbert was unconcerned about a possible Dutch reaction. He believed that Franco-Dutch trade was not of sufficient importance to Holland to justify a war.

More importantly, the English example stimulated imitation. All of Europe was impressed by England's policy of balancing economic disadvantage with the threat of a large navy. [12]

French economic circles were by no means consistently hostile to Holland. One can guess which opinions dominated in La Rochelle, even if the king's policy did everything to favour the Catholic shipowners. However the opinions of the great port towns were in contradiction to the inland merchant milieu. Haberdashers from Paris, royal tax farmers, and the merchants of the great French north-south communication lines were more than reserved. While France was the primary agricultural market in Europe, Holland was the major producer and distributor of all products for the "higher" social classes. It is still difficult to estimate just how significantly this very heterogeneous new category of luxury customer increased in France during the first half of the 17th century. This is a surprising observation in view of the poverty of the people and the horror of the never-ending war.



The capital Paris

Due to its concentration of capital Paris, whose population had doubled during the Thirty Years' War, became an important market for normal commodities and luxury goods. Great wealth and harsh poverty probably existed side by side there. Nonetheless nowhere else in Europe was there such a strong demand for goods and objects of all kinds. Paris had reached almost half a million inhabitants. Royalty, high nobility and parliamentarians' families were to an extent in competition and had contradictory interests, but they were equals in purchasing power in this uniquely stimulating urban centre.

In food production the capital city at the heart of the Paris basin promoted the development of a modern, capitalist and highly productive agriculture. [13] Of course the natural conditions played a role here. The loess soils of the Beauce, Brie, Valois and the Île-de-France were amongst the most fertile in France. This type of farming involved tenant farmers who "only" owned their team and their tools, and large landowners who closely supervised the cultivation of their land. This left an indelible mark on the landscape. The social rise of the families of the great farms, which was to continue for several centuries, began at the start of the 17th century. Uncertain wealth in uncertain times. The Paris area suffered greatly from the turmoil of the civil wars, especially the Fronde, invasions by Lorrainese troops in 1652 and the "damage" caused by marauding troops. The peasant villages crowded together in the valleys of Marne and Seine, on whose slopes a versatile viniculture was practised. The milk and vegetable producing belt round Paris is also worthy of mention. This agricultural branch was versatile and lucrative. In the field of building materials Paris possessed a double advantage. There was a wide range of types of stone underneath the city - so it was not necessary to look further afield. However, the bedrock had been exploited since Gallo-Roman times and had gradually taken the appearance of Swiss cheese. Second advantage: gypsum was available in abundance. And finally, the flow of goods was brought in on the Seine and Marne. The Seine had been greatly straightened since the 16th century. It had flood basins which could be used to create artificial high water to allow ships to manoeuvre safely through narrow points and difficult transverse dikes which were difficult to pass. The great innovation of the previous century had been the improvement of the river for large-scale transport of timber, mostly from Morvan. Up-river from the heart of the city of Paris, especially in the biggest slum area Saint Marcel, both banks of the river turned into gigantic collections of timber stacks of all types: building timber for the roofs, heavy piles to be rammed in piecework into the mud of the main bed of the Seine or as supports for the great bridges which stood literally on a forest of stilts, and finally firewood, for the towed rafts of timber were used for heating in the city. [14] Paris smelt of woodsmoke, while London heated with coal.

In 1636, in view of the possibility of a siege of Paris by the Spanish troops pouring through from the north (from Corbie), who plundered the rural areas east of Paris up to the Marne, Richlieu ordered calculations of the needs of the population of Paris to be made. These showed that it was priviledged in comparison to other major European cities (with the exception of London, Constantinople and possibly Amsterdam). The average per head consumption of meat exceeded the 50 kg mark and the other figures are equivalent, which is not to deny the enormous differences in living standards. Since Louis XI the Faubourg Saint-Antoine quarter had had various privileges, which were guaranteed and extended under Louis XIII and Richelieu. In the first place this involved complete freedom of profession, free of the strict regulations of the Parisian guilds. This explains the innovative character of the craft products of this suburb, where part of the population was war refugees, principally from the "red zone" mentioned above. Apart from the court, the customers of these enterprises included the wealthy and very heterogeneous group of the high nobility, parliamentarians and high dignitaries, and also bourgeois of various origin. Enriched through or for the war, this clientele was in a position to follow all the ever-quicker changes in fashion. One must only consider the rise in importance of the French arts, painting and architecture, to recognize the shift in wealth in the capital. This is the glorious age of the great religious buildings of the Counter Reformation, the fine Parisian "Hôtels" and - with more interruption and contingent on the financial situation - royal buildings. Patrons and collectors grew in numbers and Paris became a great artistic centre, attracting foreign artists, especially from the Netherlands. So to some extent taxation of war was turned into things of beauty. The taxes paid by the rural population were redistributed to the armies and the capital. The result, as we know, was large popular uprisings which characterize half the century and only very slowly came to an end at the start of the reign of Louis XIV. [15]



Effects on the population

The required increase in taxes, which quadrupled in less than a decade, could of course only be applied using force. The tax collectors often had to be accompanied by an armed escort. One can and should speak of wartime dictatorship rather than "absolute" monarchy. It was natural that improvisation was the order of the day. This wartime dictatorship was accompanied by immense chaos, which is difficult for the historian to grasp, but is the only way to explain why the war with Spain continued after the Peace of Westphalia. "Public opinion" or that which can be taken as such, did not understand why the war continued and that basically nothing had been decided.

The tax rises were particularly bitter in a time of crop failures, and the troops brought epidemics with them. When they marched through stocks were destroyed, sowing was prevented, and famine resulted.

A vicious circle resulted, a true circulus vitiosus, a downward spiral. The demographic situation, one of the principle components of state power and economic life, differed greatly from region to region. The birth rates in the west showed a tendency to rise, the increase being above the national average until 1640. In other areas they were stable or fell more or less distinctly, depending on the military situation. The final phase of the religious wars was accompanied by falling climatic and demographic curves, which especially between 1580 and 1600 reached an alarming scale. However the population decline did not lead to desertion of less lucrative regions to attend to the most fertile fields but rather - sooner or later - to a compensatory population recovery. This process was strengthened by the use of abandoned areas to graze herds of cattle. The nutritional situation improved, wages rose because work was plentiful but workers in short supply - the preconditions for an economic upturn, which declined again after a time.

This pattern can be observed above all in the areas with a large number of not very productive fields (mainly southern France and Centre). The crisis of the first half of the 17th century was dramatic. But fortunately, despite the war and its privations, it did not reach the scale of the 14th century crisis. It is even possible that the highest population level was somewhat above that of the end of the Middle Ages.

On the one hand war, increased taxation and epidemics caused a gradual reduction in agricultural production and population levels. On the other hand the peasantry (and with it the feudal lords, who had a direct interest in a rising population rate) found new energy to limit the effects of these negative factors.

Without reaching the scale of devastation experienced in central Europe, eastern France lost half its population through the destruction. But that does not mean that all trade disappeared. If the looters were to make even a small profit the looted goods had to be sold somewhere. The great trade arteries, especially those from south to north over the Alps, remained intact. This route was used to transport the money which the Spanish troops in the southern Netherlands desperately needed. And it was the march route to the north for the Italian reinforcements to maintain the strength of 18,000 men in the "Spanish" tercios [Spanish elite troops, translator's note]. [16] The great Spanish continental route shifted further and further east as the war went on (Lorraine, Rhine region). The French north-south route mentioned above also survived. It used the Rhône valley, at Lyon took the crossroads to Savoy via Turin, then itself forking: to the north via Troyes to Brussels, and via the Seine (and the Loire between Nevers and Orleans) to Paris.

The contrast between the collapse of agriculture and trade in central Europe and eastern France, and the boom of the English maritime economy was especially great. The English merchant fleet grew considerably in the first half of the 17th century. Despite certain difficulties and although markets on the Baltic and the Atlantic coast had been lost to England, Dutch maritime trade also flourished. Namely thanks to the upturn of the V.O.C., which made a level of profits which would never again be achieved. The latent Anglo-Dutch conflict remained suppressed until 1648 because the Netherlands concentrated on their conflict with Spain. In the meantime this rivalry allowed the French merchant navy to develop and hold markets abandoned by the main protagonists. It even initiated trade with the Caribbean islands. Fouquet started this venture, and Colbert brought in Mazarin. Thus, one can see, the Thirty Years' War obscured the considerable growth in England's power, and allowed France - or more exactly the French coastal towns - to pull back cleverly and in good time.

The two geographical aspects of French policy are also clearly outlined. The land, by far the most important aspect, and the water, which the state left in private hands wherever possible. It is illuminating that Richelieu only agreed to the construction of a navy because the necessity of conflict with Spain forced him to. Richelieu's testament describes clearly the necessity and importance of ships of the line, but emphasizes solely the need for galleys. This had not previously been recognized. Moreover this opinion, elaborated at great length, is in clear contradiction of the facts. Various explanations are possible: 1. The declared aim is to interrupt the flow of silver (and credits) which the Spanish galleys transported from Barcelona to Genoa. The Spanish squadrons and ships risked this transport ever more rarely on the English Channel. 2. For the political authorities cloth from Languedoc remained France's main export article. But cloth belonged to the category of low-volume high-value products so its transport did not require a great capacity (and therefore no great number of ships). 3. Galleys were much cheaper than naval sailing ships, recruitment of oarsmen was relatively easy, and the number of sailors required was small. So the military navy's personnel requirements did not clash with the needs of the merchant navy. Finally 4.: There is always a time-lag between an innovation (the ship of the line) and recognition of its consequences. So Maillé-Brézé's squadrons were very mixed. In 1646 his squadron which was deployed on 14 June in the battle off Giglio (near Ortibello) included 36 sailing ships, some of them converted merchant ships, and 20 galleys. The opposing Spanish squadron had 22 sailing ships and 30 galleys. The French only lost the battle because the admiral was killed and the entire fleet took flight as a result.

In this context Mazarin's defeat of the Fronde was in a way a Pyrrhic victory. Until the Peace of the Pyrenees, Mazarin was unable to maintain a fleet suitable for major (as opposed to sporadic) sea battles with Spain. The last attacks by French squadrons took place in 1652 (lifting of the Spanish blockade of La Rochelle and the French attempt to blockade Dunkirk from the sea too - although this was unsuccessful and the English fleet defeated the French on 15 September 1652) and lastly in 1655 when nine French ships put a Spanish squadron to flight off Barcelona. Nothing more happened until 1659. In 1661 apart from a few galleys, 18 French ships were left, of which some, like the "Saint Louis" had been built by the same Dutch ship designer who was responsible for the construction of the "Wasa" in Sweden. One should not forget, however, that France's efforts concentrated on strengthening its land forces.

Altogether Louis XIV's economic and foreign policies were much less original than is claimed. They arose in a situation which was determined partly by the Thirty Years' War, partly by the Peace of Westphalia. By creating a demographic and cultural [##really??##] low-point in central Europe, the Thirty Years' War opened the way for France's political and cultural hegemony under Louis XIV. As far as the Peace of Westphalia is concerned, that Holland went its own way and signed the peace treaty with Spain must be regarded as a failure for French policy. Nonetheless the treaty was a success for France, because Spain was forced to fight alone against France. Later the Peace of the Pyrenees would give Colbert the opportunity to improve the financial situation, equip the army, and rebuild the navy. In the long term it meant that the danger for England no longer came from Holland but from France. The consequence of the fast growth in power of Holland and later England meant that the political events shifted to north-west Europe.

FOOTNOTES