On 22 May 1706, the Priest of the Voigdehagen parish near Stralsund entered into the church register the marriage of Hans Brüneck, aged 102, and the widow Magdalena Arens, who was about fifty years his younger. As such a union was truly not a daily occurrence, the Priest added to his register entry something the groom had said to confirm his age: he boasted that he had fought, aged 24, in the successful defence of Stralsund against the imperial-Wallenstein besieger in June/July 1628, and that he had remained loyal to the flag for decades thereafter. For the bride and groom, as well as for the Lutheran priest, that event was a memorable and well-known example of the heroic war of beliefs that had taken place. As such, it was a part of popular historical consciousness, like many other incidents of the Thirty Years' War. [2]

The defence of Stralsund also had an important place in power politics, above all because of its consequences. At the peace negotiations in Münster and Osnabrück, the parties weighed up the war's causes and beginnings, as well as the assignment of debt, against each other, and Stralsund had a not inconsiderable position in this calculation. In his letter from Linz to his ambassadors at the Westphalian Peace Congress, dated 27 February 1646, Emperor Ferdinand III blamed the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus for having primarily started the war against Poland in Prussia in July 1626 in order to 'collect his peoples and lead them onto territory of the Reich'. He had 'made all readiness for war in Germany' and had only waited for a favourable opportunity to 'justify' his invasion. [3 ]The trouble in Stralsund in spring 1628 had delivered him this 'pretext'. The military help that Gustavus Adolphus (named after the Danish King) supplied the city - not without his demanding an alliance, troop presence and his protection - was judged by the Emperor in a later note of 5 March 1646 as 'a true principium belli'. [4] That proved correct to the extent that the Swedish leadership used their occupation of Stralsund as a bridgehead for their invasion of Pomerania, which followed two years later. [5] The Swedish side justified the 'Stralsund succurs' and the later 'expedition' into Reich territories as a necessary defence against the imperial-Catholic power, which dominated the southern Baltic coast and threatened Sweden with entire armies and a naval force, albeit a small one, at the end of 1627. The discussion in the Reich Council as to whether one should confront the opposition either 'domi' or 'foris' - out in Stralsund or home in Kalmar - was decided in favour of the concept of aggression, which was the option defended both passionately and with pragmatic arguments by the King. [6]

Essential to accelerated mobilisation in Sweden was the fact that, due to French intervention, a six-year armistice with Poland, in the Altmark, came about in September 1629. This truce freed Gustavus Adolphus from the demanding 'Polish war' and made possible his turn to the West. A new phase in Swedish Baltic policy began: driving forward the dominium maris by means of conquest of the opposing coastline, together with its harbours, and eliminating rivals, including Denmark, Poland-Lithuania and the Emperor. In the course of the Thirty Years' War, this Baltic-oriented goal was widely exceeded and covered large parts of Central Europe. Indeed, Sweden's intervention developed into a dominant aspect of the second half of the war. Numerous testimonials of that time prove that, in public consciousness, the war 'which never wanted to end' only really then began. The impression, offered by the Prioress of the Mariastein Cloisters in the diocese of Eichstätt, among others, was that of the annual or even more frequent return of the plundering 'Swedes' (the majority of soldiers were actually recruited in Germany) after 1631. [7] Research has not thus far given enough credit to the fact that, from a German perspective, the longer half of the war was in fact a 'Swedish' one.

The 'German war' of the Swedish crown took on a dimension of grave consequence and potential influence with the landing of an invading army at Usedom in the Duchy of Pomerania on 26 June/6 July 1630. [8] A relatively small force with 13,000 men, the army was not at first perceived to be a serious war party by the Emperor and Reich Diet. One of the unexplained questions of the war remains why the invaders, during a phase of the war that was decisive for them, met only weak resistance from imperial troops in the Odermündung, where they had landed. Within the next two weeks, the Swedish troops advanced toward Stettin. There, on 10/20 July, the King forced an alliance on Duke Bogislav XIV, on the grounds that the Duke's troops alone would not be able to protect his principality from the enemy, the imperial occupying troops. As he had in Stralsund, the Swedish king thus set up a military-supported protectorate. The predominant policy of wait-and-see of both the provincial diet and the public showed that they did not view this protectorate as an alternative to the 'Thirty Year ordeal' of the Emperor. In view of the uncertainties on German soil, Gustavus Adolphus felt it necessary to justify his operation in a 'deduction' (also distributed as a pamphlet, entitled 'Swedish War Manifesto'). Reaching a wide public sphere, the deduction had 21 editions in five languages and accompanied the start-up phase of the German war effort. It listed the Emperor's offences and injuries, and - in a more restrained fashion - the threat the Emperor posed to Swedish security. It claimed the protection of 'German liberty' as the most important reason for military engagement, while affirming the King's willingness for peace. The lack of a religious liberation motif in the document can be understood as a tactical measure that took into consideration both the Reich Diet and Catholic France. [9]

In contrast, Sweden and Finland, whose inhabitants were strongly and exclusively committed to Protestantism, the King and Reich Council, as well as all Reich Diet, had already resigned themselves years before 1630 to the "German war' as a possible and, ultimately, unavoidable undertaking. Considering the Catholic Counterreformation and the imperial Edict of Restitution, the representation of this latest war as a justifiable act of solidarity with their German brethren of the faith most caught hold amongst the Swedish church folk. As their spiritual and moral armament, preachers decreed days of fasting and of remaining in bed, which contributed decisively as the mass media of their time. [10] A sparsely populated Sweden showed itself to be capable of fulfilling the material and technical requirements for a significant war venture, one that was difficult to foresee. Indeed, wars against Russia, Denmark, and Poland indicated that Sweden was in sufficiently good military form, thanks to an exemplary armaments production, whose initiator, the immigrant Dutch Calvinist Louis de Geer, had brought with him both his capital and his connections. [11]

The degree of discipline and the capacity for mobilisation at all levels of Swedish society, whose aristocratic upper class was comparatively less well-to-do, played a decisive role in the preparation for the 'German war'. Amongst the Swedish church folk, the leadership conveyed comprehensible, combative religious motives. In correspondence prepared for the German Reich Diet, the reasoning that won out derived more from political conflict and reputation. There is no doubt that the King and the politically decisive groups led the war against the Emperor to achieve power-oriented goals through their offensive. As was long known, Sweden's 'security' and 'greatness' had their place next to or even above religion as grounds for war. Religious beliefs could not have been the motivation behind battles before 1630, since the countries affected by Swedish expansion neither required a mission of liberation nor were they of the same confession. Rather, religious grounds first developed their standing and their esteem in the course of the 'German war'. [12]

In the start up phase of the Swedish invasion, however, there was little meaning behind the religious grounds and the proclaimed goal of wanting to protect the constitution of the Reich. This became apparent when, in the middle of September 1630, Gustavus Adolphus intervened from his base in Pomerania to win back Mecklenburg for the expelled Duke. There, he let circulate a 'mandate to the subjects of both Principalities of the State of Mecklenburg', dated 12 October. In the mandate, he accused the inhabitants of disloyalty to their government and summoned them 'to join' their own, as well as his, army. The public should capture, quash, and expel those who, as 'enemies' and 'God's robbers', had recognised Wallenstein as their sovereign, agreeing to serve and obey him. [13] The pamphlet met with no real response, although it also emphasised the mutuality of religious beliefs. Rather, the Swedes encountered resistance in many places, their advance ultimately a complete failure. Only in the second attempt at the end of January 1631, a few months after Wallenstein was deposed, did the capture of eastern Mecklenburg and later, the repatriation of the Duchy, succeed. Over the course of the winter of 1630-31, the Swedish army completed the occupation of all Pomerania, engaging in multiple operations against the ever-weaker imperial forces.

After Wallenstein's removal from the Generality, the imperial army remained without a commander for four months, until the League commander Tilly took over the office at the end of 1631. With this move, the imperial forces won back their tactical mobility in attack and counter-attack with Gustavus Adolphus, combined with their revenge campaigns and looting as in Pasewalk (September 1630) and Neubrandenburg (9 March 1631). [14] The Swedes delivered a counterblow in Frankfurt/Oder in April, when they killed almost 2000 soldiers and inhabitants. By taking possession of this particular city, they once again threatened the imperial homeland. In Vienna, their advance was expected to begin from the Oder onwards. [15]

Much less successful than the military advance were Gustavus Adolphus's diplomatic efforts to create further allies in the Reich. He was joined in a pact on 1 August 1630 only by the city of Magdeburg, itself a threatened stronghold of a militant Protestantism, and Count Christian Wilhelm of March Brandenburg, the adventurous administrator of the archbishopric. According to this pact, the allies were obligated to provide defence against the Emperor and to serve in a leading role during revolt, while the King assured them of his full support. But neither did anyone follow the example of the rebellious citizenry, nor did the administrator get his way in the bishopric. As a result, Gustavus Adolphus did not risk advancing far into the interior of these territories. Catastrophe followed, as the imperial besiegers captured the city of Magdeburg on 20 May 1631 and brought about the most horrible massacre of the entire war. A major fire of unexplained origin subsequently destroyed almost all of the city's buildings. The case of Magdeburg, which was brought to the public's attention with countless accusatory fliers and which harmed the imperial image, nevertheless signalised the imponderabilities and miscalculations of Swedish expansion. Gustavus Adolphus believed it to be necessary to distribute a written justification as a means of cleansing himself of all suspicion of guilt in the fate of Magdeburg. He applied this suspicion to others, including the neutral Electors of Brandenburg and Sachsen. [16] The reformed Count Wilhelm of Hesse-Cassel had already formed an alliance with Sweden in November 1630; nevertheless, this pact was initially of little use.

The successes that were achieved at the beginning of the Swedish invasion, on the one hand, and the difficulty, not easily overcome, of financing the growing mass of soldiers and their livelihoods, on the other, once again brought French diplomacy into the picture. After months of negotiation, a treaty of subsidies emerged in Bärwalde, Gustavus Adolphus's Pomeranian headquarters, on 13 January 1631. This treaty required the King to maintain, in combat-ready form, army of 30,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, for which France's catholic King paid 400,000 thaler annually. The problem that proved detrimental to the halo of the Swedish 'religious campaigner', namely, his pursuit of a war with the help of a domestically-militant Catholic power, was solved in the following manner: the Swedish King renounced any change of confession and showed that he was ready to pursue neutrality with the likes of Bavaria or the League, given that they abandoned their war efforts against him. The political position of the Bavarian Elector stood in the way of this, however, as he had agreed to a secret pact with France on 28 April 1631. Despite intermittent disruptions, the collaboration between Sweden and France functioned both during and after the war. Indeed, it was one of the most important indicators of the strongly pragmatic, power political aspect of Swedish participation in the war. The King himself made this clear in his public celebration of the Bärwalde Treaty. The more the circle of activity of the anti-Reich power grew, the more urgent the most powerful Protestant Reich Diets perceived their grouping to be for the Reich's defence. The great majority of them met in the Convention of Leipzig from 16 February to 12 April 1631, in order to form themselves as a 'third party' between Sweden and the imperial side, whereby the latter, through their inflexibility, had prepared the ground for Swedish invasion of the conflict-laden Reich. They agreed to campaigns and a common fighting force of 40,000 men, 12,000 of which were furnished by Kursachsen alone. The Catholic Reich Diets also strengthened their collective force under Bavaria's leadership. [17]

The Viennese Court countered these efforts with a show of inflexible might, which they emphasised by having the imperial military march on Saxony and Leipzig. This rather pretentious politicking of the powerful drove both Protestants Electors to the side of Gustavus Adolphus. In Brandenburg, Gustavus Adolphus then had at his disposal a zone of deployment and fortresses, as prescribed by a treaty. Next, he secured an alliance with Johann Georg of Saxony on 12 September. A few days later, on the 17th of that month, Adolphus fought a memorable battle in the village of Breitenfeld, near Leipzig. In addition to outnumbering the imperialists by 30 per cent, Gustavus Adolphus masterfully administered tactics of narrow, moveable lines and used superior, light field artillery, both of which contributed to a decisive victory. Tilly's army was crushingly beaten in less than two hours. Only a third of the troops managed to escape, and hundreds of them were killed by farmers, according to chroniclers. [18] There was almost no imperial army left to defend against the further invasion of the victors. Saxony's military unexpectedly occupied Silesia and Bohemia, while the Swedish army approached the Forest of Thuringia.

The Breitenfeld slaughter marked a great change in the Swedish crown's German war effort, without solving the long-term problems of paying soldiers and financing the war. It offered the necessary forward momentum to enter the southern half of the Reich, with its other structures. The consequences of this move, however, were hard to judge. Here, every component of the 'German war' started to show the effect that had been vaguely proclaimed, in dark prophesies, in the north, and above all in the cities: that the yearned for, saviour-like, avenging 'midnight lion' ultimately took the form of Gustavus Adolphus. This notion was hawked by pulpit preaching and a never-before-seen flow of fliers - a cheap mass medium intended to influence the general thinking of the populace. [19]

The shear unstoppable course of Sweden's victory was not only explained by a strongly faithful army and the talent of its Commander-King, but also by the mistakes and limitations of its opponent. Proceeding from victory to victory until 1630, the imperial-Catholic side overestimated its own strength while disregarding that of its enemy, including that of Sweden. The common bond of the Habsburg house, as well as the military and monetary assistance of Spain, required the Emperor to stand up for these interests with strong troop contingents in the Netherlands and Northern Italy. The great imperial fighting force put together by Wallenstein represented a threat to the influence of the Electors. At the Electors' Diet of Regensburg, the Electors forced both the release of Wallenstein and the reduction of the army. As a result, a vacuum took hold of the Reich in the summer of 1630, which the Swedish leadership promptly recognised and took advantage of. [20] The invasion of Saxon troops of the imperial territory and the appearance of the royal Swedish army on the doorstep of Southern Germany required the imperial court to undertake extraordinary endeavours, of which re-calling Wallenstein to the Generality was the most extraordinary. He alone appeared to be in a position to halt the progress of the Swedish army, which, by the spring 1632, had reached Bavaria and Swabia.

On 1 October 1631, Gustavus Adolphus opened a new stage of the Swedish campaign in the Reich with the capture of Erfurt, which then belonged to the archbishopric of Mainz. Würzberg fell on 15 October, without the imperial army under Tilly even contributing to its defence. The way ahead, through the 'Priest's Walk (Pfaffengasse)', which was richly endowed with cities, fortresses, and spiritual goods, lay open. According to the worldview of militant Protestantism that had been drilled into the Swedish soldiers, this was enemy territory where booty could be claimed, according to the law of war. The existence of spiritual goods and the privileges of the Catholic clergy were put into question, placed on disposition (secularised) or burdened with high taxes. The higher clergy and civil servants of the bishopric fled, while the lower-placed personnel and lower members of the church structure remained in place. The Swedish occupiers did not enforce their religion, but nevertheless supported energetically the ways of the Protestant church.

The Swedes captured the city and fortress of Mainz in the period before Christmas, 1631. Gustavus Adolphus opened the doors to Frankfurt am Main and achieved the oath of allegiance from the city, but Frankfurt avoided the establishment of a formal alliance. [21] Adolphus discovered in the counts and barons of the Reich a plentiful clientele, one that he was able to bind to him through titles, offices, and donations, although some Protestant Princes (those of Hesse-Darmstadt and Württemberg, for example) remained further afield. Via the donations from this clientele, the King reserved the iura superioritatis, as he had already done with the Dukes Wilhelm and Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar (Erfurt/Eichsfeld, Duchy of Franconia). High Swedish civil servants and military personnel, who comprised a new class of leaders in the 'Swedish state' at Mainz, also received donations. [22] Affiliated with the structures of the archbishopric, they began to build up a new civil and financial administration. In the given circumstances, this administration had the servicing of military and war needs as its primary goal, above all the providing of credit, contributions, billets, armaments, materials, and manpower for the building of (among others) Gustavsburg Fortress, at the mouth of the Main. Gustavus Adolphus himself developed a sparkling court life in the Martinsburg archdiocese in Mainz, from which he ruled the 'Rhein State' and took care of his relations with the Reich Diets and other authorities. At the same time, however, he built up armaments for the spring campaign of 1632. [23] In the occupied areas and homes of bishoprics, cloisters, and orders, as well as in private buildings, the largest ever confiscation of 'disowned' art and cultural goods was carried out. This kind of booty was customary for the other warring parties, including Denmark, Wallenstein and Bavaria. At the end of the war, Swedish generals transferred invaluable cultural objects, seized as war booty, out of Moravia and Bohemia to Sweden. The value of art treasures from the Prague Kleinseite alone was valued at 7 million thaler in July 1648. Expertise and careful treatment prevented greater losses during transport and storage. [24]

The Swedish leaders resident in Mainz set the following goals for their campaign in 1632: the elimination of the rebuilt imperial and League armies; the occupation of League territories, especially Bavaria; and the advance into imperial lands, which would be supported by farmers' rebellions and the Prince of Siebenbürgen's renewed drive toward Vienna. The political power of the Swedish victor was supposed to form a Corpus Evangelicorum - a federation similar to that of the Union, but under Swedish leadership. The King, as 'capo', should have at his disposal the entire power and resources of the federation partners. After his drive into Bavaria and Swabia in spring and summer 1632 and his victory over the League army under Tilly near Rain am Lech in April, the King had intended to invite the entire Protestant leadership of the four highest Reich circles to Ulm for 12 September, when they would agree to a new federation. The fact that Gustavus Adolphus demanded the oath of allegiance of the city of Augsburg, while at the same time freeing Augsburg from all ties to the Emperor and the Reich, hinted that he sought both to dismantle the constitution of the Reich and to oust the imperial forces. That he wanted to take control of them himself has not been proved, but remains pure speculation. [25] In contrast, those who wrote flyers and pamphlets saw him as following in the footprints of the wandering Gothic kings, crossing the Alps and obliterating the Papacy. This was linked to the notion, cultivated in Sweden, that the history of the Swedish people dated back to the Goths and their kings (störgoticism). The 'new advance on Rome' was not forthcoming, however, as contact to Venice and the Protestant members of the confederacy proved ineffective. [26]

The advance to the outskirts of the Alps and to Lake Constance left another trace - that of destruction and retribution. Catholic farmers resisted the Swedish intruders in scattered, armed activities, having been called to arms by the Bavarian Elector and the imperial military. As a countermeasure, the Swedish troops sought revenge, mercilessly pursuing the farmers and practising the tactic of 'scorching the earth' in lower Bavaria. As a result of both this tactic and later raids, the image of 'cruel Swedes' established itself in the Catholic Danube region, as far as Passau and beyond. [27] The terrible torture of extracting confessions by means of pouring manure down a person's throat was also attributed to the Swedes, and was known as the 'Swedish potion', although others practised this punishing method even before the Swedes. Indeed, anti-Swedish tales, songs and traditions continued into the 20th century. In the course of peaceful daily contact, some regions adopted the food term 'Kaltschale (cold bowl)', taken from kallskål, which Finnish soldiers prepared when they were stationed in wine-rich Würzburg. Soldiers prepared this meal, which they enjoyed as a refreshing soup, by filling their helmets with wine and adding bread crumbs. [28] Other facts also contradicted the image of Sweden as the enemy, such as their careful treatment during their move on Munich on 17 May 1632, for which Gustavus Adolphus demanded a high price.

In the majority Protestant areas of Franconia and Swabia, whose businessmen and bankers served the Swedish war primarily through the extension of credit and army supplies, the arrival and presence of Swedish troops aroused a broad, partly enthusiastic outpouring of sympathy. This was shown in the jubilation that surrounded their welcome, in services of thanks, as well as in gifts, poetry, newspaper articles, and in the massive, multifarious production of pictures. In addition, inexpensive illustrated pamphlets were hastily produced and sold. It was reported from Nuremberg, which Gustavus Adolphus had entered at the end of March 1632, that many people were wearing a silver-cast likeness of the King around their necks. In other locales, people kneeled down and prayed in front of engravings of his image. In Naumburg, the King himself rejected such signs of divine devotion. However, the freed and faithful Protestant peoples, adopting notions from both biblical and ancient traditions, celebrated him as the 'second Alexander', 'new Joshua, Gideon, and Judah Maccabee', 'Salvador', and 'destinus liberatur & restaurator patriae', and as one who would rein in and expel the papists and 'Jesuwider (Jesuits)'. [29] These various, differentiated reactions to the 'Royal Swedish' war efforts are still not completely understood. Undoubtedly, they represented the development of a religious movement and, in some places, a swarming mass movement, right in the middle of the war. The Swedish war effort took on this dimension because of the strong resonance of the King's personality, as well as of his propaganda-created image. Gustavus Adolphus was not only a strict ruler and a tough demandeur and commander, but also a highly observant Christian, a capable speaker (his German was fluent), a master of appearances who could move the masses - with a fine touch for sensing the mood of his audience, and an officer who shared the day-to-day hardships of war and the dangers of combat with his soldiers. Hardly any ruler of early modern Europe achieved popularity to the extent Gustavus Adolphus did, as Germany's conqueror. But this popularity also had its objective limits.

The tools available to each war party - their fighting forces - reached dimensions never before known and showed similar characteristics. The troops were a direct and immediate burden to the inhabitants, regardless of whether they were in 'enemy' or 'friendly' territory. One of the many registers (many of which were imprecise) about the overall strength of Swedish and allied forces in Germany at the end of 1631 amounted to the following figures (cf. table 1). [30]

According to this list, the infantry comprised 57 per cent and the cavalry 37 per cent of the expected strength. Adding in conscripts and recruits from Sweden, the total rises to 199,256 men. Other registers for the beginning of 1632 indicate somewhat lower figures. [31] The expected strength was not likely reached, however, as there were a great number of sick and only irregular supply of men from Sweden. Therefore, it is possible to estimate a total strength of about 150,000 men, excluding all hangers-on. A list of enemies defeated, imprisoned, or taken into service by the King and his armies by the 6th or 16th February, 1632, is instructive, in so far as it was prepared for propaganda purposes. In 70 battlefields, from Stralsund in 1628 until Würzburg in September 1631, the Swedes lost 4,152 and the imperial forces 75,440 men. For Breitenfeld, the proportion of losses was given as 800: 20,000. [32] So it appeared, as on illustrated fliers with natural landscape representations of over a hundred conquered cities and fortresses, that the German war effort was an unbroken chain of easy victories and triumphs. In reality, the German stage consumed some 50,000 men during this time period. Due to the almost yearly conscription (utskrivning) in Swedish and Finnish villages of all able-bodied men (those between the ages of 15 and 60), their numbers dwindled rapidly. At least three-quarters of them never returned. [33] The 'demographic catastrophe' in Sweden, as it is referred to by some researchers, was a sort of equivalent process to the depopulation in Germany, which itself was a result of the indirect effects of war. It was unavoidable that Swedish nationals comprised part of the troops. The Swedes were the most trustworthy part of the 'Royal Army' in the Baltic Coast garrisons (sjökanten), they secured the lines of both supplies and retreat, and they fulfilled vital functions in battle. A further socio-political consequence of Sweden's war of expansion was the shrinking supply of crown property, tended to by free farmers, a trend which proved to the advantage of the growing numbers of aristocracy, as well as to military personnel and high civil servants, who were rewarded with donations and enfeoffments. This process progressed at an accelerated rate under Queen Christina and could only with great effort be partially reversed in the form of 'reductions'.

With the occupation of Bavaria, the Swedish advance reached its zenith in the lifetime of Gustavus Adolphus, but not its final goal. The Swedish forces and the forces of its allies - the largest in Central Europe - acquired a worthy opponent in Spring 1632. After calling Wallenstein back to the Generality, the Catholic side formed an army in an astonishingly short time. This army advanced out of Bohemia into Franconia, threatening to cut off the main Swedish army from its northern passage, which was its most important life-line. In summer 1632, Gustavus Adolphus had to abandon the continuation of his operations against the imperial homelands in order to try to attack and destroy Wallenstein's fortified camp near Nuremberg. Nevertheless, all offensives made according to this strategy failed, and were accompanied by great losses on both sides due to hunger and disease. The patrician Lukas Behaim laconically described the situation near Nuremberg after three months of costly conflict as follows: 'from the enemy (the imperialists) three months of encampment; from the ally, four months of exhaustion'. [34] Impoverished, both armies abandoned the ruined battlefields at the end of August, this time Gustavus Adolphus without a victory. He turned instead southwards toward the Danube, to set off onto the route to Austria, where rebellious farmers awaited him. But the news that the imperial army was marching toward Saxony and that Field Marshall Holcks Scharen laid to waste its protectorate - as a warning to the Saxon Elector - forced the King to head back to the north, in order to prevent the loss of his unreliable ally, the Elector. The Swedish army marched quickly by Arnstadt, Erfurt, and Naumberg, which was level with Leipzig. Believing that the campaigns of 1632 were at their end, Wallenstein allowed considerable forces to march toward Halle, under the command of Field Marshall Pappenheim. This proved to be a fatal error, for Gustavus Adolphus reacted to it by immediately preparing to attack the imperial troops. The 'bloody affair' (Schiller) near the small town of Lützen, near Leipzig, on the 6/16 November 1632 ended in a victory for the Swedes, but only just. The imperial troops fled the battle field during the night, making an orderly retreat, however. The King fell; his short-sightedness probably led him mistakenly into enemy lines. In the opposing camp, the talented general, Gottfried Heinrich Count Pappenheim, was also killed. Bloodstained orders (dated 15 November), in Wallenstein's handwriting, were found in Pappenheim's uniform, ordering him to leave everything and 'to return with all people and goods'. [35] The body of the king, barely clothed, was found only after a long search in the debris. He was brought to Weißenfels, embalmed and laid-in-state. Once the ice had melted in the Baltic, in spring 1633, he was transported from Wolgast to Stockholm.

Taken together, all these incidents led increasingly to a crisis of Swedish power in Germany. In contrast to 1631, the imperial army remained a strong opponent on the battlefield. This put pressure on Sweden's partners to dissolve their alliance to Sweden, since it seemed not to have brought the advantages that had been hoped for. Chancellor of the Reich Axel Oxenstierna, who led the 'German war' militarily and diplomatically (supported by talented commanders from Gustavus Adolphus' 'school', such as Bernhard of Saxony-Weimar, Johan Banér, Carl Gustav Wrangel and Lennart Torstenson) after the death of the King, realised that factors such as army unrest, crises of supplies and sinking credit meant that the growing war effort could not be financed as it had been previously. Sweden's contribution could not be further increased; rather, the burden should be shifted in great part onto the German allies. [36] This was the main reason for establishing the 'Heilbron Federation' of 27 April 1633. The stated political goal of this politico-military alliance was the reestablishment of 'German liberty, observance, and the statutes and constitutions of the Holy Roman Empire'. In other words, it was intended as a restitution, conforming to the Reich's constitution. In practice, the tendencies of the Swedish side were to undermine the Reich constitution, by engaging in state-building and creating multifarious dependencies. The German members of the federation took over the financing of the joint war effort, military direction was carried out by the Chancellor of the Reich, and the finances were administered by a collegiate council in which Sweden had three of ten seats. Bound to Sweden in a two-way treaty, France increased its clientele in the Heilbron Federation. [37] It was in Sweden's interest that the allies recognise its demand for 'satisfaction' - material remuneration for action that resulted in many victims, to the advantage of Protestant elements and their German advocates. The federation allies accepted this demand. Although the Duchy of Pomerania meant the most to Sweden, in 1634 Oxenstierna had to recognise that it was no longer possible to win over the Brandenburg Electors. According to laws of inheritance and Reich regulations, Pomerania would fall to Brandenburg after the ruling dynasty died out, which was a foreseeable event. The Pomerania question remained one of the central problems of the war and of the peace negotiations in the Reich. Other north German princes also did not enter the Swedish dominated federation, in part due to the influence of Kursachsen, which went its own way.

The stabilisation of the Swedish means of power, krig genom umbud (war through assistance), did not last. All attempts to negotiate an arranged peace, with Wallenstein among others, also failed. The Reich Council leant toward peace, however, in light of the growing internal difficulties. Only military means of power remained to bring about a resolution of the conflict. A serious situation emerged again as a result of the Silesian success of Wallenstein, whose own murder in February 1634 brought only a temporary easing of hostilities, and after the deployment in southern Germany of a Spanish-Italian army under the command of Cardinal Infant Ferdinand. The situation climaxed in the catastrophical defeat of Swedish armies under Bernhard of Saxony-Weimar and Gustav Horn near Nördlingen on 27 August/ 6 September 1634. The consequences of these defeats revealed the vulnerability of the Swedish regime and the alliance structures: the troops were expelled out of upper Germany. As they left, surrounded on all sides, they committed excesses against the public in Württemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt. The Heilbron Federation collapsed, and France tried to collect on its remaining assets. The Swedish donations and 'states' no longer existed. Swedish power never returned again in this form. [38]

The Elector of Saxony had already attached himself to peace talks with the imperial court in June - talks that ran into the Leitmeritz negotiations in the Pirna 'Noteln (note)'. These, in turn, built the basis of the imperial-Saxon peace agreed in Prague on 30 May 1635. Its compromise character (among other things, the restitution edict was removed for 40 years), as well as Sweden's retreat to the Baltic coast and the concern for the imminent entry of the French into the war, led most Reich Diets to accede to the Prague peace. It granted the Emperor discretionary power over common military forces, which then began to operate against the Swedes in order to force them off German soil. [39] With their Pomeranian base under attack, the nearly hopeless situation was characterised by mutinies in the Swedish army that were difficult to quell, as well as by drastically shrinking sources of supplies and areas of maintenance. Full retreat out of the Reich was considered in the Reich Council, but also without satisfaction. To prevent Sweden's capitulation, Cardinal Richelieu decided to give up the 'hidden war' means of Sweden against Habsburg; France declared war against Spain in 1635, in the very same month as the Prague peace, a move which drew Richelieu toward open rivalry and a war situation with the Emperor. France now deployed militarily into the Reich, operating primarily in Southwest Germany. Despite the protests of Oxenstierna, the French throne called the Swedish General Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar into its service. For 1.6 million thaler per year, Bernhard led 18,000 men into battle against the Emperor. The negotiations between Oxenstierna and Richelieu led from an agreement in Compiègne at the end of April 1635 to a regular military alliance in Wismar on 20/30 March 1636, one that was extended in 1638.

The positive effects of the French 'diversion' and of the renewed mobilisation of resources in Sweden appeared only gradually. For Sweden's position in north Germany, victory near Wittstock against an imperial-Saxon commander on 4 October 1636 meant a shift towards the direction of an offensive war. Swedish troops occupied and considered as enemy territory the state belonging to the Brandenburg Elector, who was loyal to the Emperor. This had devastating consequences for its inhabitants. The young Elector Friedrich Wilhelm sought a way out of this complicated situation, in that he had been negotiating a treaty of neutrality with Sweden since 1641. Kursachsen followed with a cease-fire from Közschenbroda in 1645. The attempt to lead the Reich on the field against Sweden had failed once and for all.

The last decade, or the 'Swedish-French phase' of the Thirty Years' War, consisted of the following basic pattern: in various battles, the Swedes maintained their regained superiority and determined ever more the course of the war. Its armies moved on marches into billets and as occupiers, in most of the Reich. Bohemia, Bavaria, and the western part of South Germany were worst affected. At the same time, the Swedish crown took Pomerania under provisional administration and prepared for its later take-over. In the course of the war against Denmark, started with an attack in 1643 and successfully completed, the Swedes led by Hans Christoph of Königsmarck occupied the Bremen and Verden bishoprics. As a result, King Christian IV of Denmark was forced out of his role as intermediary, to the advantage of the Emperor. [40] The Swedish attack on its Protestant neighbour showed once again that the confessional-ideal impetus that had influenced initial decisions and events was largely gone, and not only for the Swedes. Material motives, circles and bargains for territories and profits overwhelmingly directed events. The standing armies under Swedish leadership, with their specific interests in salary and indemnities, in booty and demobilisation, made known through repeated mutinies and unrest, forced a place for themselves as a 'third party' in politics and peace solutions.

At the Westphalian Peace Congress, where the main Swedish delegates Johan Oxenstierna and Johan Adler Salvius resided above all in Osnabrück, it was possible to conclude the results of twenty-year-long 'German war' as follows: The acquisition of West Pomerania, Bremen-Verden, and Wismar had fulfilled Sweden's 'security' postulate, as well as the 'satsfactio coronae'. The 'satisfaction militum' - the indemnity of the military forces required to withdraw - was settled by the Nuremberg Execution Diet of 1649/50, above all to the advantage of higher military personnel. [41] The once-proclaimed war aim of freeing German 'confessional brethren' from the oppression of the Catholic Counter-reformation and imperial forces, as well as the protection of their rights, was only partly achieved. In the Reich, the principal and reciprocal equalisation of the Protestant and Catholic confessions and churches could be legally anchored, with Swedish assistance. The position of property, law, and confession were frozen according to the 'normal year' of 1624. In the home territory of the Emperor, however, Protestants did not come to enjoy these achievements. Instead, they paid the price for the compromise between Sweden and the Emperor. [42] As no cease-fire could be declared, the peace negotiations took place on and off, parallel to the conduct of the war itself. More than other events, the murderous slaughter near Jankau, in Bohemia in March 1645, in which the Swedes under Torstenson defeated an equally strong imperial army (the last one of its kind), made necessary a greater willingness to compromise on the part of the imperial side. In Moravia and Bohemia, in which, according to the report of the Holsteins resident in Hamburg, the war 'would writhe' again, the Swedes planned effective action in 1648. [43] The Swedish General Königsmark undertook a surprise attack on Prague in September, but could only take the Kleinseite. But even that sort of a win was considerable: he took as booty on the Hradschin most of the rest of the art and rarities collected by Kaiser Rudolf II, and had them transported to Sweden, despite the protests of the Emperor. Upon hearing the unexpected news that peace had been declared, the Swedish troops had to put an end to all further hostilities. That was the last military engagement of the 'royal Swedish war in Germany', a war that had begun twenty years before in Stralsund.

FOOTNOTES