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Essay Volumes > Tome I: Politics, Religion, Law and Society

FERNANDO SÁNCHEZ-MARCOS
The Struggle for Freedom in Catalonia and in Portugal

In the last decade of the Thirty Years War, when the rivalry between France and Spain for the dominance of Europe was at its height, these two monarchies were faced with important revolutionary risings. In the case of the Spanish monarchy, these began in Catalonia and in Portugal within a few months of each other in 1640.

From 1640, these two regions, each with a strong individuality of history and of language, strove for liberation from the dominance of Castilla. However, the two countries were not entirely involved in this struggle in the middle of the seven-teenth century; in both cases, particularly that of Catalonia, a sector of the population, notably the ruling class, remained loyal to Philip IV. In addition, Catalonia was undergoing a serious class conflict, at least at the beginning of what came to be known as the War of the Harvesters ("Segadors" in Catalan). In Portugal, the political rising that led to the restoration of the national monarchy - (the "Restauraçôn" in Portuguese) - was less affected by social tensions. The rebellions of 1640 against the Madrid government, supported immediately by France, had a serious weakening influence on the Habsburg Spanish Empire block. The repercussions were felt not only in the turn of events of the European war and the peace negotiations in Münster but also in a proto-nationalistic sense; both movements left a deep mark on the collective memory of Catalans and Portuguese as well as on the attitude towards Catalonia of the other Spaniards, and vice versa.

Most chroniclers of the time of Philip IV considered the Catholic Monarchs, Isabel of Castilla and Fernando of Aragon, to have been the founders of the Spanish monarchy, constitutionally plural, "composed" of different historical territories [1], each with its institutions and laws. The marriage of Isabel and Fernando had joined two unequal crowns [2] On one hand, Castilla, with a more united political organization, was larger in extension and in population. As from 1492, Granada and the American dominions were joined to Castilla, and in 1512, a large part of Navarra, a territory disputed with France, was incorporated into Castilla after its conquest by Fernando, maintaining its own statutes. On the other hand, the Crown of Aragon, of which Catalonia formed a part, was more a confederation, with a long history of influence in the Western Mediterranean.

Even before Charles the Bold, the son of Philip the Good and grandson of the Catholic Kings was made Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, the Spanish Empire had acquired another inheritance, the Netherlands and the other territories of the Burgundy principal-ity, inherited by Philip the Good. Loyalty to the Habsburgs of the Austrian Empire and the identity with Catholicism - except in the north of the Netherlands - were the bonds of unity of this confederation, as it were, of peoples and nations.

The Kingdom of Portugal with its vast overseas possessions in Africa, the East Indies and Brazil had come under Philip II of Spain in 1580-1581. The young King of Portugal, Don Sebastian (Don Sebastiâo in Portuguese) had been killed in the battle of Alcazarquivir (Alkasser-el-Kebir in Arabic), and after the brief reign of Cardinal Don Enrique, Philip II claimed his right to the throne as the son of Isabel of Portugal, the second daughter of King Manuel I. There being other claimants [3], Philip sent a large army to enforce his right to the succession. He was finally sworn in as King of Portugal by the Cortes of Tomar in 1581, with the undertaking to respect all the laws of the kingdom. [4] But the Portuguese never considered Philip and his successors as their rightful kings. The myth of "Sebastianism", the hope of the return of the knightly king, "disappeared" in the struggle against the Moors, helped to keep alive the awareness of a national identity. [5]

So among the many titles figuring in the solemn documents of the Catholic Chancellery, Philip IV, King of Spain (or of the Spains) [6] was named Count of Barcelona and King of Portugal and of the Algarves, as well as of Castilla, León, Aragon, Valencia and Granada, Señor of Biscay, etc. The constitutional theory of the time was that the king should reign over his kingdoms as though he were only the sovereign of each one of them. However, the fact that he was normally absent from his domains, and also the growing identification of the Habsburgs with Castilian affairs, were to weigh heavily; in theory, the Spanish monarchy was a plural one, but the supremacy was in the hands of a largely Castllian ruling class.

During the reign of Philip IV, the court favourite, Don Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares, the head of Spanish catholic neo-imperialism, drew up a plan to extend the power of the monarchy by means of certain reforms [7]: instead of reigning over each territory, Philp IV was to become sovereign of a united Spain, somewhat on the model of Castilla. One of his main projects, the "Union of Arms" (1625), decreed that each of the kingdoms should make a fixed contribution of men and money for the defense of the other territories; in return, posts would be awarded to citizens of any of the kingdoms. The unifying idea that lay behind the Union of Arms was rejected by Catalonia. The estrangement between the Catalan ruling class, firmly in favour of constitutional solidarity, and Philip IV, came to light in the undecisive Cortes or parliament in Barcelona in 1626 and 1632 [8]; some part of this estrangement was due to the fact that the distance from the court made it difficult for the Catalan nobility to enjoy the benefits of royal patronage. In addition, the powerful "Consell de Cent" that governed Barcelona had been agitating since 1620 about whether or not to pay the "quintos" to the Crown (the fifth of the tax revenue). And the "Diputació del General de Catalunya" - the permanent committee of the Cortes of the Principality of Catalonia and of the earldoms of Rosellón and Cerdaña - had raised frequent complaints to the King about the violations of the Catalan constitutions by the Viceroys, sometimes justified by the need to put an end to banditry. [9]

The open intervention of France in the Thirty Years War as from 1635, allied with Holland and Sweden against the Habsburg league, opened new fronts and new challenges to the Madrid government. The rising levies of taxation sometimes contravened the con-stitutions of Cataluña and Portugal [10] and Cataluña became the theatre of war between Spain and France after the taking of Salses by the French in 1639. The struggle for the northern Pyrenean province of the Roussillon - one of the priorities of Louis XIII and of Richelieu - meant that a number of infantry regiments of the army of Philip IV were quartered in the north of Catalonia. The arrogant, often brutal behaviour of this army in the villages where the soldiers were billeted caused great distress to the country people, and this was denounced by the Catalan governors, more or less outspokenly. Clashes between the peasants and the troops of the Catholic King became more and more frequent and violent [11], and even acquired a religious legitimacy from the Catalan point of view when soldiers of Philip IV profaned the church of Riudarenes and the Bishop of Gerona excom-municated the offenders.

By the spring of 1640, the social unrest, the general repulsion felt against the "Castilian" army, and the unsolved conflicts over the constitution, had brought Catalonia to a pre-revolutionary situation. [12] The outburst came in Barcelona, the capital of the Principality, in two stages: on May 22, more than two thousand rebels entered the city, the "Consellers" (councillors) being unwilling or unable to hold them back, and they freed Francesc Tamarit, a deputy of the "Generalitat" of Catalonia whose imprisonment had been ordered by Olivares on March 18; The rebels shouted "Visca la fe!" ("Long live the faith!") and "Muyran los traydors y el mal gobern!" (Down with traitors and the bad government"!). More celebrated and later mythified was the rising on June 7, 1640, the feast of Corpus Christi, known in Catalonia as "Corpus de Sang" (the bloody Feast of Corpus). [13] This was the day when traditionally the harvesters crowded into Barcelona to be hired, but armed rebels went in with them and soon there were victims, in spite of the efforts of several churchmen and "consellers". The rumour spread that one of these had been murdered by the servant of a high official of the King. The outburst of anger turned against several Ministers of the High Court of Justice, the advisory body to the King in Catalonia and the Catalan Viceroy, the Count of Santa Coloma, who was stabbed when he tried to flee the mob. For several days, the "segadors" were in control of the city. Both in Barcelona and in some parts of the province, feelings ran high against the wealthy families and the representatives of the Castilian govern-ment. The Catalan authorities finally brought the situation under control, but the question remained as to the course of developments in Catalonia and the reaction of Madrid on receiving the news of the death of the King's alter ego.

There was a period of suspense. The Catalan ruling class tried to maintain links with the court in Madrid. While deploring the murder of the Viceroy they declared the right of the Catalans to defend themselves against the violence of the army, recalled the violations of their constitution by the King's ministers, and held Olivares responsible. In Madrid, the news of the death of the Viceroy caused great indignation. The crown representatives in Catalonia had failed, and this was aggravated by the sudden death of the new Viceroy, the Duke of Cardona of the Catalan aristocracy, who had taken office on June 20, 1640. After many discussions among the King's counsellors, the decision was taken in August to send an army to Barcelona. While this contingent, under the command of the new Viceroy, the Marquis of Los Vélez, was making its way slowly towards the capital of Cataluña, a heated controversy broke out over the historical and judicial predicament in the Principality. Notable churchmen and jurists supported the attitude of the "Generalitat", among them Gaspar Sala Berart and Francesc Martí Viladamor. The latter wrote in his "Noticia Universal de Catalunya" insisting on the existing agree- ments with regard to the constitution and defending the right of the Catalans to choose their own king and transfer their loyalty to another in case of need. [14]

The leader during this state of crisis was a canon, Pau Clarís [15], then President of the "Diputació del General" of Catalonia. He called a meeting of a quasi-Cortes known as the "Junta de Braços" - a kind of Defence Committee - in representation of the Catalan community. This committee met on September 16, 1640, to decide on what should be done if the army should attack Catalonia. [16] In a certain sense, these "Cortes" were a recognition of the social unrest as well as of the need for military support, and Clarís appealed to Richelieu and persuaded him to provide help without delay. [17]

Reports of the capture of Tarragona by the army of Philip IV and of the atrocities committed in Cambrils caused another outbreak of indignation in Barcelona. The Catalan leaders now faced both the threat of further social rebellion and the proximity of the troops of the King of Spain, and realized that the only solution was the protection of France. A failed attempt to set up a Cata-lan republic under the protection of France led the "Junta de Braços" to decide on January 23, 1641, to recognize the French King Louis XIII as Count of Barcelona and therefore as sovereign of Catalonia. The terms of this agreement were drawn up several months later in the Treaty of Péronne on September 19, 1641, as "The agreements and conditions under which the Braços Generales of the Principality of Catalonia... placed the Principality and the earldoms of Roussillon and Cerdagne under obedience to the Most Christian King of France, which agreements are to be named in the oath to be sworn by His Majesty and his successors at the beginning of their term of government." [18]

On January 26, 1641, the troops of the Marquis de Los Vélez tried to take Montjuic, a hill overlooking Barcelona, and were thrown back by the Catalan and French forces. This made the final break between the Catalan institutions and Philip IV and upset the hopes in Madrid of crushing the Catalan rebellion. Curiously, several hundred Portuguese noblemen and soldiers [19] fought in this battle on the side of Philip IV; probably very few of them had news of the great event that had taken place in Lisbon on December 1, 1640: the relatively peaceful proclamation of the Duke of Braganza as King of Portugal. To a certain extent, this proclamation took the Spanish authorities by surprise [20], even the Vice-Reine Margarita of Savoy, the widowed Duchess of Mantua and grand-daughter of Philip II, although the resentment of the Portuguese towards the government of Castilla had been expressed before, as we shall see now.

Throughout the 1630s and particularly in the late summer and autumn of 1637, in Évora and in fact in most of the Alentejo, the Algarve and the Ribatejo, mutinies had broken out against the taxes devised by Olivares. [21] The court in Madrid feared that the premier Duke and Earl, the eighth Duke of Braganza, might join the rebels, but he was not inclined to become involved. He united with the rest of the Portuguese nobility in rejecting the Count-Duke's call for a meeting in Madrid in the summer of 1638 of the Portuguese churchmen and nobles. Some of them did go in fact, and with the pretext of this "Great Assembly", Philip IV decided to suppress the Consejo (or Council) of Portugal which was one of the institutions that specified the identity of the kingdom. Some of the leading Portuguese aristocrats were well integrated into the Spanish system, but others were discontented with the arrogance of the Olivares government and its lack of respect for the constitutions. In addition to this motive for discontent, which was shared by the Catalans, the Portuguese had another grievance against the Spanish regime: the latter was failing to defend the vast Portuguese Empire in the Atlantic and in the Indian Oceans against the Dutch [22], and no economic benefit was being offered in exchange.

The news of the outbreak of the Catalan rebellion in June, 1640, and the order given by Madrid for the Portuguese to send an army to fight against the Catalans, seem to have hastened the preparations being made by a group of Portuguese nobles to overthrow the Spanish government. On October 12 of that year, an assembly of aristocrats in Lisbon decided to offer the crown of Portugal to the Duke of Braganza, a lateral descendant of King Juan I, founder of the Avís dynasty. Braganza was the premier Duke and was extremely wealthy so he was well placed to embody proto-nationalist legitimacy in Portugal.

On December 1, 1640, a group of conspirators seized the Palace of the Viceroy in Lisbon. One of the victims of the rising was the unpopular secretary of the Vice-Reine, Miguel de Vasconcelos, whose dying body was thrown from the windows to the mob. To cries of "liberdade, Portugueses" and "Long live King Joâo IV", the Duke of Braganza was acclaimed as King of Portugal with the name of John IV. Unlike the Corpus Christi Day riot in Barcelona, the Rising of the people of Lisbon did not start with an outbreak of violence, but it was made possibile by the sympathy of the population. [23]

A few days later, on December 15, the Duke of Braganza was solemnly proclaimed King of Portugal, and in Lisbon on December 28, the newly formed "Cortes de la "Restauraçâo" officially ratified the proclamation as constitutional. [24] They also re-affirmed constitutionally their financial responsibilities and their position of representatives of the kingdom and of all the Portuguese "Terras", since Portugal had been held as a kind of "Republic of republics". In the official interpretation, expressed in the contemporary documents of the Braganza move-ment, the legitimate dynasty and Portuguese freedom had been reestablished. [25] This was ratified in the rest of the country and gradually in the overseas territories - in Brasil in February, 1641, and in India in September. [26] The new regime was further strengthened in July of the same year when a pro-Austrian plot, headed by the Archbishop of Braga and a few nobles, was put down.

The sermons of priests and monks were influential in the spread of popular support for the change of dynasty in Portugal. [27] The Jesuits were the most outspoken in this regard, and one of them, Inácio de Mascarenhas, was chosen to lead a delegation of solidarity to the "Diputació de Catalunya" and then to enlist the support of France. His arrival in Barcelona on January 26, 1646, on the very day of the decisive battle of Monjuïc raised the spirits of the Catalans, who responded with a mission headed by Jacint Sala and Rafael Cervera to seek the help of the Lisbon government. [28] This shows the awareness in Portugal and in Cataluña of their interdependence in the struggle to affirm their identity before the Spanish monarchy. Then the fact that in the following year the two Catalan ambassadors in Lisbon transferred their services to Philip IV revealed the rift between different sectors of the rebel leaders. These differences with regard to the break with the Spanish monarchy were more marked in Catalonia than in Portugal. [29]

This mutual support between the restored Portugal and the Catalonia of Pau Clarís was of great symbolic importance, but of course the future of the two countries depended in great measure not only on the attitude of the great powers, rivals of the Catholic King - France under Richelieu and its great Dutch seafaring ally - but also on the fortunes of the Spanish army.

Faced in the peninsula with trouble on both sides, Philip IV opted for the recovery of Catalonia as being on the frontier with France, the arch-enemy, leaving the conflict with Portugal for a later date. So Catalonia became the field of hard-fought battles. Lleida (Lérida en Spanish), as the town nearest to the kingdom of Aragon, was taken and lost several times, before and after the opening of the Münster negotiations. These were eased somewhat by the disappearance of two great opponents: Richelieu who died in December, 1642, and the Count-Duke who was forced to resign in January of the following year. The more flexible attitude of his successor, Luis de Haro, and the solemn oath of Philip IV to abide by the Catalan constitutions on his victorious entry into Lerida in 1644, together with his promise of a general amnesty, laid the way for new opportunities for the ruling class in Catalonia and a policy of good neighbourliness.

The Catalan question was also heavily involved with the French monarchy. [30] The French government, from 1643 under Mazarin, having obtained Roussillon, its main priority, was not prepared to relinquish the hope of taking over the Principality of Cata-lonia. This was another piece on its international chessboard. [31] The Münster delegate of the parliament of Catalonia and of Barcelona, Dr.Josep Fontanella, was well aware of this when advising the French plenipotentiaries on the affairs of Catalonia and keeping an eye on its interests. [32] And the representation of Joâo IV, in the protective shadow of the French delegation, was formally reduced; this was composed of Luís Pereira de Castro and Francisco de Andrade Leitâo in Münster and of Rodrigo Botelho de Morais in Osnabrück, succeeded after his death by Cristovâo Soares de Abreu. [33] Under severe pressure of the plenipotentia-ries of Philip IV, the mediators - particularly the Papal Nuncio, Fabio Chigi - considered it inadvisable to give formal recognition to the delegations of Portugal and Catalonia. The future of these two representations was a bone of contention in the Münster negotiations, and several proposals were put forward with threats of armed intervention. The errors of calculation and the arrogance of Paris and Madrid - both governments under the impression that an additional effort would exhaust the rival - meant that the peace agreements reached in Münster did not extend, unfortunately, to the Spanish monarchy and to the Kingdom of France.

The outbreak of the civil war in France in 1648 made it difficult to pay the French troops stationed in Catalonia to fight the army of Philip IV, and also prevented any political and military coor-dination on the part of the French government. [34] In addition, the French Viceroys in Catalonia had not shown more respect for the Catalan constitutions than had the Spanish before them. So the people of Catalonia, suffering the abuses of the French troops on their soil, and their ruling class, soon came to have the same grievances as before, at least similar to those of 1639-1640. [35] Another handicap as a result of the association of Catalonia with France was an economic one: the loss of the markets of the south of Italy. This was the situation in 1652 at the time of the victory of Condé [36]; after a long siege by the troops of Don Juan José of Austria - the illegitimate son of Philip IV - Barcelona came once again under the Spanish monarchy, followed by most of Catalonia. The capital of the Principality was restored to Spain under the terms of an ambiguous pact with Don Juan of Austria and also by armed repression. [37] Peace, however, did not return to Catalonia until the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659. It was a bitter peace because it left the Roussillon and some neighbouring territories in the hands of France. But while Catalonia did not preserve the whole of her territory in the turbulent years of the middle of the century, she did weather the storm keeping intact her historical, political and linguistic identity as well as her own institutions and, in great measure, her constitutional liberty.

In the meantime, Portugal benefited from the fact that the Catholic King had chosen Catalonia as the field of battle. Joâo IV was able to devote a large part of his energy to recovering the Empire that had been lost to the Dutch. This offensive was strengthened after 1646-1647 when the United Provinces made peace with Spain, renouncing the alliance with France, her great protector, but a remote protector with no danger of annexation which had been the fate of Catalonia. So in 1648, Portugal was able to recover Angola, and in 1654, the Brazilian territories that had been conquered by the Dutch. [38] In the Indian Ocean, however, the Dutch held on to most of the Portuguese possessions.

With the economic support of her overseas dominions, identified with her own dynasty, and with the military aid of England [39] as well as of France, the restored Portugal was able to confront the forces of the exhausted monarchy of Philip IV. Even though the Spanish army commanded by Don Juan José of Austria had some brief success in 1663, it was defeated soon afterwards at Ameixial (Estremoz) by the Portuguese, aided by the French under Marshal Schomberg. In 1665, the Portuguese victory of Monte-Claros put an end to the war. [40]




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FOOTNOTES


* My thanks are due to J.L.Palos and F.González del Campo for their help in the preparation of the text and the illustrations.

1. One of the contemporary authors who place the founding of the Spanish monarchy as being composed of several kingdoms and nations, in the epoch of the Catholic Kings, is Baltasar Gracián (Gracián 1646, pp. 9 and 11). Other writers consider that the two monarchs complete the restoration of Spain to the unity of before the Moslem invasion.

2. In recent years, Helmut G.Koenigsberger, John H.Elliott and Xavier Gil have contributed to a revaluation of the term "composed" or "composite" as a designation of the Spanish monarchy. The status of Catalonia in the organization of the monarchy is studied by Molas 1966, pp. 11-21, and Belenguer 1994.

3. The most important claimants, also grandchildren of Manuel I, were Don Antonio, Prior of Crato, and Doña Catalina de Braganza.

4. In a sense the agreement was a compromise: the Portuguese understood the pact as binding, while Castilla regarded it rather as the granting of a royal favour. See Bouza 1987. Philip III swore the laws of Portugal in Lisbon in 1619.

5. One of the classical works on this subject is Azevedo 1918; for a bibliographical study see Pérez Samper 1992. p. 75.

6. The significant contemporary alternation between the singular and plural forms - Spain and Spains - is discussed in Sánchez-Marcos 1995, p.12.

7. A special study of the Olivares project is found in Elliott 1986, as well as in Elliott/Peña 1978/80.

8. These Cortes are studied in Elliott 1963; for the representation of the states in the Cortes: Palos 1994; cf. also Congress 1991.

9. The rising tension between Catalonia and Madrid see Elliott 1963; Zudaire 1964; for banditry Reglà 1966; Torres 1991.

10. The financial straits of Philip IV are detailed by Ortiz 1960; Boyajian 1982. Part of the financial burden was due to the help given to the Austrians by the Spanish Habsburgs which is studied by Ernst 1991. Rising taxation to pay for the war was not exclusive to Spain; in France it gave rise to revolts such as that of the "Nu-pieds" in Normandy in 1639.

11. The form of billeting "Lombardy-style" - entirely borne by the villagers - was against the constitutions of Catalonia which set limits to what the peasants should provide for the soldiers.

12. There are different opinions about the interpretation of the terms used for the 1640 rising in Catalonia - (rebellion, revolt, revolution). see Serra 1992; Tarrés 1992.

13. The denomination "Corpus de Sang" was first used in the novel by Angelón 1858.

14. A large part of the material of this propaganda war is given in Ettinghausen 1993. Texts of Catalan proto-nationalism appear in Serra 1995.

15. A fairly recent work on Clarís that summarizes and comments on earlier studies such as those of Rovira Virgili is by García Carcel 1985. Another important figure in the "revolta" was the lawyer Fontanella, "Conseller en cap" (President of the Council) in Barcelona. See Palos 1997. A number of works examine the part played by lawyers in the European revo-lutionary movements of the 40s; for La Fronde, Moote 1971; For a general view, the third section of "Monarchische Herrschaft und Herrschaft des Rechts" by Asch/Duchhardt 1996, pp.167-273.

16. The presence of the King was not required in the "Junta de Braços" as it was in the Cortes. The proceedings of this Junta are given in Rubí 1976.

17. Intervention in Catalonia posed a dilemma for Richelieu: should he, the pillar of absolutism, help a rising against a king? or should he miss the chance to open a bridgehead on Spanish territory in his struggle against the Habsburgs? A key work - if somewhat one-sided - on the French connection with Catalonia is Sanabre 1956.

18. An interesting point in these pacts is that they reflect an extreme constitutionalist theory with a historical background from which the Catalan ruling class derives a new political contract in defense of the ideal of self-government undermined by Olivares. This view - the restoration of freedom - comes again in the Portuguese "Restauraçâo" and in the English "Commonwealth", whose commemorative medal has the inscription "First Year of Freedom, restored by the grace of God".

19. The battle was witnessed by the Portuguese Francisco Manuel de Melo. His "Historia de los movimientos y separación de Cataluña", San Vicente 1645, ordered by the Marquis de Los Vélez was published in Portugal when Melo became a partisan of the "Restauraçâo" (Melo 1645).

20. See Bouza 1993.

21. In addition to the studies by Antonio and Aurelio de Oliveira, I would mention that of Serrâo 1967.

22. In the 1630s, the Dutch occupied the ports of the coasts of Guinea and Angola from which the Portuguese shipped slaves to their plantations in Brazil. The Portuguese rising came a year after the Spanish naval defeat of the Downs (1639). Early in 1640, the squadron sent by Philip IV to recover Pernambuco had failed.

23. The idea that in acclaiming the King the people were in sympathy with the nobles is that given in the first great official history of the "Restauraçâo" (Ericeira 1679-89). Valladares 1995 questions this in "Sobre Reyes de Invierno. He does accept that after the acclamation the people "bore the taxes for the war more willingly than before 1640" (ibid p.134). The interpretation of the rising as a blow for freedom is also found in the contemporary writings of Sousa Macedo.

24. On the subject of this Cortes, see histories of Portugal such as Verissimo Serrâo 1980; Reis Torgal 1981-82; Hespanha 1992.

25. From the constitutional point of view, the most important theorist of the Restoration was F.Velasco de Gouveia. The idea of Portugal as a republic of republics is used by Joâo Pinto Ribeiro, one of the best jurists and agents of Joâo IV, and author of two works published in 1646 at a critical stage of the Münster Congress (Pinto Ribeiro 1646; Pinto Ribeiro 1646a).

26. The only exception was the North African port of Ceuta which still considered the King of Spain as its sovereign.

27. Here there are fuller accounts for Portugal than for Catalonia, see Marques 1983; Bouza 1986; González 1984.

28. For these missions see Pérez 1992; Brazâo 1979. See also ref. 3092-3108 in Duchhardt 1996, pp.295-296.

29. The emigrants of the period in: Vidal 1984. From these data, Eva Serra calculated that 23% of the nobles in the Cortes of 1626 went into exile. Serra 1992, p.62.

30. The fitfulness of this engagement is one of the main themes of the book by Sanabre, 1956. Continuity was given to the interests of the French government, under the rapid succession of Viceroys, by the inspector Pierre de Marca.

31. In Sánchez-Marcos, I describe the continuities and the variations observed in the attitude to Catalonia of the political communities involved. See this article for details of the sources.

32. For details of this mission and the activity of Fontanella, see Sánchez-Marcos; Costa/Quintana/Serra 1991.

33. For the activities and efforts of the representatives of Joâo IV, see Cardim [in press].

34. Recent studies of the Fronde such as Ranum 1994, and Pernot 1994, clarify the French govern-ment crisis, the involvement in this crisis of key figures of the army in Catalonia such as d'Harcourt and Marchin, and their defection that demoralised the pro-French Catalans.

35. For example, the French Viceroys set up a control of the lists of candidates for the draw for posts in the Consell de Cent.

36. The same Prince of Condé who crushed the army of Philip IV at Rocroi in 1643, by his role in the Fronde and his alliance with Spain, helped to return Barcelona and a large part of Catalonia to Spain in 1652.

37. For the reincorporation of Catalonia and its new status, see Sánchez-Marcos 1983; Torras 1992 stresses the repressive nature of some measures taken against Catalonia after 1652. The period was one of absolutism, and the measures are better seen in context if one recalls the treatment of Prague in 1620, of Naples in 1648, and of Paris after the Fronde.

38. For the Portuguese recovery of its empire, Boxer 1952; Cabral Mello 1979.

39. After the restoration of the English monarchy, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance of 1642 was renewed in 1660 and the marriage was arranged between Charles II and Catherine (Catarina) of Braganza. The dowry of the Princess included Tangiers and Bombay, and Charles II promised military aid to the Portuguese.

40. Portuguese historians have always emphasized this stage of the fratricide war between Spain and Portugal in which freedom was won in the "grandes batalhas" (Serrâo 1980, p.53). Kamen 1981, pp. 98-102 describes the dire effects of this war in the frontier region. For the last stages of the war, Cortés 1985; Castillo 1992, pp. 155-194.

41. The letters of the Jesuit Vieira, sent to Rome to pursue the project, are edited in Azevedo 1970. See also Batllori 1971.



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