While the peace negociations in Münster and Osnabrück began to reach their final, one of the most spectacular events of the whole war occured, the Swedish attack on, and conquer of the so called AKleinseite" of the city of Prague. On October 24, 1648 the peace-treaty was signed by Sweden's negociator's in Osnabrück. But news travelled relatively slow in the 17th century. Therefore, without any knowledge of what had occured in Westphalia, the Swedish army in Bohemia began it's action.

On the next day, or October 15 according to the old chronology, Swedish, Finnish and German soldiers made an assault against the city-walls of Prague, however without any success. Thanks to the very well preserved musterrolls and other documents in the Military Archives and National Archives of Stockholm, we can today study these and other parts of the Swedish armies in Germany, during the 18 years that Sweden took part in the Thirty Years War.

The war was over. The spectacular last battle for Prague was the military end of a struggle that had begun 1618, and for Sweden - as well as the eastern part of the realm, Finland - in 1630. The war had engaged soldiers from almost all parts of Europe on battlefields on German soil. This was also the case in the Swedish army. [1]

The Swedish armies in Germany in 1648, large and multieuropean, had grown very much since 1630, but the history began another two decades earlier.

Already after Gustavus Adolphus had taken place on the throne of Sweden in 1611, the work on modernizing the armed forces began. This work led in the 1620's to the creation of the so called provincial regiments, recruited in a specific province. In 1634 it was decided that the army should consist of 8 cavalry- and 23 infantry regiments.

While the artillery and the cavalry to a large extent could be recruited with volunteers, levying, a sort of conscription, was used to fill the infantry regiments. This conscription was during most of Gustavus Adolphus' reign an obligatory for most men in Sweden from the age of 15. By this a new system was introduced, that gave the state or the crown the right to engage the whole population in a war. An explicit example of this way to regard the inhabitants of Sweden's towns and villages can be read in Gustavus Adolphus' law of military personnel (Swedish: Krigsfolksordning) that was published in 1619. In this law the priest in every parish were ordered to keep knowledge about Athe age of those who are growing. So that when they are arriving to their fifteen years" they can be written in the lists of all men obliged to join the army or navy if so was requested by the crown. These lists of all Swedish men 15 years of age and older give today's historians good opportunities to study the demographical consequences of the war for the Swedish population. Any thoughts about sending teenagers to war can hardly be found. Instead we can read in the above mentioned law of 1619: Athe younger they will come to (a) soldiers profession the better they learn and get used to what belongs to the profession of a military man". [2]

During a conscription - that first had to be decided by the parliament, not only by the king - all the men listed by the priest were gathered and divided in groups of ten. From each group one man was chosen to be a soldier.

The conscriptions and the large casualties had hard effects on the Swedish population, especially the 90-95 percent that were living as farmers. Estimates done recently by historians shows that every third man in Sweden (including Finland) - some 500.000 - died in military service during Sweden's age of greatness during the years 1620-1721, most of them by diseases, cold and starvation, not by wounds in battle. [3] A large number of conscripted soldiers deserted from the army, before they were shipped to some of the fronts on the other side of the Baltic sea, while some counties with a more developed agricultural and commercial life could rise money to pay volunteers to take the place in line instead of the conscripts. [4]

The most common way to complete the Swedish (which in the following also includes Finnish) units, was to buy foreign mercenaries. During the wars from the 1540's and onwards a varied number of foreign soldiers had been recruited to the Swedish army, but never was their number as large as during the thirty years war. In 1621, when Sweden conquered the city of Riga from the Poles, the Swedish army consisted to 85 percent of soldiers from Sweden. At the time of the Swedish entrance in the war in Germany, during the summer of 1630, the Swedes still numbered a little more than half of the army's total strenght. The development escalated so that the Swedish part of the troops at the battle of Breitenfeld in September 1631 was down to 28 percent. In many of the battles of the thirty years war only 10-15 percent of the soldiers in the Swedish army in Germany were Swedes. This was, as an example, the case at the battle of Lützen on November 6, 1632, when Gustavus Adolphus was killed.

When Sweden wanted to buy mercenaries, she entered the international market for soldiers. On this market operated all from small dealers who only offered their own services, to large deliverers (as Freiherr von Wallenstein, the greatest of all condottieri) who sold whole regiments and armies. The payment from Sweden was taken from incomes from customs (especially in conquered harbours around the Baltic coastline), export from the rich copper-mines in central Sweden(transferred into cash in Amsterdam) and financial support from allies, especially France. [5]

In this way the Swedish army was filled with soldiers from many countries, even if the Germans were dominating. Another large category came from Scotland. Mainly from the eastern Highlands around Inverness, Aberdeen and Edinburgh came between 13.000 and 14.000 Scottish soldiers to serve the Swedish army during Gustavus Adolphus. The development of the war in Germany in 1627-28 cut Sweden off from the potential mercenaries in large parts of the continent. Then Sweden turned to England and Scotland to recruit soldiers, mercenaries that soon became famous for their, unusual, loyalty. As chancellor Axel Oxenstierna wrote in 1630: AThey are good fellows, easier to deal with than others tend to be".

Although English and Scottish soldiers had been bought by the Swedish army for the war against Russia in the east already in the 1580's, the large numbers served the Swedes during the 1620's and 1630's. During Sweden's first envolvement in Germany from 1630 the Scottish and English units played an important role, but their number decreased rapidly between 1638-40, when many of them returned home to the growing troubles that in the 1640's resulted in the English civil war. Many high-ranking Britons, however, stayed in Swedish service and moved to Sweden, and this way many important Swedish noble families were established. At least 21 English and Scottish regiments can be identified in Swedish service between 1624 and 1639. All of them were infantry, since export of horses from the British isles were forbidden. [6]

But the Germans were the majority among the infantry mercenaries, and this goes even to a larger extent for the cavalry. During 1630-33 Sweden sent six native cavalry regiments to Germany, together with five German, one Livonian and one Courland regiment. The foreign units were originally used against the Poles of the battlefields of Eastern Prussia in 1626-29. In Germany another 14 German cavalry regiments were organized, together with one combined Bohemian and Silesian, one with Pomeranians and Slavs, and one French regiment, as well as a number of other units. [7]

The Swedish envolvement in the German war began when some hundred soldiers in 1628 were sent from Prussia to support the besieged city of Stralsund.

In the autumn 1629 - after some 40 000 casualties during the war of the 1620's against Poland [8] - the Swedish government estimated that the planned engagement in Germany demanded at least 30.000 men, while the rest of the armed forces would count 45.000 men. To be able to mobilize these 75.000 Sweden had to mobilize all her resources to the very utmost, not the least by new conscriptions, but also with a high preparedness for the recruitment of new mercenaries. In the spring of 1630 Gustavus Adolphus rose the demand on the (coming) fieldarmy for Germany to 46.000 men. In the early summer the army was organized, half of it mercenaries. Many of them were veterans from the campaigns in Livonia and Prussia with demand on salary from the crown. They found it wise to stay and see to that they got their money, once the army had landed in Germany. Other soldiers were newly recruited mercenaries, that were bought on credit and promised pay when the operations (and the hopefully also the incomes) had begun in Germany. [9]

On June 26, 1630 Gustavus Adolphus landed at Peenemünde with 13.000 soldiers. The following weeks reinforcements kept coming from Sweden and the fieldarmy in Prussia, so that the Swedish army in Germany around August 1, numbered almost 26.000 men. [10]

The Swedish forces, and especially the mercenaries, were to a large extent maintained by resources in Germany. Enemy as well as allies or neutrals had to contribute with cash or goods in kind to the army. The history of Sweden's participation in the thirty years war is to a large extent the history of endless negociations, not seldom under more or less outspoken armed threats, about contributions from allied cities and provinces. At the same time the army pressed what it could from conquered enemy territory. [11]

One of the first German cities that had to pay for the Swedish troops was Stettin, who was taken by the Sweden already in the summer 1630. Despite attempts by the city to reduce the financial burdon, Sweden already from the autumn 1630 managed to get Stettin to accept to provide for a garrison of 4.000 Swedish soldiers, what in reality was the major part of Sweden's army along the river Oder.

During the years 1630 and 1631 Sweden managed to establish a system that guaranteed the inflow of a little more than half of the costs of the warfare came from Germany, especially in form of contributions from Pomerania. The rest was payed from Sweden. This way, a fundament, however not so very stabile, was layed for the expansion of the army on the cost of the allies and the enemy territory. [12] This was not only the case for the units of foreign mercenaries. The German territory was as a matter of fact responsible for between 80-83 percent of the costs for wages in the Finnish infantry-units, while the figure for the Finnish cavalry was 60 percent. [13]

The 17th century Europe saw a dramatic growth of the size of the armies in several nations, not the least as a result of the development of an art of warfare that demanded more soldiers. This development can be studied at least since the end of the 15 century. [14] This was most evident in France, where the army in the mid 16th century counted 36.000 men, a force that had grown to 150.000 soldiers in 1630, and during the reign of Louis XIV at the end of the century had risen to 400.000. [15] In the same way the Imperial, Bavarian, Dutch and Spanish forces grew.The national origin of the soldiers were, in most armies, more or less mixed. [16]

Because only minor forces could be maintained outside Europe's richest agrarian areas, the Povalley and Flanders, all nations and commanders had to spred their armies in order to secure different areas for their supply with food and other necessary goods. Not more than 20.000 or at a very maximum 30.000 soldiers could be concentrated at the same area for a battle, despite how large the total forces of the nation or commander was. The logistics drew a line for how large the armies could be.

This expansion was also a case in the Swedish example, who's forces began to grow directly after the entrance in the war. The need for the control of the harbours along the baltic coastline in northern Germany - the utmost important lifeline between the fieldarmy and the homeland - as well as a number of important cities and fortresses, and not the least important areas for logistics and contribution, made that Gustavus Adolphus' force rapidly grew. [17]

In early November 1630 the Swedish fieldarmy counted 29.000 men (of whom more than 9.000 were sick), while 13.000 were in 9 important garrisons in Pomerania. Soon after the new year the king, who had his quarters in Neumark, commanded more than 20.000 men (of whom only 14.000 weren't ill), while another 18.000 were in a number of garrisons. The army had begun to melt down, at a time when one of every third soldier lay in sickcamps. [18] But soon the development would take another direction.

In October 1630 we can for the first time see the strategical dividing of the Swedish army, that would be more and more developed during the rest of the war. Already now the forces were so large, that a concentrated logistic was impossible. The chancellor Axel Oxenstierna suggested from his headquarter in Elbing in Prussia, that Gustavus Adolphus first should see to, that the AGarrisons are in order and supplied", and thereafter gather the main force in an army led by the king himself to search for and fight the Emperor's main army. Beside that a second army should be organized along the Oderline, in order to secure the flank if the Poles joined the war. [19]

A year later the organization had been developed further more. When the year 1631 turned into 1632 Gustavus Adolphus lead the so called Army of the Rhine of 19.000 men, while an army in Franken counted a little more than 8.000, an army in Magdeburg more than 16.000, the army in Niedersachsen 13.000 and the army in Mecklenburg less than 4.000. In total the fieldarmy was divided into five armies that operated independently. Gustavus Adolphus also comanded some allied forces and at least 10.000 men i different garrisons. In total the Swedish forces in Germany consisted of 83.000 men, a force that in February-March 1632 had risen further to 108.000 men. [20] Of these forces only 13.000 were Swedish and Finnish, the rest were mercenaries. The weak Swedish and Finnish units were, relatively seen, even weaker if we also take into account Sweden's allies from Mecklenburg, Bremen, Sachsen and Brandenburg, who made the total figures of the forces under Gustavus Adolphus' command to 140.000 men. [21] Sweden's war in Germany was already to a very large extent fought with German troops, payed for by German money.

With these large forces the Swedes created a central basearea from Pomerania in the north and further south through central Germany between Weser and Oder, all the way to the border of Bohemia. The Swedes also expanded their influence towards southwest and Würzburg, Frankfurt am Main, Strassbourg and Mainz. In several cities large food magazines were organized, to provide for the troops.

But already after the battle of Lützen in November 1632 Axel Oxenstierna ordered a more carefull Swedish policy. In the beginning of 1633 Swedish and Finnish units began to leave the fieldarmies, and be concentrated around the harbours in Pomerania. This important baseregion was defended by the most reliable regiments, while the mercenaries in an even higher degree filled the fieldarmies. The threat from Denmark and Poland against Pomerania was always very actual for Axel Oxenstierna. Sweden could never risk that her forces on the continent could be cut of from Sweden itself. Pomerania was the most important bastion. [22]

Not only Swedish units were concentrated to Stralsund, Stettin and other harbours, also reliable mercenary-regiments, mainly British, were sent to these garrisons. The retreat towards Pomerania and the Baltic sea was more evident after the disaster at Nördlingen in 1634, and in 1637 also the Swedish positions in northern Germany were threatened by the Imperial forces, before the war once again changed pattern. The longer the war lasted, the more difficult it became to maintain troops in the most devastated parts of Germany. This led to a decrease of the size of the armies.

There is a large contrast to the situation 1631-32 already if we study the plans for the campaign of 1636. Then Axel Oxenstierna planned to mobilize three fieldarmies along Elbe (around Magdeburg), Oder and Weser with together 53.000 men. But of these only 45.000 existed at the beginning of the year, so new recruitments of mercenaries were ordered. The Swedes also had some 9.000 men in garrison in Pomerania and Mecklenburg. [23] In this situation the Swedish and Finnish units once again grew and conscriptions steadily resultet in reinforcements sent to Germany. In the year 1640 13.700 Swedish and Finnish soldiers were in Germany, less than half of the total native force of 34.000 men. Most of these troops were still in reserve in Sweden, Finland and the Baltic provinces. [24]

If the army had expanded enormously in size with a large number of different nationalities within it's ranks, the situation was totally different within the Swedish navy.

Since the Polish navy ceased to exist in the late 1620's and the Imperial naval armaments in the Baltic sea were stopped a very early moment, there were only two navies left in this sea, the Danish and the Swedish, century-long rivals. When the thirty years war ended Denmark's position was everly weakened, by the loss of her positions in the islands Ösel and Gotland to Sweden in 1645 and, above all, the defeat against the Swedish navy at the battle of Femern in 1644. In january 1646 chancellor Axel Oxenstierna told the council at the Stockholms castle, that Athe king of Denmark is now out of the Baltic, and Her Majesty has it most by herself", a correct analyse of the strategic situation. [25]

The Netherlands might be some threat to Sweden's position due to that country's commercial interests, but there were no immediate fear of Dutch naval envolvement in the Baltic sea, due to Netherland's war against Spain. [26] In this situation the Swedish navy was, deliberately, weakened since four large battle-ships were sold to the French allies. There were a large amount of discussion within the royal council if this wasn't to hazardous, but the ships were still sold. Beside of this a number of other naval ships were given to private entrepreneurs who had lended the crown substantial amounts of money for the war. Thus the Swedish navy in 1646 lost 20 ships and only gained 7 new. At the early years of the war in Germany Denmark was still much more powerfull on sea than Sweden, in 1630 there were 42 Danish and only 31 Swedish ships in the region. Still the Swedish navy had grown since the early 1620's, although the large ship Vasa sunk in Stockholm's harbour when she was destined to the front in Prussia in 1628. But already in 1635 the Swedish navy had grown to 53 ships after a large acquisition program. In 1645, when the Swedish navy was at it's peak, it could muster 58 ships against 35 Danish. But the sellout of a number of ships reduced, together with other factors, the Swedish superiority to a more equal situation in 1650, 42 Swedish and 43 Danish ships. [27]

This large navy demanded a growing number of officers and seamen. In the year 1645, when the Swedish navy was as largest, it could muster 6.152 officers and sailors together with 3.256 army soldiers stationed on the ships, in all 9.408 men. In comparison the total number in 1630 was just above 5.000 men. These seamen and soldiers were almost all recruited in Sweden and Finland. Already in the late 1620's an agreement between the crown and the burghers in the cities of Sweden was made, stipulating how many seamen each city should muster for the navy. A large number of seamen was also recruited from the countryside, in the same way as the army got it's Swedish and Finnish soldiers. [28] The reason for having only Swedes and Finns in the navy was obviously practical. On land German or Scottish units could fight in their own formations, but on a naval ship all men had to act close together and understanding the same language. There were no place for mercenaries who didn't spoke or at least understood Swedish on the ships, although we have examples of Dutch and English seamen on Swedish naval ships heading for the Swedish colony New Sweden in North America in the 1640's. [29] But here the need for experienced men used to the travel across the Atlantic were an even more important factor. In this way the Swedish navy during the whole thirty years war became a national force, and not multieuropean as the army.

The navy's most important task was to secure the transportation lines between Sweden and her forces in Germany. Troops and material was escorted from numerous Swedish harbours to Stralsund, Lübeck, Wismar and Rostock. Special landing-stages for horses were built at Dalarö castle in the Stockholm archipelago, in Helsinki and at the Älvsborg castle close to Gothenburg. In the summer 1648 the navy took 7.000 men, infantry and cavalry, from the harbours of Narva, Helsinki, Stockholm, Nyköping, Norrköping, Kalmar and Gothenburg. In all 20 navy ships and 100 special hired ships were used for these transports, the last of this size during the war. [30] This was possible without any other threats than that of hard weather and demonstrated the truth in the a stipulate by Axel Oxenstierna already in 1636: AIf we are masters on navy, we are also masters on the Baltic sea". [31]

When the last year of the thirty years war began the Swedish field army in Germany counted 9.000 Swedish soldiers and 28.000 mercenaries. In a large number of garrisons there were additional 9.000 Swedish and 17.000 foreign soldiers. [32] The Swedish army had - as the Imperial and Bavarian forces - increased in number since the early 1640's but it was far from the large size of the early 1630's. Instead the proportion of Swedish troops had risen.

The large question for all participants of the war was that about satisfaction, that is compensation for the war costs in general and the mercenaries in specific, so that masses of unpaid mercenaries wouldn't start uncontrolled anarchy all over Germany.

In this situation the Swedes were unwilling to retreat from areas were the troops could be provided for, and at the same time a high degree of preparedness could be maintained if the enemy would try anything hostile. The Imperial field marshall Ottavio Piccolomini realised this, and on November 23, 1648 he wrote to the Imperial court-councellor and vice chancellor count Kurz, that the Swedes step by step widened the area that they occupied around Prague. Piccolomini enraged declared that the Swedish soldiers Adas Land arm zu essen", when they let themself be provided by the Bohemian population. [33]

After long negociations in Osnabrück, in June 1648 Johan Oxenstierna for Sweden accepted a sum of five million reichsthaler from the German Reichstag as a compensation for the demobilization of the Swedish army, although the army leadership had thought that seven millions was an absolute minimum. Sweden couldn't afford to pay herself for the demobilization of the still relatively strong army. Such a scenario was a large threat to the country's financies, or as the royal council formulated it, that was to be sitting with Athe whole army against our throat", a situation that would hurt Sweden Ainto her bones".

Both the Emperor, Bavaria and France had to crush revolts among mercenaries at several times. Swedish troops made revolt in Überlingen, Neumarkt, Langenach, Meinau, Eger and Schweinfurt. The most serious events occured in Anhalt, were revolting mercenaries were circled in and shot down.

Neither was the possibilities of continued service a beat for mercenaries in the Swedish army, far from it. During the autumn 1649 the number of deserteurs increased rapidly, when the Swedish army retreated step by step towards Pomerania, while the soldiers feared to be sent to the Baltic provinces or Sweden, places far away and with small temptations for most German soldiers. [34]

Besides of all this the size of the Swedish army was a problem itself. Axel Oxenstierna concluded in august 1648 that the large units were spread over a large territory: AThe army is under the Alps and in Bremen, and garrisons all over Germany. Think what time it will demand first to sign the decision (of a demobilization; my remark), and then realize it properly and with security". For Sweden it was Charles Gustavus (in 1648 Commander in Chief and from 1654 king Charles X of Sweden)who was responsible for the realization of the peace agreement, while Piccolomini got the same responsibility on the Imperial side.

At the end of the war the total amount of Swedish troops were 70.000 men, of whom 40.000 where in the field-army and the rest in the garrisons. The allied in Hessen-Kassel could muster 11.000 and the French 21.000. The Emperor had still 25.000 in his armies, while Bavaria had 18.000 men. [35] The French troops were sent back to France to fight the Fronde-rising. [36] Some Imperial units were sent to Hungary, where the threat from the Turks once again grew. [37]

The Swedish army gave every demobilized infantry mercenary 12 Swedish reichsthaler, while a cavalryman could got 33 reichsthaler. Everyone got his share. Best payed was the commander of the whole demobilization, Charles Gustavus himself who got 80.000 reichsthaler, while Carl Gustaf Wrangel had to be satisfied with 60.000 and Axel Oxenstierna with 30.000. Many soldiers also took weapons and other equipment when they left the army. At the same time large arms depots were built by the Swedes at the end of the war in several Northgerman harbours. Some high-ranking officers also could get their payment not in cash, but in canons (sic!), while most of the artillery were sent back home to Sweden.

The first plans for the demobilization was drawn up in Stockholm already in april 1647 and the strategy was obvious. Step by step the army would be drawn back to Pomerania, a province that the peace-treaty also formally placed in Swedish hands, a process carefully coordinated with the demobilization of the Imperial forces. It was also important to have enough troops to secure the promised compensation money from Germany. The first step was to demobilize Aall foreign cavalry ... since the German cavalrymen's salary are relatively high and in an unbearable way presses the state".

On July 28, 1649 Charles Gustavus met with Piccolomini in Nürnberg and made and agreement about the process of demobilization and the evacuation of a number of cities. Since new problems had occured the process halted, but in the beginning of october 1649 the two men made a new agreement. At this time already 130 Swedish and 163 Imperial cavalry companies had been demobilized, as well as several Bavarian units. During the month of October the Swedes began the withdrawal their forces out of Kur-Sachsen.

At the end of 1649 almost 9.000 Swedish and Finnish soldiers had been moved back home across the Baltic sea. Of the artillery only 144 men remained in Germany. The lifeguard with it's 1.900 men were sent to Stockholm and Riga. The transports of Swedish units were to some extent financed with extra taxes from the new Swedish provinces in Germany. [38] The process of demobilization was halted in early 1650, due to worries that the Emperor might be tempted to attack the weakened Swedish positions.

On July 16, 1650 Charles Gustavus and Piccolomini agreed upon the continued demobilization. During the summer 1650 this process was finished for the Swedish forces, and after August the remaining Swedish units in Germany had been drawn back to Pomerania. The only exceptions were Hinterpommern and a Swedish garrison in the fortress Vechta in Niedersachsen, where the Swedes stayed until 1654 to secure unpayed compensation money. At the end of 1650 the French forces had also totally left Germany and the Imperial demobilization was finished.

Remaining in Germany was now, two years after the treaty of Westphalia, 4.100 mercenaries in Swedish service in Pomerania. The Swedish and Finnish units in the new German provinces numbered 4.500 men, while 7.000 were placed in the Baltic provinces and only 2.000 in Swedish garrisons. [39]

Now in 1648 the Swedish army in Germany was reduced to a little less than the size of the army that Gustavus Adolphus had interferred with in the German war. The proportions between Swedish and Finnish soldiers and foreign mercenaries were now also restored to those that existed in 1630. The circle was to some extent closed. But now the soldiers didn't belong to an army with an uncertain future and limited goals when it sat it's foot on German soil at Peenemünde. Now in 1650 it was an army of a nation that had gained provinces in northern Germany as well as seat in the German Reichstag. These achievements had been gained to the cost of the lives of tens of thousands of Swedes and Finns, but also, the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers from Germany, England, Scotland, Estonia, Livonia (Latvia), Holland, Ireland, France and a number of other European soldiers when they served in one of the largest multieuropean armies ever seen before the time of Napoleon.

FOOTNOTES