I. The missing signature

At the bottom of the treaty between the Republic of the United Netherlands and the King of Spain which was signed in Münster on 30 January 1648, one signature was missing, that of Godard van Reede, the envoy from Utrecht. Van Reede's refusal threatened the entire peace process. According to the Union of Utrecht of 1579, the founding charter of the Republic, unanimity was required in matters of war and peace: every one of the provinces had to agree. The province of Zeeland was equally uncooperative and would not let their delegate Johan de Knuyt sign, either.

At this remove it may seem as though the Peace of Münster was inevitable, but contemporaries were hardly convinced. The intractability of Utrecht and Zeeland was such that, as late as the spring of 1648, an end to the war with Spain was still out of reach. This essay takes a closer look at Utrecht's resistance. The envoy from Utrecht, Godard van Reede, lord of Nederhorst (1588–1648), will figure prominently: his network, his financial interests — including the question of his bribery by the French — and his less than glorious demise in 1648.



II. Divided to Münster

Around 1640 there was a ground swell of desire to end the protracted, destructive wars of which the Dutch Revolt against the Spanish Crown was part. The military objectives of the seemingly unwinnable conflict were becoming obscure because the original contrast between Catholics and Protestants had blurred. Out of self-interest Catholic France supported the United Provinces and Sweden against the Habsburgers, whereas Protestant states such as Saxony and Brandenburg sided with the Emperor. The conflict of interests made more modest goals seem acceptable, thus bringing peace into view. The pragmatic Dutch merchant community was eager to put the war behind them. Moreover, one of the cardinal motives for the struggle, self-preservation, had dissolved in the wake of the military successes by land and sea. What with a manageable and easily defensible territory, naval supremacy and colonial expansion, the prize was already won as far as most Dutch were concerned. Prolonging the war would only bring additional risks and expenses.

Yet there were also those who opposed reconciliation with Spain. As a military commander, Stadholder Frederik Hendrik was keen to extend his winning streak and the nobility, who supplied the armed forces with many of their officers, saw peace as an obstacle to their careers. Finding themselves on the front lines, the provinces of Zeeland and Gelderland were eager to have the borders moved further south. And finally, there were the orthodox Calvinists, led by the Utrecht professor Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676), who wanted to carry on the struggle against the papist arch-enemy. The strict wing of the Reformed Church to which Voetius belonged had many members of southern Netherlandish descent — 'Heimatvertriebenen', as they were called - who longed for the liberation of their homeland. As a result, the two cities in Holland with the most southern immigrants, Leiden and Haarlem, were against peace.

Around 1640, the Spanish enemy were eager for peace. Hope of subduing the rebellious northern provinces had been abandoned and from 1635 onward the Spanish found themselves in dangerous straits. French participation in the conflict meant they had to fight on two fronts in the Low Countries while they still had the Thirty Years War to contend with. Revolts in Catalonia and Portugal, which were supported by the French and the Dutch, further exacerbated matters. The cost of the desperate struggle kept mounting and the state of the Spanish treasury was precarious, partly due to the economic crisis that began in 1627. [1]

After several years of cautious deliberation, peace talks commenced in Münster and Osnabrück in 1644. The position of the Spanish, who negotiated in the former city, had been further undermined the previous year by a devastating defeat near the fortress town of Rocroi. Problems abroad — war with Denmark over navigation through the Sound and precarious relations with the French allies — and the notorious complexity of their decision-making process prevented the Dutch from sending their delegation to Münster until 1646. In 1635 the French and Dutch had agreed to divide the Spanish Netherlands among themselves. On their way to Münster the French ambassadors d'Avaux and Servien had stopped in The Hague, where they signed two agreements in March 1644: a 'subsidy treaty' to cover the military expenses incurred by the two allies and a 'guarantee treaty' that obliged them to negotiate collectively in Münster and to coordinate their efforts. [2] Another problem was the recognition of the Dutch delegates as plenipotentiaries of a sovereign state. Spain was already prepared to do so in late 1640, but French recognition was not forthcoming until February 1645. The Republic sent eight ambassadors: two from Holland and one from each of the other six provinces. Godard van Reede was delegated on behalf of Utrecht.

The negotiations were hampered by the escalation of tensions between the war and peace factions in the Republic. The war faction was wary of a separate peace with Spain. Released from the burden of waging war on two fronts at once, a rallying Spain could still subdue the Low Countries. Nor could any further help be expected from abroad after the scandalous breach of the treaty with France. The peace faction, under the leadership of Holland, feared precisely the opposite: if France were to conclude peace with Spain before the United Provinces, the Dutch would have to contend with the entire Spanish army. That the peace faction ultimately prevailed was thanks above all to the aggressive policy of the new French prime minister, Cardinal Jules Mazarin (1602–1661). Following the victory at Rocroi in 1643, Mazarin thought he could annex the Spanish Netherlands as a whole. As France's power increased, so too did the chances of it becoming the Republic's immediate neighbour to the south, across a border that differed only slightly from the existing front line. This posed a new threat for the Dutch.

It became increasingly attractive to leave the southern Netherlands in Spanish hands as a buffer against France, which helped Holland win support for a separate peace with Spain. The peace faction thought the terms agreed upon in 1644 could be ignored since the French did not adhere to those of 1635. Nor were the dangers involved lost on the stadholder, Frederik Hendrik, whose change of heart advanced this faction. Only Zeeland and Utrecht persevered in their resistance to a separate peace with Spain, which enhanced the importance of their envoys to Münster, De Knuyt and Van Reede, in the eyes of France. Mazarin personally admonished the diplomat Longueville to stay on friendly terms with Van Reede, whom the Cardinal saw as a more crucial figure than the unreliable De Knuyt. [3]

Spain and the Republic reached agreement on a number of points with relative speed. Both parties wanted a new armistice whereby the southern Netherlands would remain Spanish. The negotiators could not agree, however, on the overseas possessions wrested from Spain by the United East India Company (VOC) and the West India Company (WIC). A particularly sensitive issue was the religious freedom of Catholics in parts of Flanders and Brabant and along the Meuse that had recently been captured by the Republic, whose sovereignty in these areas the Spanish contested. Above all Zeeland and Utrecht were strongly opposed to concessions on this point. Yet in late 1646 the standpoints of the Dutch and Spanish envoys were so close that even a definitive peace seemed possible.

In the meantime, however, Utrecht and Zeeland were digging in their heels. Their delegates raised various questions that had still not been resolved: the problems surrounding the territories in North Brabant as well as the status of the VOC and WIC. The latter issue was clearly important to Zeeland, whereas Utrecht's interests were more equivocal. In the province of Utrecht it was Ambassador Van Reede who set the course against peace. His opposition was affirmed by the orthodox Reformed clergy in the city of Utrecht under the leadership of Voetius. They were determined that the peace treaty not 'benefit in any way the worldly affairs of the abominable papacy' (door weereltsche consideratien het grouwelijck Pausdom eenichsints zoude gefavoriseert worden) on Dutch soil. The Dutch plenipotentiaries were not to tolerate anything but the Reformed religion. In the States General, the deputies from Zeeland were of one mind with Utrecht on this point. [4] When the Spanish acquiesced regarding the overseas possessions, De Knuyt thought he could countenance the peace. At the signing of the tentative terms on 8 January 1647 Van Reede was the only one who remained recalcitrant.

The year 1647 brought an end to the hostilities, facilitating the peace process. There was progress in the negotiations on the contentious points that remained. The demarcation of the recently captured territories would be entrusted to a commission representing both parties, which would ignore religious issues. Yet 1647 did not bring a definitive solution. Loyalty to the French allies remained a stumbling block, about which a violent debate erupted in the sovereign Republic. The opponents presented their views in the form of pamphlets. Nor did the French spare any effort to win support for their cause. They placed their hope in Zeeland and Utrecht, who still opposed a separate peace. Chastened by his principals, De Knuyt was back in line with his colleague from Utrecht.

Allegiance to France on the part of the other provinces continued to crumble. There was growing suspicion that the French desire to pursue the war against Spain at any cost was in their own interest. The States General therefore decided that, while every effort should be made for a comprehensive peace, if it became clear that France was out to sabotage the peace process, a separate peace with Spain was certainly an option. [5] That the French were in fact guilty of sabotage was evident before long, for they countered every Spanish concession with new demands. By January 1648 the States General had had enough and instructed their envoys in Münster to sign the peace treaty, which had been amended in the meantime. Zeeland resisted but on 30 January their representative in Münster changed his mind yet again and signed after all. The only one who steadfastly balked at a separate peace with Spain was the ambassador from Utrecht.



III. Politics in the province of Utrecht

Understanding the peace process requires some insight into the political structure of the various provinces. [6] The Republic of the United Netherlands comprised seven sovereign provinces which convened in the States General in The Hague. Unanimity was required on important decisions. Each province was administered by States, which sent a delegation to the States General. The composition of the States varied from one province to another. The towns and the nobility sent representatives to the assemblies. In the maritime provinces of Holland and Zeeland it was the towns that predominated, in the rural provinces, especially Gelderland and Overijssel, the nobility. The nobles were divided into ridderschappen while the towns were administered by councils or vroedschappen. These councils, manned by regents, appointed deputies to the States assemblies as well as burgomasters and magistrates, who governed the towns on a day-to-day basis and administered justice. Membership in the Reformed Church was required of the Regents. When the Revolt against Spain broke out these were nouveaux riches for the most part, either from the merchant class or, to a lesser extent, the guilds. In the course of the seventeenth century, however, the group evolved into a regent patriciate, which sought to block admission from below and thus became an oligarchy.

In practice, informal relations influenced policy in the Republic even more than formal ones. Within the ridderschappen and the town councils there were groups, or rather factions, whose members were bound by common interests, friendship or blood. They often shared the same political and religious ideas as well. This combination made the faction an important political factor. [7]

A unique figure within the government was the stadholder. Originally the representative of the sovereign, after the abjuration of Philip II in 1581 the office was maintained in the service of the States. But in fact the position was much stronger than this implies. The stadholders, William the Silent and then his sons Maurits and Frederik Hendrik, held the office in several provinces concomitantly, in addition to being captain-generals of the army. The military successes of Maurits and later those of his brother Frederik Hendrik contributed much to their prestige.

The decision-making of the individual provinces proceeded along the lines of formal powers and informal ties that have just been described. Zeeland's attitude can thus be explained by the interplay between the various constituents of the States, which included a First Noble (representing the Prince of Orange) and six towns. The towns' interests in the WIC alone accounts for their desire to pursue the war against Spain. The structure of Utrecht was slightly more complex. The States of Utrecht were unique inasmuch as they comprised a relic of the clergy and, as in the Middle Ages, three estates or 'members'. The First Member, that of the clergy, comprised delegates from the five chapters, which were immensely rich. Following the introduction of the Reformation in 1580 the chapters were retained in altered form. Thenceforth the canons were patrician and above all aristocratic laymen who had to belong to the now ascendant Reformed Church. It was they who appointed the college of Delegated States — the First Member of the Utrecht States from 1580 onward. The Second Member, which represented the nobility and the countryside, was formed by the ridderschap. Noblemen could hold a seat in the States provincial provided they met certain requirements: noble birth, possession of a recognised manor house with tower and drawbridge, and membership in the Reformed Church. Whoever sat in the Second Member could count on interesting offices, especially since it was kept so small. The so-called Jufferconventen, relics of former convents administered by the ridderschap, formed an additional source of income that enabled the nobility to support sisters or daughters. [8] The Third Member consisted of the five towns in the province: Utrecht, Amersfoort, Rhenen, Wijk bij Duurstede and Montfoort. Utrecht challenged the voice of the four other 'small towns' in the administration of the province with varying degrees of success, because it saw itself as the only representative of the Third Member. It was often supported in this view by the ridderschap, which saw the city as an ally because of the nobility's growing influence on municipal politics.

The nobility was already preponderant in the Delegated States, the body that managed the quotidian affairs of the province, in which the three Members had a representative. All three of the representatives were often nobles. The resistance of urban regents to the concentration of so much power was inevitable. They could count on the support of the civic militia, which consisted largely of guildsmen. Discontent over high taxes or food prices could lead to rioting, as it did in 1588 and 1610. When, in 1618, another riot threatened, the ruling aristocrats hired mercenaries (waardgelders) to put the civic militia out of commission. These events precipitated the crisis that occurred in the Republic during the Twelve Years Truce with Spain (1609–1621). A theological conflict between Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants over the interpretation of Reformed doctrine proceeded to dominate politics after town councils took a stand. The Remonstrant view that the Church was subordinate to the government appealed to many regents, including the aristocratic administrators in Utrecht. [9] Stadholder Maurits sided with the Counter-Remonstrants, on the other hand, and saw the engagement of the waardgelders by the Remonstrant aristocracy in Utrecht as an affront to his military authority. In July 1618 he appeared with his troops in the city, disbanded the waardgelders and appointed new regents who were loyal to him. They were generally of Counter-Remonstrant persuasion and from a more modest social background than their predecessors. The coup d'état staged by Maurits put an end to the aristocratic domination in the province because the ridderschap lost control of the Utrecht town council. Thenceforth the Delegated States numbered as many nobles as urban regents. On the other hand, the Stadholder's power in the province, already greater than it was in Holland, had grown.



IV. Godard van Reede, lord of Nederhorst and his Network

The power of the nobility may have declined, but by no means were they played out. Constitutionally, they held all of the seats in the Second Member and half of those in the First. Maurits's coup had put several very capable nobles in office, which eventually increased their influence. One of these aristocrats was Godard van Reede, lord of Nederhorst, who later became the negotiator in Münster. In light of his Remonstrant sympathies his appointment to the States was remarkable; his loyalty to Maurits apparently did the trick, opening the door to numerous offices. In Godard's first major post, that of extra-ordinary council at the Hof (or Chancery) of Utrecht, his legal studies at the universities of Franeker and Poitiers proved useful, for his task was to monitor the Hof on behalf of the ridderschap. In 1619 the ridderschap delegated him to the provincial synod of Utrecht, where Remonstrant and Counter-Remonstrant preachers were preparing for the National Synod. [10]

Van Reede proved to be very skilled at the game of provincial politics. In his appointments as in his votes on laws and taxes he was clever at forging alliances. Most of the Delegated States in Utrecht usually followed the ridderschap. They could often count on the sympathy of the small towns, moreover, which saw themselves as being eclipsed by the capital. In 1626, Godard was made superintendent of the Jufferconventen and two years later treasurer. In addition, he was appointed steward of the convent known as the Vrouwenklooster. These offices not only swelled his purse but also gave him opportunities to oblige other nobles by awarding attractive posts to aristocratic women. Power began to concentrate around Van Reede. Especially after Frederik Hendrik succeeded his brother Maurits as stadholder of Utrecht in 1625, the Van Reedes were able to consolidate their clan's position. The change of stadholder freed Van Reede, who was still on the side of the Remonstrants, of a religious handicap, because, unlike Maurits, Frederik Hendrik had no intention of dealing severely with the Remonstrants.

Van Reede was able to extend his power gradually, but only after the death of Frederik Hendrik's favourite Adriaan Ploos van Amstel in 1639 could the Van Reede clan really break through. Together with his brothers Johan and Ernst, Godard thenceforth controlled the First and the Second Members of the States. The faction included Pieter van Hardenbroek, Johan van Asch van Wijck and relatives by marriage in the Delegated States and ridderschap. They had close ties with the Stadholder, moreover: in 1644 Frederik Hendrik appointed Godard stadholder of Utrecht and the Paulusabdij. The Van Reede faction's resistance to peace with Spain was a natural consequence of these ties. At a time when Holland, with Amsterdam in the lead, was doing everything it could to achieve that peace, the faction therefore enjoyed the support of the orthodox Calvinist majority in the vroedschap of Utrecht, which pleaded for perseverance in the struggle against the 'loathsome papists'. Van Reede had clashed with them over religious matters in the past, but now they were united by their common goal. The strength of their position explains the choice of Van Reede as Utrecht's ambassador.

The network from which Godard's power derived was largely familial. The sisters married scions of important Utrecht families and thus strengthened the family network. In 1623 Brother Johan (1593–1682) purchased the manor Renswoude, but a seat in the ridderschap did not follow since Godard already had one. In 1634 he entered the Delegated States of Utrecht, and was regularly commissioned to the States General. Johan maintained good relations with Frederik Hendrik and was sent on a diplomatic mission to England on behalf of Utrecht in 1644 to mediate between Charles I and Parliament. He had already successfully brokered the marriage between the King's daughter Mary and the son of Frederik Hendrik, the future stadholder William II. Out of gratitude for his mediation Charles I created Johan 'Baron Reede'. In 1646 the lord of Renswoude represented his province at the marriage of Frederik Hendrik's daughter Louise Henriette and Friedrich Wilhelm, elector of Brandenburg. Johan's marriage further strengthened the Van Reede clan. In 1616 he wed Jacomina van Eeden, from an aristocratic family in Gelderland. The other brothers as well strengthened the network by the marriages and the offices they held.

Godard himself married twice. In 1617 his first wife Emerentia, daughter of the Hof of Holland's president Gerrit Oem van Wijngaarden, and Sandrina Croesinck. Her family owned considerable land in Holland. Godard and Emerentia had two sons — the eldest of whom, Gerard, succeeded his father as lord of Nederhorst — and six daughters. Through his faction Godard orchestrated his admission to the First Member of the States. That the couple named their second son after Frederik Hendrik betokens their attachment to the Orange family. Godard's daughters married into prominent families as well, thereby extending the network further still. His own, second marriage to Catharina van Utenhove, whom he married after the death of Emerentia, forged links with the Van Utenhove and Van Renesse families as well. [11]

Godard van Reede, lord of Nederhorst had a lifelong fascination with wealth. As in politics he wanted more and more, and to that end he threw himself into one business venture after another. By reinvesting his profits and selling land he was able to finance his schemes. Land reclamation was one of his principal activities. The use of windmills to drain lakes became increasingly common in the first half of the seventeenth century. [12] Godard invested in the drainage of the Horstermeer and the Naardermeer, for instance, both of which were in the neighbourhood of his manor Nederhorst. The project ended in a fiasco. When the Spanish invaded in 1629, land along the Vecht River as well as the Horstermeer and the Naardermeer polders were flooded in defense of Amsterdam. The cost of draining these areas anew was ruinous. One by one the participants withdrew and the land beneath the Naardermeer was never reclaimed. The Spanish thus dealt Godard a devastating blow he would never forget.

Land for farming was won not only through reclamation, but also by bringing what was referred to as 'wild ground' (woeste gronden) such as peat bogs and sand drifts under cultivation. Van Reede was active in this area as well. Shortly after 1620 he purchased large tracts of bog in the province of Utrecht. Several entrepreneurs had the peat removed, which was highly profitable. Peat was vital to the Dutch economy as a form of fuel. As treasurer of the Vrouwenklooster, Godard himself had granted the concession. And after the peat had been removed, the ground was suitable for pasture, which generated further income in the form of rent.

Van Reede's investments were not confined to the Republic. When the West India Company (WIC) was established in 1621 he and his nephew Godard van Reede, lord of Amerongen invested 1,200 guilders. On 14 June 1628 they sold their shares — not a wise decision in hindsight, for that same year Dutch privateers captured two Spanish silver fleets and the price of WIC shares doubled. Too cautious in this case and therefore too quick to sell, later on Godard got involved too deeply in another overseas venture. In 1640 he co-founded the Company of New Netherland, which established a colony on the site of what is now New York. The Company was never successful.

Van Reede's overseas investments, and more especially his involvement with the weapons industry, brought him into contact with the military. In 1628 he launched an ambitious scheme with capital from the sale of land his wife had inherited. The market was favourable: the resumption of the war against Spain created enormous demand for cannon, muskets and ammunition. The overseas conflict heightened demand further still. On the other hand trade was blocked by the conflict between Denmark and the imperial troops under Tilly in 1627–1628. The obstruction of the Sound threatened to cut the Republic off from manufacturers in Sweden, Hamburg and Lübeck.

In order to keep the army supplied, production had to increase, and in this the province of Utrecht would play an important role. Arms had always been an important industry in Utrecht, which now produced quantities of muskets, swords and lances. [13] The town was ideally situated to become a sort of national armoury. With a view to stepping up production, in February 1628 the States of Utrecht granted permission to establish a company to mine zinc as well as soil for melting pots. The raw materials had been discovered in the southeastern section of the province. For the amalgamation of copper and zinc in order to produce brass, necessary for the production of firearms, three copper mills were erected near Amersfoort. Godard and his brother Ernst decided to participate as well. The smelteries and rolling mills required large quantities of peat for fuel, which was supplied by the Jufferconventen. Thus Godard was able once again to turn his official association with the convents to his financial advantage. Dirck Hoeufft was his partner in the peat-winning project.

The entire enterprise eventually led to a production line of 63 ovens, 17 of them in the Republic: the three new ones in Utrecht mentioned earlier and 14 pre-existent ones in Holland, most of which belonged to Thiens and Hoeufft. In addition, there were 32 ovens in Sweden, including 12 that belonged to Louis de Geer and 14 to Thiens and his partners, and 14 more in Hamburg and Lübeck. Sweden's entry into the Thirty Years War in 1630 increased the political importance of this multi-national industry. The companies supplied Gustavus II with arms [14], which contributed to his military success — thus alleviating Spanish pressure on the Republic — and enriched the investors. [15]

Godard van Reede invested his money not only in business enterprises and land, but also in goods that were calculated to enhance his social status, such as townhouses. He also expanded the land he owned around Nederhorst Castle by buying 20 morgens from the drost of Muiden, P.C. Hooft. The noted poet and historian asked his brother-in-law to negotiate on his behalf, since he did not trust Van Reede: "he is, I'm told, very cunning in these matters, and will turn things this way and that, and fill all the vats, in order to wring out the most advantage; a manner quite at odds with my character and practice". [16]

Van Reede lavishly furnished his houses and above all his castle with all the furniture, art and books he owned. When everything was going well he could afford to live as a grand seigneur, but the setbacks Godard suffered in America, for instance, wreaked havoc on his finances. Nor did the diplomatic mission to Münster help matters, for the compensation of 400 guilders hardly covered his costs. The gravity of the situation did not become clear until Van Reede's estate was inventoried in the summer of 1648: the sum of his debts proved far greater than the value of his possessions. [17]

The lord of Nederhorst's financial woes are interesting in light of contemporary rumours that he accepted French bribes to oppose a separate peace with Spain. Both the Spanish ambassadors and the peace faction within the Republic alleged that the French plenipotentiary Servien had crossed the Dutchman's palm to guarantee his support. The accusations were never substantiated and did not actually surface until after the peace was signed. [18] Yet the recently published journals of the Frisian stadholder Willem Frederik confirmed the suspicions that Van Reede was indeed bribed by the French. On 5 March 1648 the Frisian negotiator Donia informed Willem Frederik that "Pau, Knuyt, Mengerswijck elck een tonne gautz van de Spaensche ontfangen en Nederhorst een van de Francen". [19] Van Reede supposedly received half of the 100,000 guilders from Servien and was still owed the rest, which would explain why he played the French card so avidly to the bitter end. The previously mentioned inventory which brought Godard's financial woes to light includes a rather incriminating item in the list of income, assets and debts: "tgeene noch vande Vredehandelinge comen mochte" ([the sum] which may still come from the peace negotiations). [20]

#Daß sich Servien intensiv mit Bestechungen beschäftigte, wird z.B. aus einer Rechnung deutlich wo er die Zahlung von 30.000 Livres notiert, die unter anderem für zwei nicht namentlich genannte Mitglieder der niederländischen Delegation bestimmt waren ('Mrs. les Estatz'). [21] Die Zahlung erfolge über den Bankier Mathieu Hoeufft, einem Verwandten von Nederhorsts Geschäftspartner Dirck Hoeufft.



V. The ambassador's downfall

When, on 30 January 1648, Van Reede was the only envoy who refused to sign the peace treaty, he thought he was invincible. The constitutional rule about unanimity clearly stipulated that no province could be outvoted. Nor had Zeeland dropped its objections to peace in the meantime; De Knuyt had negotiated on his own, after all. Van Reede put all his hope in the new stadholder Willem II, who had succeeded his father within the past year. Whereas Frederik Hendrik had inclined towards peace in the last years of his life, his son longed to prove himself on the battlefield and was therefore eager to resume the conflict with Spain.

As it happened, Van Reede grossly overplayed his hand, for in the course of several months the peace process gained momentum. The opponents' arguments were enfeebled by Spain's far-reaching concessions with regard to Brabant and the overseas territories, while the series of new demands that were made by France undermined that state's credibility. The reasons adduced by Van Reede and his allies for honouring the treaty of 1635 gradually lost their persuasiveness. On 30 January 1648 Holland, Gelderland and Overijssel had ratified the peace treaty without further ado, whereas the other provinces continued to deliberate. Through their contacts Holland's envoys sought to undermine the position of the war factions elsewhere. In late March, Groningen and Friesland voted in favour of ratification while Holland sought to sway Utrecht.

Van Reede remained obdurate, but the mood in his province began to shift. The consensus in the First and Second Members, which had consistently supported the ambassador, was threatened by the dissatisfaction of a recently appointed group of nobles who were systematically excluded from higher office. Few of these men belonged to the Van Reede family network. Once they realised that the lord of Nederhorst and his supporters were losing favour in The Hague and Münster, the nobles asserted themselves.

The death in 1645 of Jacob van Asch van Wijck, who had a seat in the Delegated States, weakened the war faction. Van Asch's successor Anthonie Parmentier was a powerful advocate of peace with Spain. In the spring of 1648 supporters and opponents among the Delegated States and ridderschap were evenly divided. [22] At that point a pamphlet war broke out as the two sides sought to win support. Once again the Hollanders defended a separate peace by pointing to the delaying tactics of the French, while Van Reede blamed the Spanish for the same.

Once it was clear that Utrecht and Zeeland were isolated, the consensus in the States of Utrecht changed, the more so since The Hague had accused the two provinces of subverting the Union. Members of the ridderschap of Holland sought to bring their confrères in Utrecht round to their position. At the end of February Van Reede complained to his French friends Longueville and Servien that above all the gentlemen 'Opdam, Heemstede et autres m'avoyent forme des grandes traverses et difficultés'. [23]

By March a majority in the ridderschap favoured signing the definitive peace. Only by personally appearing before the States of Utrecht and the ridderschap could Van Reede hope to keep the war faction alive. He therefore left the negotiations in Münster and, by luring a nobleman into the war camp and casting his own vote in the ridderschap, created a majority of one. Evidently relieved, the Utrechter wrote to Servien that the pro-Holland faction was keen to send him back to Münster to sign, but that 'Graces a Dieu j'ay surmonté tout cela, et obtenu une resolution des Estats d'Utrecht'. [24] Shortly thereafter it became clear that Godard's victory was actually Pyrrhic. His illegal conduct (as ambassador he was in the service of the Generality and therefore had no right to vote in the provincial assembly) had met with the usual resistance. On 9 March 1648 the Utrecht vroedschap came out in favour of ratification. Several peace proponents in the States had managed to drive a stake between the city and the war faction. Johan van Reede, lord of Renswoude failed in a final attempt to rebut the swelling criticism of his brother. [25] The tide could no longer be stemmed. So divided was the ridderschap that the minority did not hesitate to broadcast their position. On 17 March four outvoted members informed the Delegated States that they had voted for ratification in the ridderschap. At their request this was duly recorded in the resolution book of the States of Utrecht. [26] Van Reede's spell was thus broken.

Once again a pamphlet war broke out, and this time individuals were plainly targeted. Outsiders could see that something was afoot when, on 30 March, an expanded Utrecht commission appeared before the States General. Apparently the gentlemen no longer trusted one another. It now became clear that the Delegated States had gone overboard. Behind the scenes the delegates from Holland apparently managed to convince their colleagues from Utrecht: on 16 April the States provincial instructed Van Reede to sign the peace [27], but the envoy still refused. At the end of the month the States General, save Zeeland, ordered their ambassadors to swear the separate peace with Spain.

Meanwhile Van Reede's health began declining precipitously. At the sitting of the States General in late March he was already ill. The journey to Münster, where he arrived on 21 April, taxed him so severely that the Spanish began to fear for his life. Ratification was thus needlessly delayed once again. The ailing ambassador received a visit from several Spanish diplomats who pressed him to sign as soon as possible, which he finally did on the 30th.

Though Zeeland had still not ratified the treaty, the envoys of Spain and the Republic swore the Peace of Münster on 15 May 1648. Utrecht's ambassador did not attend the formality. [28] The illness that prevented him was no ploy. Sensing his end was nigh, he went home to die. He did not live to see the official proclamation of peace in the Republic on 5 June 1648. Within three weeks of his return to Utrecht, Godard van Reede, lord of Nederhorst was dead at the age of 59.



VI. Conclusion

We have still not answered the fundamental question as to why Utrecht opposed the peace process. Clearly Zeeland had a lot riding on the outcome, especially the overseas possessions. Thanks in part to the constant vacillations of Zeeland's envoy in Münster the province concurred at crucial moments. Utrecht's situation was just the opposite: the province had no particular interest in prolonging the conflict; it was rather their ambassador in Münster, Godard van Reede, who opposed a separate peace with Spain. Until early 1648 he was a powerful figure in provincial politics. Through his personal network he controlled the First and Second Members of the States provincial and thus had the majority behind him. He also enjoyed the support of the Third Member, because the principal faction in the city of Utrecht was against peace on religious grounds. The Stadholder, with whom Van Reede was on excellent terms, carried considerable weight in Utrecht politics as well.

If indeed Utrecht's role in the peace process was largely determined by one man, one cannot help but wonder what his motives were. Lacking evidence of his thoughts on the subject, we can only speculate. In public Van Reede always insisted that the Dutch should not betray their French allies, which he considered paramount. Contemporaries suspected he had been bribed by the French ambassadors. Recently published journals of the Frisian stadholder Willem Frederik lend credence to their suspicion. Moreover, Van Reede's personal finances were such that he could have used the money. If in fact the transaction did occur, given its illicit nature one would not expect it to have left any trace. On the other hand, its effect would have been limited by the fact that every party sought to buy support.

One possible explanation for the ambassador's conduct is his character, which was extraordinarily tenacious. After 1618 he remained sympathetic to the Remonstrant cause despite the losses the movement suffered at the Synod of Dordrecht and despite the powerful new position he held, which he owed to none other than Prince Maurits. The same obstinacy characterised his business dealings, which cost him dearly on more than one occasion. Those same dealings, especially his involvement in the arms trade and in overseas ventures, may partly explain Van Reede's determination to prolong the war. And, given the financial consequences he suffered when the Spanish invaded in 1629 and his descendence from a 'Heimatvertriebene' on his mother's side, perhaps revenge was a motive as well.

Van Reede's motto was Malo mori quam foedari (Better dead than dishonoured). He abided by it at the Münster peace congress — if, that is, foedari can be interpreted as forsaking one's principles. The shifting positions of one province after another in the States General, Frederik Hendrik's change of heart, the dramatic power shift in Utrecht in the first months of 1648 — none of it could sway the lord of Nederhorst from his opposition to a separate peace with Spain. Only after he had lost all his power and the States of Utrecht had decided to ratify the peace did Van Reede finally consent to sign, which he did on the bed in which he was about to die.

FOOTNOTES