Johann Rudolf Wettstein (1594-1666), burgomaster of Basel since 1645, was one of the most important figures in Swiss political life in the middle of the 17th century. It was Wettstein who negotiated the legal separation of the Swiss Confederation from the German Empire, achieved its recognition as a sovereign state and hence its acceptance into the family of European nations. The present essay only attempts to deal with one aspect of Wettstein's activities, his work and achievements in foreign affairs. [1]



I. Switzerland at the edge of the empire

In June 1631 a strange thing happened in Basel which astounded the local politicians. An imperial messenger appeared bearing a great number of letters and imperial mandates. The council decided to accept the letters for the sake of appearances, but to return the mandates to the messenger with the comment, "Here one is not used to receiving such mandates, even less so to posting them, and it is better to take them away again and, so as to avoid derision, not to post these mandates anywhere. The city of Basel has nothing to do with the affairs of the empire." [2]

No matter how clear the refusal was, imperial authorities tried several times in those years to address Basel as a member of the empire. In the year 1638 the imperial councillors in Vienna caused the imperial registry and the archive in Mainz to be consulted in order to determine "what the Swiss as associates of the Empire are obliged to do for the Emperor and the Empire in the present state of the Empire, when it is being attacked all over by foreign peoples." [3]

The Swabian War and the Peace of Basel, concluded on September 22, 1499, had had a fundamental influence in determining Switzerland's relationship to the empire. From this time on the empire and the Swiss Confederation went their separate ways and grew further and further apart. [4 ]Nowadays this opinion is held by almost all Swiss historians. In the knowledge of the historical outcome and marked by the nationalistic mind of the 19th century, contemporary historians have tended to detect a long process of Swiss separation from the empire and to discover the roots of this development in the Late Middle Ages. In his brilliant study Karl Mommsen proved, however, that the relatively early development of national organisation in the Helvetian cantons was perfectly compatible with membership in the empire. [5] At least in the Late Middle Ages there is no indication of a separation. At that time German principalities, too, had developed a similar sovereignty, though they did not split away from the empire at later time. The difference was that the confederate cities organised themselves in the form of cooperative republics. All Swiss historiographies of the 15th and 16th centuries attached great importance to legitimising the liberties and rights of the confederates by means of the imperial privileges that had been granted. The Swiss confederates cited emperor and empire as the sources of their sovereign rights, while at the same time rejecting any form of intermediary powers (princes). The contemporary translation of privilegium was "freedom". Unfortunately, Mommsen's examination breaks off at the beginning of early modern times; no such study exists for the 16th and early 17th centuries which could even roughly compare with the quality of Mommsen's sophisticated observations.

There are many indications that the Swiss confederates continued to espouse the old interpretation of the law in early modern times. They sent special delegations to all emperors of the 16th century to request legitimisation for their sovereign rule. [6] In all these documents the emperors confirmed the favours, freedoms, rights and privileges. These so-called charters and patents, magnificently framed, purchased by the confederates at great effort and huge expense, and carefully preserved in their archives, were not declarations of independence, but records of special privileges. These privileges protected the sovereignty of the confederate cities and anchored them in law. In the 16th century it was still not the aim of the Swiss confederates to part from emperor and empire, but to verify and legitimise their own sovereign rights. Even in Westphalia Wettstein was still deriving the confederate liberties from imperial privileges. To be sure, the Swiss always objected strongly to any interference with their autonomy. They did not carry out Emperor Maximilian's imperial reform and they had no dealings at all with the imperial estates and especially not with the empire's highest court, the Imperial Chamber in Speyer. They paid no imperial taxes and did not attend the imperial diets.

Coinage designs and heraldry in the 16th and early 17th centuries showed the Swiss confederates as faithful members of the empire. Numerous coins from the confederate cities and contemporary coats of arms bear the imperial eagle. When the powerful republic of Berne built a new city gate in 1641-1644, the tower was adorned with a coat of arms in the form of a sculpted relief. It bore the double heraldic figure of Berne topped by the arms of the empire, and all this was placed on an official Berne edifice just five years before the formal withdrawal of the Swiss confederation from the federation of the empire. [7] In 1640 [ ]Basel struck coins bearing the imperial eagle. It went without saying that in 1642 Matthaeus Merian the Elder, a native of Basel, counted Switzerland as part of the German Empire in his Topographia Helvetiae. "The Swiss citizens and their confederates, the peoples of Grisons and Valais, [are] not only from times of old comprised under the name of the German Empire: but are still counted as part of Germany today." [8]

Ample evidence of the Helvetian bond with emperor and empire can be found until 1648 on the imperial side, as well. When Emperor Ferdinand III communicated his accession to the throne to the Swiss diet, he addressed the confederates as "Our and the Empire's love and faithful subjects". [9] In the year 1629 Isaak Volmar (1582-1662), chancellor of the anterior Austrian states with seat in Ensisheim (Alsace), wrote a memorandum about the Alsacian city of Mulhouse, which was allied with the Swiss Confederation. Volmar - he later represented Emperor Ferdinand III as deputy delegate and vigorously supported the request for juridical exemption - explained that "the Swiss generally cannot boast of such perfect, inimitable freedom, but rather that the Holy Roman Emperor to this very day is still wont to describe them as 'Our and the Empire's love and faithful subjects'; by their very meaning such words suggest subjugation and are only used toward such people as adhere and are bound to the empire and, as far as I know, have not been contradicted by the Swiss [...]. And that they are doubtless citizens belonging to the Holy Roman Empire, yet freed of other common obligations toward the empire, is witnessed by the public buildings throughout Switzerland, because all over they paint the imperial eagle in their city and on their coat of arms and thus publicly acknowledge that they stand under the protection and sovereignty of the empire." [10]

The Swiss confederates did not attempt to separate themselves from emperor and empire until well into the 17th century, although it was always very important to them to be treated as a free estate. However, they did not comprehend freedom as exemption from imperial jurisdiction, but as self-administration. They were proud to stress the cooperative-republican character of the confederate cities and thus differentiated themselves from the principalities.

The development of the empire into an association of estates, the increasing governmental concentration in the empire and especially the efforts of the imperial institutions, above all the Imperial Chamber, to bind the neighbouring Swiss Confederation or parts of it more closely to the empire raised the question of the position taken by Switzerland toward the empire. It wasn't political theoreticians or particularly intelligent politicians that triggered the debate about the legal international status of Switzerland and led to an undreamed-of clash of principles, but rather two in themselves insignificant points of litigation. They first made people aware of the problem and forced the confederates to seek an incontestable legal clarification of the issue. At first it was not a matter of leaving the imperial union, but of quashing the demands of a foreign court of law. If the Imperial Chamber had continued to respect the Swiss liberties (self-administration) in the early 17th century, no one in Switzerland would have even thought of sending an ambassador to the Westphalian peace congress. [11]

At the peace congress the dispute about exemption unfurled before the backdrop of the conflict about the constitution of the empire. As is well known, the princes emerged from this confrontation in a stronger position; Switzerland went a few steps further and withdrew from the imperial union. Whether this occurrence was preceded by a long and straightforward process of separation beginning in the Late Middle Ages or not will have to be examined more closely another time.



II. From petty cases to the fundamental question

Two citizens of Basel had dealings with the Imperial Chamber. The first, Dr. Melchior ab Insula, a Genoese professor of law who had become a Basel citizen and taught at the university, instituted proceedings at the imperial court in 1628 to have a decision by the Basel municipal court reviewed. The second lawsuit that got Basel involved in conflicts with the Imperial Chamber was instigated by Florian Wachter, a wine merchant from Schlettstadt. Highwaymen had held up a transport of wine from Alsace to Basel and stolen some hired horses. Since Wachter did not want to pay for the damage, the owners of the horses confiscated Wachter's stock of wine in Basel. The litigation was carried out in Basel in 1641. Afterwards Wachter demanded damages for lost time. The Basel municipal court ruled that the damages and costs be shared, whereupon Wachter took his case to the Imperial Chamber. In both cases the council of Basel forbade the two Basel citizens named in the lawsuits to take their cases to the imperial court in Speyer. The court therefore ruled that the plaintiffs had right to seize merchandise from Basel in the empire. This struck a vital nerve in the trading city of Basel. The city then turned to the Swiss Confederation in 1643 and requested support. The diet entered a protest with Emperor Ferdinand III. As the emperor remained silent despite numerous admonitions, Basel proposed to the Protestant cities in July 1645 to have the confederate freedom secured in the Westphalian peace treaty with the help of the French. The French plenipotentiary, Henri d'Orléans, duke of Longueville, should be requested - said the proposal - to offer mediation so that the confederation would be included in the general peace negotiations and would thus in future be spared such innovations that run counter to their time-honoured sovereignty. The French ambassador in Switzerland was of the opinion that the country should send its own delegate to the peace negotiations. Wettstein and his colleague Brand, chief warden of the guild, picked up this idea immediately and tried to gain the approval of Zurich for the project. [12] Time was pressing.

The Basel proposal was not well received, however. At the conference of the Protestant cities in February they did not even address the question, and in March 1646 the Catholic cantons spoke out decisively against sending a delegation, "in whatever form it might take". They hoped that the Basel complaints could be redressed without such an expensive measure, since they had received indications from Innsbruck that raised their hopes for a solution. [13] So the entire project almost fell through because of the lack of interest and solidarity of the confederate cantons.

Wettstein did not give up and was evidently pulling the strings in the background. On 14 November 1646 he reported to the council of Basel that he had been to Berne and Solothurn privately (!) and had called on the French ambassador. The latter had declared that he felt it would be advisable to send a delegation to Westphalia and that the French plenipotentiaries (in Münster) had received orders to back the cause of the confederate liberties, in particular those of Basel. [14] In other words, the French government had put pressure on its delegates. This time they acted quickly in Basel and Wettstein was given the order by the ruling council, the "Kleiner Rat", to go immediately to Zurich and Lucerne. In Zurich he met with a committee of the council - their names are not known - on November 19. Burgomaster Ziegler had come there from Schaffhausen. Wettstein skilfully pointed out the support of the ambassador again. In Basel, he continued, they would like to hear the opinion of the two other towns. After extensive discussion it was ascertained that the ambassador was surely taking up their cause out of sympathy toward the confederation and that this should not be ignored, but rather they should "show their will". This was just what the advocates of the mission were waiting for. The French, of course, were not acting out of disinterestedness. Through their support they wanted to gain the sympathies of the Swiss in order to create goodwill in Helvetia for the imminent renewal of the military alliance. Furthermore, any weakening of the Habsburgs and the German Empire was welcomed by the French. The Zurich assembly gave its definitive approval of sending a delegation and resolved to delegate the responsibility to a suitable personality from Basel - only Wettstein could have been meant. This person should not become involved in any disputation but approach the delegates present only for the purpose of seeing that the whole confederation remain undisturbed and safe owing to its privileges and its origin. The business must be undertaken in the name of all the confederate cities, to which aim Wettstein should travel to Lucerne and Berne. In case Lucerne should reject the proposal, the delegation should nevertheless proceed to act in the name of the entire confederation. [15]

The confederate solidarity failed miserably. In Lucerne Wettstein was told that the council did not feel authorised to approve the delegation in the name of the Catholic cantons; it was superfluous to send a delegation. The disapproval of the Catholic cities was based on the one hand on the denominational mistrust of an undertaking which up till now had been demanded by the Reformed cantons, on the other on a misjudgement of the planned mission. It was believed that it was a matter touching the interests of Basel and approval was therefore not given to the Reformed estate. At this time, however, the Reformed parties themselves hardly suspected the significance that Wettstein's mission would finally have for the entire confederation either.



III. The instructions

The document of instruction to the delegates was drafted by the Zurich conference, the final version of which was issued by the Zurich chancellery on December 10. Although there were only representatives from Basel, Zurich and Schaffhausen present, the document was written in the name of the Reformed towns of Zurich, Berne, Glarus, Basel, Schaffhausen, Appenzell-Ausserrhoden and the two allied cities of St. Gallen and Biel. Wettstein was involved in composing the instructions and was probably the pre-eminent author. Zurich sealed the document for all of the above named towns. The original has been preserved until the present day. [16]

The document not only staked out the aims, but also laid out the procedure to be taken very precisely. The document gives an excellent impression of the intentions. Wettstein was charged with the task of going to the envoys of the emperor and the French king in Westphalia and representing to them that the Imperial Chamber had violated the imperial privileges and liberties of the confederate city of Basel in its attacks against that city; the confederates were therefore compelled to negotiate about the matter in order to receive their time-honoured freedoms. Wettstein should fulfil his mission "by means of His Royal Majesty in France as gracious ally". Playing the great powers against one another, which Wettstein was to do so masterfully, was already mapped out in the instructions. In addition, the delegate should work toward getting the powers to continue to leave the confederation "peaceful, unchallenged and carefree in its traditional freedoms". He may present himself to other envoys, but must urgently prevent the matter from being dealt with by the whole assembled congress, because the outcome might turn out negative; instead, he should try to achieve his aim through the mediation and pressure exerted by the French plenipotentiary. Wettstein should guard against any involvement in conflicts about confederate freedom; if this freedom be doubted, he should protest and depart immediately.

Three aims were formulated in the instructions: rejection of the claims of the Imperial Chamber on Basel due to imperial and royal privileges and confederate freedoms; guarantee of Swiss freedoms; inclusion of Switzerland in the general peace. The confederate freedom as such may not be put in question in any way; indeed, it should serve as proof of improper action on the part of the Imperial Chamber. The fact that Basel's imperial privileges and traditional freedoms were used to argue the case shows that the Zurich conference still moved along the lines of traditional, and actually mediaeval, concepts of legality. The autonomy of Basel and Switzerland was traced back to imperial privileges, not based on the modern political theories of Jean Bodin. Caught in this old interpretation of the law, the confederates merely sought another imperial confirmation of their privileges in order to overturn the demands of the Imperial Chamber. Accordingly, Wettstein had copies of the charters in the confederate archives made before starting on his mission and later actually presented them in Westphalia. It was warnings from the French [17] and individual Germans [18] as well as the course of the negotiations that finally taught him not to base his case on legal titles, but rather on hard-won power. He recognised that the aim - the Imperial Chamber's confirmation of the judicial exemption - could no longer be achieved through the traditional imperial privileges. He sought a new legal title and found it only in exemption from all legal dealings with the empire. He then began to link the original aim of his mission entirely with the confirmation of this exemption. In this way he created a new judicial foundation on which to base the guarantee of confederate freedoms as demanded in the document of instruction; this first had to be won over in a difficult struggle, however.

The Zurich conference's document of instruction was read out and approved by the ruling council of Basel on 28 November 1646. At the behest of the Zurich conference, the council selected Wettstein as envoy. Hans Rudolf Burckhardt, a substitute councillor who later became town clerk, was chosen to serve as secretary with him. Wettstein was allowed to take along two servants of his choice. Wettstein's youngest son, 14-year-old Fritz, also attended the delegation.



IV. "Travels per Münster"

In the early morning of 14 December 1646 Wettstein and his peculiar entourage embarked by ship from the Basel landing stage. "May the good Lord's will prevail. On the 4th of December [old calendar] I departed in a covered ship by orders of my lords, the Protestant towns of the Confederation, in God's name, from Basel per Münster and Ossnabruckh, together with cousin Ruedolph Burkard, substitute councillor, who my lords sent along to serve, as it were, alongside Hannss Jäkhlin from Übelreut and Hannss Horn from Seehausen, now in the service of my lords, formerly quartermaster, and my son Friderich." Thus begins Wettstein's extensive diary about his "Travels per Münster". The delegation undertook the last stretch of the trip from Wesel to Münster by land after hiring a horse and carriage. On December 27, "after surviving an 8 or 9 hour abominable passage through ice and mire" the party "happily arrived in Münster, thank God." [20]

On a very tight budget, Wettstein had to put up with extremely modest accommodations; he found lodgings with a wool weaver. This involuntary simplicity made him feel less favoured in comparison with the other envoys, many of whom appeared with princely splendour and a huge entourage. The social differences were particularly in evidence when envoys occasionally sought Wettstein out at his lodgings and he was no longer able to conceal his situation. On 22 May 1647, for instance, the Swedish envoy Johann Adler Salvius appeared unexpectedly. The high-ranking guest drove up in two coaches decked out in red velvet and with an entourage of 20 persons. The bodies of the coaches were gold-plated and hung with silk tassels. Wettstein led his guest into the wool weaver's little room which "a few weeks ago had still been a henhouse." [21] He later wrote to his friend Rippel in Basel: "I requested him to take a seat in an chair that had only one armrest (I didn't have the time or otherwise would have broken off the other one to save Switzerland's reputation) and on which lay an dirty, old, blue woollen pillow whose filling and feathers were sticking out. He looked carefully at this construction before sitting down. Meanwhile I had taken a seat on a chair with three legs, as can often be found in this country. His excellency is quite fat and heavy and didn't sit well on the wooden chair, which slipped back and forth. But since the floor, which is boarded with oak planks, is so uneven and crooked that is it almost impossible for more than two of the four legs to touch the floor at the same time, he had to half sit and half hover or wobble. I was afraid for him, but he calmed me down. For when I wanted to apologise for the poor lodgings and because his excellency was accommodated so uncomfortably, he said with an amused smile, he knew that one couldn't bring along one's own lodgings, i.e. if I understood him rightly, if one could only sit more comfortably, one would not need a better room. That was the end of that, and the good man suffered to stay almost two hours with me." [22]

In Osnabrück - Wettstein went to the city three times - it was no better: there he rented a room at the home of another wool weaver with a large family. The lodgings had only the barest necessities. Part of the house was used as a meat-drying chamber, and it was filled with sausages and half or whole sides of bacon hanging from the ceiling. The clothes of the landlady stank of fish oil. The smell carried over to the bedclothes and could not even be dispelled by burning juniper and caraway. [23]

In outward appearance Wettstein was far behind the envoys from the other states. He lacked the time and money to take part in the social life, receptions, banquets and coach rides. His entry into Osnabrück for instance was a wretched sight indeed. Wettstein rode on horseback with the quartermaster ahead of the luggage carriage. It was covered with a green oilcloth upon which sat his son Fritz, his personal servant and his secretary. Wettstein put up with all this with a mixture of resentment and irony, but also sensed that Switzerland's prestige suffered under this extreme frugality. "I most emphatically testify again, between you and me, that in my opinion the confederation has continually been doing a most foolish and coarse thing, for if they had offered only a quarter of the splendour that the Dutch display and had sent people who know how to conduct themselves in the world, then it would have been received favourably and earned us great respect." [24] Far more serious for Wettstein than these outward adversities was the lack of legitimisation on the part of the confederation - he was officially only the envoy of the four Protestant cantons and two allied towns, but was supposed to present himself in the name of the entire confederation.



V. Negotiations in Münster

Immediately upon his arrival in Münster Wettstein, in agreement with the French plenipotentiary, entered into negotiations with the emperor's legates: Basel was a member of the confederation and by virtue of its privileges should be acquitted of the coercion of the Speyer court, he argued. The imperial envoy, Isaak Volmar, asserted that the matter concerned both emperor and empire. Volmar did not pass the memorandum on to the emperor in Vienna, but submitted it instead to the councils of the imperial estates. Wettstein agreed to this only with great hesitation, because he well knew that he was thus acting in contradiction to his mission. Hence, the procedure was managed in the wrong way from the very beginning, because the demand - contrary to the express interdiction of the instructions - was raised to a matter to be treated by the imperial estates. This was aggravated by the fact that the imperial envoys saw Wettstein as a representative merely of Basel. He immediately drafted a second note asserting that the confederation was a free estate and was accountable to no one except God.

In the meanwhile the representatives of the Imperial Chamber also reacted, demanding that the imperial authorities should decide whether Basel had the right to dissolve its membership in the empire. An initial meeting of the electors showed that they differed in opinion. The council of the estates did not dare to reach a decision, because the question was already weighed down by tactical political considerations; the imperial envoys had already issued a warning not to drive the irate Swiss into the arms of France and Sweden. The envoys from Brandenburg proposed separating the question of exemption from imperial jurisdiction from that concerning the Imperial Chamber, or in other words splitting the judicial question away from that of political jurisdiction. The electors approved this proposal unanimously, while the princes and cities passed it by a majority vote. The emperor, it read, should be entreated to graciously confer exemption from the Imperial Chamber on Basel (that of the other confederate cities had not even been discussed). Here they had reverted back to the late mediaeval tradition of bestowing privileges. To Wettstein's dismay, they wanted to take up the question of the juridical position of Switzerland at a later meeting of the imperial diet. It appeared to solve the problem for Basel at least superficially, but for Switzerland the "time-honoured freedoms" were cast into doubt. Wettstein still blamed this failure on the lack of legitimisation. He wrote sarcastically to Hans Caspar Hirzel, the son of the burgomaster in Zurich: "I truly wonder what so many cities are thinking that they have such qualms about issuing a simple, strong letter of recommendation in such an equitable matter concerning not religion, but their own general freedom. [...] When it comes to rushing to the aid of such a priest-ridden nest [referring to the Catholic city of Constance], then everybody has to take up arms and defend them, but when it is about us others, they would rather see us a thousand times lost and oppressed than preserved." [25]

For Wettstein the arrival of the official credentials from the Swiss Confederation on 20 February 1647 felt like a stroke of fate. [26] He started all over again, presented himself self-confidently in the name of the confederation and demanded in a petition to the imperial envoys to let Switzerland remain in its free, sovereign status and tradition. The Swiss, he contended, were ready to protect themselves with God's help and to meet force with force. [27] For the first time he asserted that it was not a matter of the privileges of Basel or the confederation, but of the confirmation of Swiss sovereignty. However, at this point he used the notions of sovereignty, freedom and exemption indistinctly. All that followed in the next months was a struggle for unconditional exemption.

A year and a half later the peace treaties fulfilled this demand. Volmar and Trautmannsdorf passed Wettstein's petition on to Emperor Ferdinand III. The Basel government instructed Wettstein that if the emperor should send a refusal, he should answer it with a protest that was to be taken into the imperial protocol. The imperial estates naturally expressed their resistance. When an answer from the emperor failed to arrive, Wettstein began to have self-doubts. He worried that the matter could develop into a conflict of competence between emperor and empire, a struggle in which he would have no say at all. Renewed confiscation of Basel merchandise raised doubts in Switzerland about Wettstein's effectiveness. To make matters worse, a messenger from the Imperial Chamber arrived in Basel in March. The Basel magistracy refused to receive him, however, and had him led out of the city by servants. [28]

To get around the deadlock, Wettstein took the question of Switzerland out of this inner-German context and raised it to an international concern. He skilfully played off the rivalries between the major powers against each other and turned to the enemies of the Habsburgs and the empire. He achieved his aim effortlessly with the French. In July 1647 they adopted an article about Switzerland agreed upon with Wettstein into the draft of the treaty; the Swedes did the same. The imperial envoys were under such pressure that they for their part also added an article of exemption to the imperial draft of the contract. Wettstein's aim was now within reaching distance. In September 1647 the French, Swedes and imperial representatives agreed in writing to take the article on Switzerland as arranged into the definitive peace treaty, or alternatively Ferdinand's decree if it should get there on time. Wettstein was preparing to return home when the emperor's decree finally arrived. Volmar handed it over to Wettstein on November 7. [29] To what degree the emperor had acted under pressure from the French was evident in the fact that the decree had been antedated to 16 May 1647. In an accompanying letter which Volmar read aloud, Emperor Ferdinand openly admitted that he had done this. Wettstein noted in his diary: "His Majesty states why it was done like that; the principal cause is, as he [Volmar] read to me from the letter, that the French should not believe they had brought about the Instrumentum Pacis [peace treaty] through their own actions." [30] Ferdinand's decree was - as the three parties had arranged - taken into the final peace treaties. The exemption of Basel and Switzerland from the empire's jurisdiction was expressed in Article 6 of the Swedish treaty and Article 61 of the French treaty.

On 21 November 1647, eleven months before the treaty was signed, Wettstein set off on his way home: "I departed from Münster on the appointed 11 / 21 November around 10 o'clock in God's name together with my party, and herewith bid farewell to Waste- or (as some people are prone to call it) Pest-phalia. And we arrived back in Basel happy and well, all preserved from misfortune by God's mercy, in the night of 6 / 16 December 1647, after spending a whole year and two days on our travels. Praise and thanks be to almighty God for his fatherly mercy and blessing forever and ever, amen, amen." [31] Thus ends the diary.

Once at home, Wettstein delayed making his report. On 15 January 1648 he offered "some relation" [32] of the proceedings to the Basel council, and a week later he gave a report to the assembly of the Protestant cities. Finally he wanted to inform the Swiss diet at the end of February, but there was not enough time. It was not even possible to get all 13 confederate estates together to approve a letter of gratitude to the great powers. [33] It was not until June 1648 that Wettstein could give an extensive report about his mission to the Swiss diet. [34] He reaped high praise. The assembly decided to consign the original documents to the Basel archive, where it is still preserved.

The exemption article that had been agreed upon ran into further difficulties in Westphalia. In the spring of 1648 the conflict of competence broke out between the emperor and the imperial estates, as Wettstein had feared. Wettstein - long since back home again - trusted in the fact that the great powers had given their word and was not troubled by the matter at first. It would all work out in the end, he implied. [35] But a few weeks before the treaties were to be signed the situation turned more and more critical. The imperial estates said they were only willing to approve the exemption under certain circumstances. When even the Swedes and the French supported this motion, all that Wettstein had achieved was at stake. He therefore turned to the envoys in Westphalia and resolutely stated that Switzerland would only accept the unconditional exemption. The situation grew less tense in June when the emperor confirmed in a note to the confederation that the prearranged text would be taken into the peace treaties. The treaties were signed in Münster and Osnabrück on 24 October 1648 - in the absence of Wettstein. Switzerland thus legally became a sovereign European state; its independence from the German Empire was recognised internationally.

It was not only the outward circumstances of Wettstein's mission that were peculiar; at the congress itself he also played a strange, virtually unique role as an outsider. He had the rank of an envoy, but was not invited by the congress to participate. In restless activity he organised hundreds of talks and hurried from one audience to the next with his petition - he called it "hinhoppeln" (hopping around) - to win over influential congress participants to his cause. Wettstein's signature is missing on the treaties. Hence, even in this important moment in its history Switzerland was far more the object of the great powers than a subject acting on its own.



VI. Effecting the agreement

The signing of the treaties did not bring an end to the opposition of the imperial estates. The Imperial Chamber did not recognise the stipulations, repeated its demands that Basel pay contributions and again had merchandise from Basel confiscated along the Rhine in the year 1650. The distraint orders caused a storm of indignation in Basel. Economic warfare had broken out again. Wettstein realised that only a peremptory order from the emperor to the Imperial Chamber and the estates would remedy the situation. On 11 November 1650 he addressed the Swiss diet and proposed sending a delegation to Vienna. Supported by a committee, he formulated a note of protest and prepared the necessary credentials. [36] The importance attached to this undertaking can be seen in the fact that the Swiss charged their two most important statesmen with the mission: Wettstein and the head of the canton of Uri, Sebastian Peregrin Zwyer von Evibach (1597-1661). The envoys were charged to call upon the emperor in Vienna and declare that the Swiss would no longer put up with such acts of violence. On December 19, Wettstein came face to face with Emperor Ferdinand III in the Vienna Hofburg. The Swiss delegation quickly achieved its aim. Within ten days they were able to get a mandate from the emperor in which he exhorted the Imperial Chamber to recognise the Westphalian peace treaties unconditionally. In return for the emperor's concessions the Swiss were obliged to safeguard the interests of Austria vis-à-vis France. The imperial councillors formulated a memorandum with Austria's wishes: the confederation should help protect the anterior Austrian territories at the Upper Rhine, and France should only be allowed to employ Swiss mercenaries within its old boundaries. The emperor knew that the military alliance between Switzerland and France was to run out in 1651 and that France desired to renew it. The emperor wished that the Swiss would abandon the idea of renewing the alliance. Neither Wettstein nor Zwyer dared to make such a concession, however. At the farewell audience Emperor Ferdinand gave the Basel burgomaster a gold chain with a medal containing the emperor's portrait.

In the following years Zwyer and Wettstein at first successfully lent their support to the emperor's affairs. Wettstein's Austrophile and anti-French position was meanwhile so well-known in Switzerland that a disparaging tractate "On whether a commendable confederation should renew the expiring alliance with the French crown" was immediately attributed to him, although the authorship was never clarified. On 27 May 1653 Emperor Ferdinand awarded the title of nobility to Wettstein and improved his coat of arms, an act that was no doubt linked with the emperor's political intentions. [37]

At the beginning of the fifties Wettstein had reached the pinnacle of his power and influence on foreign affairs. In the Swiss Peasants' War of 1653 he took vigorous action as a typical advocate of absolutistic rule. That he was held in high esteem was again confirmed in 1656 after the first Villmergen War (a religious war in the confederation), when he was selected to preside over the court of arbitration.

In the late fifties Wettstein quickly disappeared from the centre of interest. The united confederate front against France crumbled away. The enticements of Louis blancs and customs privileges were too great, too skilful were the financial and diplomatic allurements of the French. Individual cantons concluded special alliances with France in the late fifties, and these finally led to a general alliance in 1663. Wettstein was fighting a losing battle. In November 1663 the pact with France was pledged in Paris in the presence of King Louis XIV and 227 delegates from Switzerland with a display of baroque splendour in Notre-Dame cathedral. Wettstein had stayed in Basel.

Wettstein had won judicial independence from the German Empire, but he failed with his concept of a balanced foreign policy for a minor state directed toward two sides. He had tried in vain to counterbalance the political shift caused by the rise of France and secure for the confederation at least a minimal amount of latitude for its own activity. The bonds with the empire had hardly been loosened when Switzerland began getting increasingly caught up in dependence on France, and for more than a century it virtually became a satellite of France. In retrospect one gets the impression that for many decades Switzerland was neither willing nor able to realise the sovereignty that Wettstein had gained.



VII. Honours and misunderstandings

For his struggle for Swiss sovereignty Wettstein received three presents: a gold medal, a gilt silver nautilus goblet and some ground rent from farms in the nearby villages of Riehen and Bettingen. The presents throw light on the estimation of Wettstein's activities by his contemporaries.

The thirteen cantons of the confederation put together to donate a gold medal of merit in 1652. [38] The front side shows in the middle a ring of clouds with the hand of God. The arms of the thirteen old cities are arranged around the centre. On the back two angels hold a cross on the beams of which is written the Bible verse from Romans 8,31: SI DEUS PRO NOBIS / QUIS CONTRA NOBIS (If God be for us, who can be against us?). The legend is a quotation from Sallust, Bellum Jug. 10,6: CONCORDIA RES PARVAE CRESCUNT: DISCORDIA MAXIMAE DILABUNTUR (Small things grow through concord, discord destroys the greatest things). [39] The medal of merit was not a new creation. This type of medal is based on one designed by Hans Jakob Stampfer (1505-1579) which the confederation had presented to King Henry II of France on the occasion of the birth of Princess Claudia. It was one of the most popular Swiss medals, and many variations that were later cast have been preserved. [40]

The most magnificent gift was presented to Wettstein in 1649. Seven merchants from Basel had a gilt silver nautilus goblet made for him in Strasbourg. [41] The illustrations on the three-and-a-half kilogram, 65 cm high drinking vessel invoke Wettstein's activities in Westphalia. A basilisk - a mythical creature and popular heraldic motif as Basel supporter - holds the Basel shield and supports the cup, which was made of precious metal in the form of a nautilus shell. The arms of Münster and Osnabrück are engraved on the right and left sides; the seven Basel merchants who bestowed the gift are immortalised on the bow. The three confederates swearing the oath can be seen on the platform of the cup, a popular reference to history which is meant to verify that Switzerland does not trace its origins back to a rebellion, but to the alliance of free men. On the inner wall of the unrolled nautilus coil is a silver plaque with Wettstein's arms, above which is the dedication inscription and the year 1649. To the right and left on top of the coil are engraved the arms of France and Sweden, the two powers who joined the emperor in supporting the exemption of Switzerland from the jurisdiction of the empire and recognised it internationally. The drinking vessel is crowned by the imperial eagle; in its right talon it holds an olive branch as a symbol of peace and the sealed document with the inscription PRIVILEGIA. The name of the emperor is engraved on the back of the document: FERDINAND III. Hence, Wettstein's contemporaries have misunderstood his mission as a verification of traditional privileges. [42] The confederates are shown taking the oath under the protection of the imperial eagle and the imperial privileges. Wettstein's friends - and probably many other contemporaries as well - had not understood that Switzerland had become a sovereign state, independent of the empire. This gift takes us back to our point of departure. The motivation for Wettstein's mission was not to achieve a constitutional change but to restore freedom of trade. He wanted to accomplish this aim by using the argument of the traditional confederate freedoms. But the evidence he presented in the form of the old charters was not enough. It was only when he ran into resistance in Westphalia that he realised that this freedom required a fundamental, modern, constitutional definition. The Basel merchants honoured the restoration of free trade with their precious goblet, but they did not comprehend Wettstein's constitutional achievement.

The third present, a gift from Wettstein's native city of Basel, consisted in the meagre ground rent of "fruits, wine, money, chickens, eggs or other such things" which the deserved burgomaster was allowed to buy from the city at the preferential price of 2000 guilders! The long-winded deed of sale mentions Wettstein's accomplishments, justifies the gift and reveals with stupendous frankness the niggardly spirit of his political colleagues. The Imperial Chamber, the deed stated, had badgered the free state of Basel with lawsuits and had thus done "irreparable harm to the whole city, particularly by blocking free trade and commerce." Wettstein had "swept away such errors." Once again Wettstein's accomplishment is reduced to winning back Basel's freedom of trade. A committee of the council has proposed, the deed continued, "that this time it is perhaps best if the community is spared of certain expenses, and instead such means should be used that are not needed at the moment and are designated to be spent soon and could otherwise be lost in the future. [...] It was therefore felt that if the honourable former burgomaster Wettstein would accept such a fair price (which includes everything), it would be least harmful to the community." [43]

The difference between the last two presents described here could hardly be greater; on the one hand the gilt silver goblet from a few merchants, on the other a petty gift from miserly colleagues. It remained for later generations to grasp the political significance of Wettstein's achievements.