In just two decades, Gustavus II Adolphus (1594-1632) succeeded in transforming Sweden B a country which, at the time of his accession to the throne in 1611, was faced with extinction and was of practically no international significance B into the leading Protestant power in Europe. This remarkable achievement may be attributed not only to his exceptional political and military skill, as well as a personal charisma characterised by a quite brilliant power of rhetoric, but also to his innovative policy towards the arts and his use of propaganda. The following is a general analysis of the origins and development of the artistic portrayal of the reign of Gustavus II Adolphus and its impact on Germany and Sweden.

Michael Roberts makes the following observation about the accession of the 16 year-old heir to the throne: "The prospect must have appeared daunting to the most of sagacious of statesmen: at the time of Karl's death Gustav had not yet attained the age of seventeen." [2 ]The state of affairs which Gustavus inherited was indeed extremely difficult. [3] The very existence of Sweden was threatened by external forces, while domestically the country was on the verge of total collapse, with neither proper administration nor a functioning tax collection system. Furthermore, as a result of the heavy financial indemnities due to Christian IV of Denmark under the terms of the treaty of Knäröd (1613), Sweden was almost bankrupt. The conflict with the Sweden's arch-enemy, Vasa Poland, is also evidence that the legitimacy of Gustavus> claim to the throne was, quite rightly, the subject of some dispute, given that his succession did not conform with the strictly agnate right of primogeniture laid down in the deed of succession of 1544. The situation was made even more difficult by the fact that the konungaförsäkran ("Royal Assurance"), which the juvenile Gustavus was required to declare in 1611, restricted his political freedom enormously. His was only a dominum utile, a right of usufruct to the Swedish crown, not a dominum directum, or direct power of disposal demanding absolute servitude. [4] Finally, Gustavus found the royal patronage of the arts to be in a state of such total vacuum B with the exception of coin and medal production B that it was impossible for him to generate effective propaganda for his own ends. These circumstances acquire added significance when one considers how the misgovernment of the sons of Gustav I Vasa, in particular Gustavus' own father, Charles IX, had shaken popular faith in the dynasty to the core.

In view of the extremely difficult conditions which Gustavus was presented with, his political achievements appear all the more astounding. Introduced to public life in early childhood, he was already very well aware of the problems which Sweden faced, and perceived his monarchy as a categorical imperative for innovation in all areas of his authority B including royal patronage of the arts. Thus Gustavus not only brought about the most significant military reforms of his time, he was also to revive the concept of repraesentatio maiestatis.

While the sources available are somewhat incomplete [5] (due in part to the castle fire of 1697), it is clear that Gustavus himself was the spiritus rector behind the organisation and conceptual development of the royal policy towards the arts. The king, already renowned for his predilection for bataille en detail, would surely not have delegated such an important area of his monarchy.

Educated according to the teachings of Petrus Ramus and guided by the maxim "simplicity, clarity, brevity" [6], Gustavus was well prepared for the demands of royal self-presentation. His tutors, Johann Skytte and Johannes Bureus, had taught him to combine his own portrayal with his propaganda machinery in a manner tailored to the expectations and education of his audience. Thus, in the spirit of nescit regnare, nescit dissimulare [7], Gustavus became something of a master of mimicry. His promotion of the arts was organised with military efficiency and was founded on four main principles [8], chief among these being the premise that function must precede aesthetic form. Unlike other rulers, who sought to underline their royal status through ambitious artistic projects, royal patronage of the arts was, for Gustavus, a means of self-presentation, and should therefore be concerned less with aesthetic considerations than with its efficacy as an instrument of propaganda. A logical development of this concept was the principle of "quantity over quality". Royal portraits should be easy to reproduce and distribute, in order that the popularity of the monarch may be developed to its maximum potential. Hence Gustavus' order for "a mass of portraits for the purpose of veneration". [9] The third principle of Gustavus' artistic philosophy was that "constant repetition increases the power of penetration". This principle demanded, on the one hand, that royal portraiture be defined by a simple arrangement of characteristic features (short hair, moustache and pointed beard, large eyes, a prominent nose, simple military apparel and a broad collar), without any concession to fashion or trend; and on the other, that the various means of self-portrayal should be integrated in terms of their content and the ideas presented. Finally, there was the practice of distributing royal favours by various categories of merit, in accordance with the justitia distributiva, or fairness in distribution, satisfying the principle of "favour accorded by merit as an expression of >geometric proportion". [10]

With this innovative approach to the arts, Gustavus set himself apart from other rulers of his time, such as his Danish arch-rival, Christian IV, who, in the role of rex splendens, sought to emphasise his royal status by commissioning art of extraordinary splendour, or Maximilian I of Bavaria, who, with the aid of the Marianisches Staatsprogramm ("Marian state programme") and its unbending religio-political ideals sought to turn Bavaria into a Sakrallandschaft or "sacred country". [11]

The development of Gustavus' policy towards the arts in terms of iconography and content may be divided into three principal phases: propaganda prior to 1628/29, arts policy with respect to the Swedish intervention in the Thirty Years' War (in oral and written form from the end of 1625, and in pictorial form from 1628/29 onwards), and finally, propaganda on German soil from 1627 to 1632.

During the first of these three phases, Gustavus concentrated B in addition to the production of coins and medals, which was to remain an important artistic practice throughout his reign B on the graphic arts. This interest may be attributed, on the one hand, to the lack of funds which limited the scope of royal patronage and, on the other, to the need for broad dissemination of the royal portrait. With just five images, Gustavus succeeded in propagating his principal political aims, and, through the mystical elevation of his own person in royal portraiture, in manifesting his claim to the status of dominium directum, constitutionally denied him by the konungaförsäkran. [12]

During the conflict with Vasa Poland, the king presented himself in Thrautman's engraving as the miles christianus, the Christian soldier, one of the most important topoi employed in the legitimisation of war. In van Sichem's work of 1617, the heir to the throne is shown shortly before his coronation in the role of princeps constitutus, or prince loyal to the constitution. In the engraving used in the Sweriskes Rijckes Stadz Lagh, a book of municipal law republished in 1617, Gustavus is depicted in his jurisdictional function (rex justus). Iconographically, this image draws on the traditions of both the David Rex and medieval royal portraiture, alluding on the idea of the king as the earthly image of Christ and God (rex imago Christi et Dei). The Bible engraving produced in 1618, on the other hand, depicts the function of the king under canon law as executor divinae. The map by Anders Bureus (1626) shows the king in his role as defender of the Fatherland, or defensor patriae, accepting the right of patronage and duty of protection over his kingdom.

The reciprocal obligation (obligatio reciproca) [13] between king and kingdom prescribed in the "Royal Assurance" of 1611 is clearly depicted in van Sichem's work. Here, the king is portrayed on equal terms with his kingdom, symbolised by the coats of arms of the various provinces. The arms not only frame the portrait, they also define the royal sphere of influence.

Considered in the light of the almost mystical elevation of the king in the Sweriskes Rijckes Stadz Lagh, the constitutionally imposed dominium utile appears quite inappropriate to the station of the monarch. In the Bible engraving, the king with imperial orb B the symbol of monarchic perfection B is shown breaking through an armorial frame. While in Bureus' work, the coats of arms serve a merely decorative function. This sequence of images reveals how the dominium utile of the young heir to the throne was transformed into the dominium directum of the military commander. They are images which parallel the actual political aspirations and development of the Swedish monarch.

Direct and unconditional authority over his subjects was a prerequisite for Gustavus' aspiration to turn Sweden into one of the major powers on the European continent; a vision which, given the associated risks and sacrifices, was unpopular both among the nobility and the broad mass of the population. Most of Sweden was therefore against any intervention in the Thirty Years' War. The numerous pamphlets warning of the enormous humanitarian and financial burdens which intervention would bring [14] convinced the king that, despite his increasing power, he would have to rely heavily on propaganda in order to realise this ambitious undertaking.

Thus, the second phase of Gustavus' policy towards the arts became necessary, a phase which was as rigid in its organisation as the images produced were manipulative in their content. True to the principle of constant repetition to increase the power of penetration, the king sought to combine oral, written and visual propaganda in one system. Every Swedish citizen was bound under fear of punishment B and the watchful eye of the clergy B to attend church services on what were known as "days of prayer and fasting". [15] During these services, prayers were offered and sermons given according to themes set by the king. The congregation were then read the texts of "prayer-day notices" prepared by Gustavus, which were also displayed in public places. Mindful of political developments, the king was carefully creating the notion of a papist and imperialist threat, fuelling the irrational fear that the imperial troops, which, following the defeat of Christians IV at Lutter am Barenberge in August 1626, had advanced as far as Jutland, could soon invade Sweden. Thus, Gustavus was able to present Swedish intervention in the Thirty Years' War on German soil as necessary for the protection of his own country. It is interesting to note here that, as well as taking the special church services, the clergy were also responsible for the raising of troops.

In order to be present "in person" during these services, Gustavus commissioned the artist, van Doordt, to develop a special portrait type which would be hung in every church (ill. 1). In keeping with the oral and written propaganda used on these occasions, this portrait type was free of any aggressively military overtone, depicting Gustavus in slashed doublet and armed with only a rapier B as the defender rather than the aggressor. The colour and form of his apparel are reminiscent of that of Luther, and would surely have been taken by contemporary viewers as an allusion to Luther's teachings on domestic life (the oeconomia), a work of extraordinary importance in Scandinavia and which provided the basis for all social interaction. [16] Gustavus presented himself in these portraits as the dux oeconomicus, or Lutheran father of the people, ready to defend his kingdom. [17] As Brahe states, the Swedish oeconomia demanded obedience on the part of the family and servants or subjects towards the master of the house or sovereign. Seen in this context, this portrait type B which was produced in vast numbers following the stadga of 1622 [18], the royal "review" of all Swedish painters B served as a tool in developing the support of the population.

The pressure of this massive propaganda initiative could not be withstood by the royal council for ever, and so, on the 12th of January 1628, Gustavus was finally granted leave to enter the Thirty Years' War on the 26th of June 1630 B a military campaign which would propel Sweden from being a nation of little or no significance to one of Europe's major powers.

Parallel to the propaganda campaign in Sweden, Gustavus began in 1627 to disseminate written "publicity" about himself in Germany, using experienced printers and propagandists such as Reusner, Adler Salvius or Sadeler. [19] Here, completely new propaganda arguments were required, given that Gustavus could neither be legitimised by the Protestant princes, careful to guard their neutrality, nor present himself as king demanding obedience from his subjects. What Gustavus needed in Germany was the support of the general population B unlike his position in Sweden where, as "king of the nobility", he depended above all on the favour of the aristocracy. He therefore sought to present himself to the German nation as the "people's king", offering a potent combination of proximity and sanctificatio ("sanctification") or even deificatio ("deification"). [20] For the educated classes, Gustavus legitimised his policies using the notion of the bellum justum, or just war. [21] This propaganda campaign, as strict as any military operation in terms of its planning and organisation, was a unique success. Gustavus attained a degree of popularity previously unheard of, becoming a cult figure enjoying widespread adulation. A contemporary epigram reflects the adoration showered on the king: "Deus heißt auf Teutsch Gott, und aus diesen vier Buchstaben kommet Sued." [22]

Given Gustavus' difficult legal position as a foreign king on German soil, propaganda was particularly important as a means of legitimising his campaigns of war. Within this propaganda, three distinct levels of justification can be found: the mystical, the religious and the political.

In keeping with the importance of quantity in his notion of repraesentatio maiestatis, Gustavus' favoured means of pictorial propaganda was the broadsheet, a medium which was both cheap and easy to distribute.

The mystical justification for war was developed using the idea of the "Lion of the North" [23], which, with its biblical, Rosicrucian and Paracelsian origins, presented the king as a charismatic saviour, ushering in a golden age of peace. The notion of the "Lion of the North", propagated by means of broadsheets as well as a wide variety of medals, developed to the level that it became an almost mystical symbol for the king. The image of the militia christiana was used to justify war on religious grounds as a bellum justum. [24] With the portrayal of the warrior as the miles christianus stretching back to the Middle Ages, the Swedish propagandists had a rich iconographical and typological palette at their disposal. A particular favourite was the theme of the "miles christianus on horseback", an image which depicted the virtues of the Christian knight, his triumph over carnal desires symbolised by the horse, with singular clarity. This imagery provided a context in which Gustavus' ambitions and plans could be presented using devices, emblems and the composition of the background. After his victory at the Battle of Breitenfeld in September 1631, the propaganda fidei took on a whole new dimension, with the king sanctified and deified as miles triumphans in work such as that by Oeder or the broadsheet Triumph (ill. 2). The perception of Gustavus as saviour also became more widespread through his portrayal as salvator ecclesiae or restitutor libertatis. The political legitimacy of his campaigns, on the other hand, was propagated through the depiction of his alliances with the Protestant princes [25], whereby, given the disputes concerning matters of authority between the allies, the Swedish propagandists sought to promote Gustavus' claim to absolute leadership, depicting him as capo of the corpus bellicum.

In the course of the capture (expugnatio) and occupation (occupatio) of the various cities, Swedish propaganda was cultivated along military lines and used as a means of manifesting Sweden's claims under the conventions of war. [26] In order to ensure the obedience of the populace to the new commander-in-chief and ruler of the city, the printers, all of whom were under Swedish control, were required to contribute to the sanctification of the "people's king". When a city was taken, its capture would first be described in the form of a quasi-military report, which was then followed by documentation of the actual occupation by the troops. Under martial law, the ius belli, this type of broadsheet served as a means of asserting military claims (assecuratio) and securing the obligation on the part of the populace to provide satisfaction (satisfactio), particularly in the form of financial contributions. [27]

Gustavus is portrayed in numerous broadsheets with a series of miniature views of captured cities, documenting the king's campaign of conquest in chronological order and asserting his claims under the conventions of war, or arma nostra in urbe vestra. [28] In some cases, the homage paid to Gustavus as civic ruler took the form of pseudo-documentary broadsheets, while others sought to sanctify the king.

The degree to which the adoration of Gustavus developed is clear from the text of a broadsheet documenting the occupation of Augsburg (ill. 3): "Geängstigt ward Augspurg die Stadt, Gott durch Gott ihr geholfen hat." [29] The deification of the king had evidently peaked with the acceptance of his actual divinity. This God-like status created, on the one hand, an absolutely uncritical obedience towards Gustavus and, on the other, a degree of expectation which was impossible to fulfil. The mystification and almost mythic representation of the king had now taken on proportions which were to prove extremely problematic.

The homage he enjoyed is also evident from the expensive gifts bestowed by the German cities, such as Hainhofer's famous cabinet, the busts by Petel, or the goblets presented by the city of Nuremberg with the form of a terrestrial and celestial globe B alluding to the notion of the king as ruler of the world.

In order to propagate his rights of sovereignty in terms of ius superioritatis [30], Gustavus ordered that his portrait be displayed in public buildings. Conscious of his difficult legal position as a Swedish king on German soil, a special portrait type was developed in which Gustavus was depicted purely in his military role as protector et patronus [31] of the conquered regions.

This portrait type is characterised by a martial pragmatism and simple arrangement of characteristic features (elk-skin waistcoat, commander's hat (in most examples), an accentuated air of gravitas [32], and corpulence as a symbol of his steadfastness). The portrait was easy for less talented artists to copy and could therefore be more widely distributed. City-arms or a panorama through an open window were among the devices used to create a specific local reference.

The popularity of Gustavus among the general population was expressed in the innumerable, less ambitious depictions of the king which appeared. The production of these objects B which in cities such as Augsburg and Nuremberg took on almost industrial proportions B was also a significant factor in overcoming the economic difficulties of wartime. Of particular note are the many miniature wax sculptures, which adapt the cult of beatification around Maximilian I to depict Gustavus as a man of piety [33], clear testimony of the religious exaltation with which the king was perceived.

The image of Gustavus as the "people's king" brought him a level of popularity never before enjoyed in Germany by any ruler. It also led, however, to the rather disrespectful treatment of him in the pages of many satirical broadsheets [34], where he was depicted as a tooth-drawer or barber-surgeon clothed only in a loincloth and raffia cap.

While the aim of these works may have been to mock the enemies of the Swedish monarch, they also threatened to undermine his own charisma and majesty.

The cult-like adoration of Gustavus reached its zenith with his "martyrdom" at the Battle of Lützen on the 6th (16th) of November 1632. The king's death was "marketed" by the Swedish propagandists using all the media of his repraesentatio maiestatis, the aim being to secure the continued support of the German populace and the Protestant princes for Swedish ambitions. [35]

The royal coinage and medals [36] produced during this period document in detail the specific characteristics of the king's policy towards the arts. The principal function of these objects was to be distributed as widely as possible, even if it meant that the highest standards of quality were lost in the process. The Swedes were careful to differentiate between the iconography used on coins in actual Swedish possessions and in territory which was only under occupation. When medals were awarded, however, the principal criteria as regards pictorial content was the social status and level of education of the recipient, the aim being to ensure that awards be seen as merited, thereby setting an example to others.

On coins and medals, the king was portrayed in archetypal fashion, using a simple arrangement of characteristic features. The reverse of coins and medals, on the other hand, varied greatly and B as with his painted and graphic portraits B were often used as a vehicle for the mystical elevation of the king, the legitimisation of war, manifestation of the ius belli, etc.

The warship Vasa is a particularly striking example of the combination of utility and aesthetics. This ship, with its didactic iconography confined to a relatively small number of continuously repeated motifs (there are over 50 depictions of lions alone), demonstrates the key principles of Gustavus' understanding of the function of art. [37]

The innovative approach to propaganda developed by Gustavus was a significant contributing factor in the realisation of his political aims. Without his repraesentatio maiestatis, which facilitated his intervention in the Thirty Years' War and, in Germany, won him the support of the broad mass of the population, Sweden's rise to become one of the great European powers would not have been possible. It should not be overlooked here that Gustavus was by no means a man who based his policies on personal conviction. His was a public image developed to suit the purposes of his propaganda alone. Educated according to the Paulinistic teachings of predestination, Gustavus actually regarded the common people as the "vulgus" and viewed them with suspicion. Criticising the masses he once wrote: "For it has no counsel, no reason, no power of discernment, no circumspection." [38] Thus, it was in spite of enormous personal reservation that he presented himself in Germany in the role of the "people's king".

We now turn to the impact of Gustavus' arts policy on Germany and Sweden, a policy for which he was prepared to deny his own instincts.

Firstly, I shall briefly examine the influence of Swedish policy towards the arts on German territory while Gustavus was alive. The king's enormous popularity also contributed to a massive increase in interest in his allies and enemies, who were now also portrayed in works which reached the broad mass of the population. A large number of broadsheets documented the cooperation between Gustavus, Johann Georg of Saxony and Georg Wilhelm of Brandenburg. The Swedish king also featured with Tilly and Wallenstein in Van Dyck's Iconography [39] B a series of engravings which were particularly popular in Germany. The general interest aroused in the contemporary princes and military commanders through their connection with Gustavus inspired numerous engravings and collections of royal prints, both in Germany and abroad. [40] These engraved portraits were also extremely popular as single prints.

Gustavus' military successes were an enormous boost to the confidence of the Protestant forces, which, prior to the Swedish intervention, had suffered a long series of defeats in the early stages of the Thirty Years' War. This new sense of self-assurance was expressed in innumerable satirical broadsheets which poked fun at the Catholic enemy and had an important "catalytic function" in a war characterised by massive military clashes.

The Swedish king's fondness for the broadsheet as a means of propaganda led to a period of blossoming for this particular medium comparable only with the Reformation. Prior to the Swedish intervention in the war, the German princes were, on the whole, rather sceptical about the broadsheet as a means of propaganda. However, the extraordinary success enjoyed by Gustavus soon saw other rulers turn to the broadsheet for their own purposes. In Tugendt vnd Laster Kampff, for example, the victory at the Battle of Breitenfeld is celebrated from the perspective of the German princes, while in Das Schwerdt des HERRN, the Saxon claims to leadership of the corpus bellicum with Sweden are propagated. [41]

Gustavus' popularity was a significant economic factor not just in the workshops of Nuremberg and Augsburg, it also helped engravers such as Kilian attain international fame and recognition. The engraving known as Kilian IV (ill. 4) [42] was, in fact, the most popular portrait of the king in Germany at that time.

The veritable flood of images which Gustavus channelled into Germany soon forced other rulers to consider their own repraesentatio maiestatis. It is interesting to note that, after 1630 the number of images of contemporary princes produced in Germany was significantly higher than prior to the Swedish intervention in the war. [43] And given that the example and military pragmatism evident in the portrayal of the king was a very effective aid in the difficult task of recruitment, other rulers were quick to appropriate the image of protector et patronus (compare, for example, the portraits of Johann Georg of Saxony or Maximilian I).

Even after the death of Gustavus, portraits of military commanders in the Thirty Years' War generally followed the example of the king in terms of simplicity and military pragmatism.



The repraesentatio maiestatis of Gustavus, fuelled by a desire for popular support in Germany, actually helped develop the political education of the populace thanks to the success of the Swedish propagandists in presenting difficult concepts such as the structure of the ius belli in such a way as to be understood by all. The result was that, for the rest of the Thirty Years' War, all warring parties were obliged to legitimise and document military events using pictorial propaganda geared for consumption by the general population. It is clear from Snoilsky's index [44] of broadsheets in the Royal Library in Stockholm, for example, that a disproportionate number of works were produced in the final, "French" phase of the war (1635-1648).

Despite its success, the cult of personality around Gustavus had one serious drawback. Following the death of the king, the Swedish propaganda machine found itself in a total vacuum. Faced with total reorientation of its political concepts, it would never again enjoy the same level of success as it had in the "Swedish" phase of the war (1630-1635). In order to ensure a measure of continuity throughout the remainder of the Thirty Years' War, Swedish propagandists were careful to avoid too close a link between the glorification of military commanders or princes and the presentation of specific events.

What influence did the propaganda and arts policy of Gustavus II Adolphus have on Sweden?

It is quite clear, that the principles developed by Gustavus concerning the use of the visual arts served Sweden as a European power not only during the years of the "trustee government" (1634-1644) and the reign of Christina (1644-1654), but even during the reign of Charles XII (1697-1718). It was only through Gustavus' policy towards the arts that the Swedish nobility discovered an interest in systematic pictorial self-presentation and the organisation of artistic activity within their own courts. [45] Illustrative of the approach taken by the nobilitas erudita was the motto Arte & Marte, "for art and war" [46], which, in the spirit of Gustavus, sought to unite artistic policy with military ambition. It was also the military nobility which represented Sweden abroad and dominated domestic politics, a situation which may be regarded as the result of Gustavus' efforts to turn Sweden into a "military monarchy". [47] In its portrayal of itself, the military nobility followed the martial and pragmatic approach developed by Gustavus B despite a more refined way of life through the increasing influence from France B as documented by the portraits of Hans Christoph von Königsmarck or even Charles XII as military commanders. Compared with contemporary work in other countries, these portraits come across as wholly anachronistic.

True to the principle of usefulness before aesthetic form, both the Swedish royal house and its nobility did not commission works from the major artists of the day, despite their enormous financial resources. Instead, they preferred to decorate their palaces with works of art plundered from abroad, a significantly cheaper alternative. Even the use of quantity in the portrayal of Gustavus was borrowed by the Swedish royalty and nobility, as demonstrated by the huge series of stereotyped portraits of military officers commissioned by Karl Gustav Wrangel for Skokloster castle. [48]

With its emphasis on simplicity and teaching by example, the concept of art established by Gustavus hindered the use of allegory, one of the characteristic features of baroque art. On the rare occasions when allegories were used, artists sought to render the imagery as simply and succinctly as possible. The results were often really rather comical, an example being Bourdon's title page for a book on history by Chemnitz, where the departed Gustavus, floating upon a cloud in the role of Hercules, passes the mace, the symbol of power and virtue, to his daughter Christina (ill. 5).

While it is clear that Gustavus' approach to the arts was a significant factor in the rise of Sweden as a major European force, it also brought about a distinct expansion in his own power. However, as far as the Swedish nobility were concerned, the royal sphere of influence was something to be reduced, not developed. [49]

Heeding the "warnings" of the use of art during the reign of Gustavus, the nobility were rigorous in combating the development of a mythical or mystical cult of personality around Christina or her successors. The state portraits of Christina or Charles X allude to the notion of nobilitas erudita and are characterised by a simple perception of majesty, avoiding any attempt at sanctificatio or deificatio.

In his development of the arts B a process characterised by his innovative approach to his repraesentatio maiestatis B Gustavus not only contributed to his own fame and paved the way for Sweden's rise as a leading European power, he also exerted a lasting influence on the notion of self-presentation and the perception of art among the nobility of both Germany and Sweden.

In contemporary art historical research, the arts policy of Gustavus II Adolphus is generally regarded with serious reservation, mainly due to the fact that it did not give rise to any of the "great" works of the period. If, however, one considers the impact this form of pictorial propaganda had on the population of the time, as well as the political successes it helped bring about, both for the king and for Sweden itself, it is reasonable to ask whether the view held by contemporary historians is justified.

FOOTNOTES